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SUMMARY
COPING WITH PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT \ E. GRAWERT & K. MIELKE 
This Working Paper addresses the situation of Afghans before, during and after 
their displacements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Its aim is: (1) to under-
stand how internally displaced lower-class Afghans, refugees who have  
returned and Afghan refugees staying in Pakistan and Iran perceive their  
current living conditions and what activities they pursue towards securing 
their families’ livelihood; (2) to establish the influence of socio- economic 
class dispositions on the displaced persons’ abilities and agency and on the 
strategic forging of networks in translocal space as a way of securing their 
livelihood, and (3) to contribute towards elaborating an analytical livelihood  
approach that can explain agency in protracted displacement situations 
caused by violent conflict—thereby going beyond established assumptions of 
migration and conventional refugee studies. 
The authors elaborate on the significance of translocal networks for Afghans 
as a livelihood pillar and consider ‘established–outsider relations’ as enabling 
condition. The authors argue that both dimensions are constitutive for a liveli-
hood approach that has analytical value in conflict contexts. The evidence- 
based identification of these two components for a comprehensive livelihood 
approach in displacement contexts should subsequently guide assistance to 
displaced people. Entry points are the support of translocal networks and col-
lective approaches to securing livelihoods (e.g. targeting extended families) 
and the equal consideration of host and (re)integration communities in assis-
tance programming. In the case of displaced Afghans, a support of translocal 
networks could amount to a ‘fourth durable solution’. 
The empirical data highlight the difference in livelihood options between lower- 
and middle-class Afghans. While lower-class Afghans generally have fewer  
options, some may be able to acquire skills and education during their displace-
ment and thus have a greater chance to secure their livelihood more sustainably 
in the future. Yet both are affected by national policy constraints and ethnic 
boundary-drawing that inhibit access to resources and assets and the chance 
of political participation in the host contexts of Iran and Pakistan. Currently, 
increasing violence in Afghanistan, heightened tensions and adverse policies 
against Afghans in Pakistan and Iran as well as restrictive European refugee 
policies contribute to the narrowing of livelihood options.   
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Translocal networks are a pillar of livelihood security 
for Afghans in protracted displacement
Strategic translocal networks enable additional 
livelihood options; the networks provide social  
arrangements for self-help of extended Afghan families 
and have become indispensable for securing their 
livelihood in protracted displacement situations. Long- 
established translocal networks, that have long been 
established and have amplified during the past forty 
years of violent conflict, therefore, constitute a liveli-
hood pillar rather than purely an option. Currently, 
these networks are massively under pressure. A con-
sequence of this is the decline of self-help capacities 
and agency, in particular among the lower class.
Gaining skills during displacement enables future 
social mobility for lower-class Afghans
Education and skills acquired during the dis-
placement phase/s are likely to have a positive effect 
on making a livelihood in the future.
In practical terms, i.e. how to apply  
findings to policies and operational 
assistance work
Support of transnational networks is necessary to  
enhance self-organizing capacity of displaced people
Refugee and aid policies as well as implementing 
agencies need to pay systematic attention to options 
that could enhance self-organizing capacities of dis-
placed persons on the move and in displacement and 
return contexts. This implies adapting measures to 
the logic of translocal networks and their context- 
specific role in sustaining a livelihood in conflict and 
protracted displacement situations. Currently, how-
ever, translocal networks do not always receive the 
same attention as other livelihood options. Likewise, 
established-outsider relations would be another point 
of intervention to apply leverage for support.
A safe legal status is a precondition
The provision of political entitlements to those 
who were born in Iran and Pakistan or have been liv-
ing there in the second or third generation as well as 
assuring access to land, housing and employment . 
would be the first step to create a sustainable liveli-
hood for lower-class Afghans.   
Conceptually, i.e. the application of a 
livelihood approach to violent conflict / 
protracted displacement
Translocal networks and accord within communities 
are crucial for securing livelihoods  
Securing a livelihood involves various activities 
of collectives or individuals) within their social envi-
ronment and social interaction in times of emergency 
with the aim of retaining the basis for resuming 
‘their way of life’ when the emergency is over. Two 
components are crucial for applying a livelihood  
approach to protracted displacement situations: 
Translocal networks as livelihood option and estab-
lished‒outsider relations as framing / enabling 
condition. 
Research and assistance must consider that people 
are under pressure to navigate local power structures  
The following aspects must be taken into account: 
(1) The significance of access to powerholders; (2) the 
ability to negotiate one’s family’s everyday existence 
in adverse conditions as one livelihood option; (3) the 
enabling role of the informal economy; and (4) the 
tension between enabling and inhibiting effects of 
the absence of the rule of law in the displacement 
and (re)integration environment.
 
In terms of content, i.e. how Afghans  
secure their livelihood
Social class affiliation determines livelihood prospects
Livelihood options of displaced persons differ  
considerably depending on their social class as the 
availability of assets, access to education and regular  
employment for individuals and their extended family 
vary. Lower-class Afghans who have less or no access 
to such options cannot secure their livelihood in the 
same way as middle-class Afghans can. Lower-class 
people mostly must do with network relations whose 
financial means at most allow them to survive in pre-
carious livelihood conditions and largely provide 
moral support. In contrast, the networks of middle- 
class Afghans are spatially and economically more 
diversified. 
Main findings
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a livelihood in protracted displacement situations. 
This serves to illustrate how the livelihood options of 
lower-class versus middle-class Afghans differ. We  
argue, second, that—in the case of Afghan–translocal 
networks are not only an important livelihood option, 
but constitute a pillar of livelihood due to the strategic 
nature of social networking and the translocal net-
works’ significance for securing livelihood (understood 
as ensuring a life in dignity at the concerned person’s 
or group’s own measure, see section ‘Applying a liveli-
hood approach …’). Third, we argue that in protracted 
displacement situations—no matter whether during 
or after displacement or return—local community  
relations between ‘settled’ (established) and ‘new-
comers’ (outsider) must be taken into account. The 
nature and quality of the established–outsider rela-
tions should be considered as it is highly significant 
for processes of inclusion vs exclusion, marginaliza-
tion and/or belonging at the location of interaction. 
Research questions and approach 
The agency of displaced Afghan people has already 
been the subject of a range of academic research, 
spanning about forty years of forced migration due to 
repeated surges of armed fighting and frequent inci-
dences of violence in Afghanistan and including the 
second- and third-generation of people born as dis-
placed abroad who have never been to Afghanistan. 4 
Whereas scholars focused on the Afghans’ transna-
tional networks that have emerged over the decades 
(Monsutti, 2005; 2008; Harpviken, 2014), in this Paper,  
we examine the role of translocal networks 5 as one 
4 \  Cf. among others Abbasi-Shavazi, 2012; Rohani, 2014; Noghani & 
Akhlaghi, 2014. According to informed estimates, about 90 per cent of 
all Afghans currently living in Pakistan were born in Pakistan during 
the years of refuge. Interview with NGO head implementing for UNHCR, 
Islamabad, 21 March 2017.
5 \  Throughout this Paper, we use the term translocal (networks or rela-
tions) to signify network relations between individuals at several loca-
tions which potentially transgress international borders but might 
also be limited to a large extent to one nation-state context. As with 
migration, any displacement (whether internal or across borders)  
exposes the displaced to new contexts and experiences that can be 
assumed to transform the respective individual, family or other social 
grouping (in potentially several respects), the ‘local’ (as expressed in 
translocal rather than mere ‘transnational’) deserves consideration, 
especially when analyzing patterns of agency and its contextual for-
mation. The choice of terminology does not contradict scholarly work 
that prefers to highlight the cross-border dimension, thus using the 
term ‘transnational’ (as Harpviken, 2014, Rouse, 1991, or Monsutti, 2005 
Afghanistan is synonymous with protracted violent 
conflict and displacement 1. Afghanistan’s wars have 
triggered waves of refugees during escalations of 
armed conflict and mass returns during declines of 
violence since the late 1970s. The neighbouring coun-
tries of Pakistan and Iran have hosted around five 
million Afghans throughout these decades, whereas 
the population of land-locked Afghanistan comes to 
an estimated 30 million plus. Throughout the pro-
tracted violent conflict, the lives of Afghans who were 
displaced across the borders and within Afghanistan 
have transformed considerably. When unconditioned 
aid declined massively after the end of the Cold War, 
they relied largely on their own abilities and agency. 2 
They attempted to integrate into certain locations 
temporarily or longer, find jobs and tried to ‘belong’. 
For decades, most Afghans have been coping with 
adverse conditions of living outside humanitarian 
supervision, acquiring a high degree of mobility so 
that families have become scattered in different loca-
tions inside and outside conflict areas within Afghan-
istan, Iran and Pakistan. Many Afghans support each 
other through networks of family members located 
inside and outside the country; some have done so 
for a long time, some only temporarily (Monsutti, 
2005). Circular displacement has become rampant; 3 
numerous Afghans secure their livelihood outside of 
what constitutes formal migration regimes.
This Paper elaborates how a livelihood approach 
can be meaningfully applied to analyse protracted 
conflict and displacement situations. The conceptual 
argument is made in three steps: First, underpinned 
by the hypothesis that attributes of positionality  
determine individuals’ ability to act and thus imply 
differences in moulding translocal social networks 
with regard to quality and shape, we introduce the 
variable of social class into the discussion on securing 
1 \  We consider protracted displacement along the lines of UNHCR which 
defines situations where more than 25,000 persons have been forced to 
stay abroad for five years or longer without any perspective for a solu-
tion as protracted refugee situations (UNHCR, 2004). Throughout this 
Paper, we use the term displacement to comprise refugees as well as 
internally displaced people (IDPs).
2 \  Aid flows accompanying the political and military interventions after 
9/11 2001 focused on reconstruction and development.
3 \  Cf. Monsutti (2005), who states that “recurrent multidirectional move-
ment” (p. 241) is the means by which Afghans have been securing their 
families’ livelihood for many decades. Accordingly, there are few family 
groups without at least one member abroad.
Introduction: Securing livelihood as a function of 
class, agency and translocal networks
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The empirical sections below address the following 
research questions:
   \  How do internally displaced lower-class Afghans, 
Afghan returnees and Afghans remaining in 
Pakistan and Iran—the countries that have 
been receiving the largest numbers of Afghan 
refugees—perceive their conditions of living 
and their social, economic and political context?
   \  How do they describe their activities towards 
securing their livelihood in protracted dis-
placement situations before, during and after 
having been displaced?
   \  Which efforts do lower-class Afghans undertake 
in situations of long-term forced displacement 
to secure their livelihood in the long run? 
Translocal networks as a livelihood  
option
‘Securing a livelihood’ denotes “maintaining the 
way of life” (Grawert, 1998, p. 2), i.e., ensuring life in 
dignity according to the particular social group’s own 
measure. In this sense, securing a livelihood is the 
cause and effect of the formation of translocal net-
works. Establishing new networks or making use of 
already existing translocal networks are important 
livelihood options for families in situations of eco-
nomic distress and—as we illustrate in this Paper—
protracted displacement. The networks can contribute 
to livelihood security through remittances, informa-
tion exchange, hosting—at least temporarily—further 
relatives and guiding them towards overcoming  
bureaucratic hurdles of all kinds. Translocal networks 
can enable young men to generate bridewealth and 
marry, thus providing future-oriented livelihood  
options from which other family members can benefit. 
Intermarriage with inhabitants of host communities 
can expand network support and thus increase the 
livelihood security for scattered family members (for 
Afghans in Iran, cf. Abbasi-Shavazi, 2012). Family 
members who have established themselves abroad 
use their knowledge of the local labour market and 
mobilize relationships with people from the same 
country or in the host community to find jobs for the 
newcomers in the foreign labour market. If this is not 
livelihood option among others for Afghans in pro-
tracted displacement situations. Accordingly, we  
endeavour to analyse the empirical material on dis-
placed Afghans within and outside Afghanistan with 
an academic livelihood approach. The Paper builds on 
earlier studies following Robert Chambers’ appeal to 
enable sustainable livelihoods as a development ap-
proach that safeguards the own agency of the rural 
poor, not least in order to reduce “distress migration” 
(Chambers, 1988, p. 11). Hence, from the outset, con-
cepts of livelihood have been linked to forced migration. 
We go a crucial step further by applying the livelihood 
lens to situations of protracted displacement, assum-
ing that this approach allows a better understanding 
of the agency of people in such situations. Moreover, 
as livelihood options are likely to differ according  
to social class, we look into the agency of lower-class  
Afghans and compare it with that of middle-class  
Afghans in the three countries. We further assume 
that the specific circumstances of protracted dis-
placement will yield indications for the necessity to 
refine the existing academic approach to livelihood 
studies. 
The various ways in which long-term displaced 
Afghans secure their livelihood as internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), as returnees within Afghanistan and 
as (first-, second- or third-generation) refugees in the 
regional neighbourhood of Pakistan and Iran provide 
the empirical basis on which the authors intend to 
develop the livelihood approach further for research 
on protracted displacement. We thus pose the over- 
arching research question: 
How could the existing academic approach to livelihood 
studies be extended or refined to apply it to situations of pro-
tracted displacement–with an analytical surplus value? Put 
differently, which dimensions need to be included in an aca-
demic livelihood approach that can comprehensively explain 
how people in protracted displacement situations secure their 
livelihood?
do); it is meant to specify the object of study more clearly and take 
into account the described process dimension of agency formation 
(constant ‘becoming’) during displacement trajectories. 
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refugee studies perspective. A household’s decision- 
making process for migration resembles a displaced 
household’s decision-making process for return. In 
both cases, there are rational reasons for ‘split house-
hold’ strategies with the subsequent development of 
‘transnational households’ (Harpviken, 2014, p. 58). 
There are some differences between the decision 
to migrate and the decision to flee due to imminent 
violence or being caught in a war zone, which does 
not allow a thorough planning and decision-making 
process. Nevertheless, those who escaped as refugees 
or IDPs may well be faced with similar situations as 
migrants when their displacement becomes protracted, 
because—like migrants—they will need to secure 
their livelihood in different places—including tempo-
rarily in the country of origin, moving in the so-called 
transnational migrant circuit (Harpviken, 2014; Rouse, 
1991). This suggests taking a perspective on people in 
protracted displacement situations that does not stress 
the differences between refugees, IDPs, returnees,  
deportees and migrants. The main argument of  
this Paper is that differences in class are much more 
relevant for the livelihood options open to displaced 
people. 
Entering positionality and class into 
livelihood analysis
Broadly defined as the ability to act, an individual 
actor’s agency encompasses the possible scope of  
action as a function of her or his own capacities vs. 
desires on the one hand and the external structural 
factors framing his or her everyday existence on the 
other (Houte et al., 2015, p. 693). 7 Such ‘external’ 
7 \  Translocal networks are not only the result of the agency of displaced 
people aiming to secure their own and their scattered families’ liveli-
hood. On the one hand, governments often have an interest in exporting 
or receiving migrants. Exporting migrants can be a strategy of govern-
ments to alleviate pressure on the domestic labour market. The refugees 
and migrants abroad can be used as a bargaining chip for negotiations 
about more aid or security support as unemployed returnees may 
cause unrest and put pressure on the domestic labour market. This in 
turn keeps aid agencies taking the responsibility of engagement and 
induces governments to support them as donors. On the other hand, 
governments hosting refugees and migrants, like Iran and Pakistan, 
can use them as a bargaining chip as well, in particular when they are 
illegal. According to international law, each state is obliged to take its 
citizens back if migrants are no longer wanted (Bradley, 2008). Hence, 
successful, they may move on after some time to 
places promising better opportunities. A further effect 
of translocal networks can be enhanced business ties 
across borders, which are likely to be perpetuated 
when the armed conflict subsides and parts of the 
family return. Translocal networks are a means of 
maintaining what people in protracted displacement 
situations consider a more or less appropriate way of 
life for their scattered families. If they do not succeed 
in achieving or re-gaining the desired way of life they 
may be able to pave the way for future generations. 
Hence, these future-oriented options of livelihood 
sustain and reproduce translocal networks. 
Especially in times of emergency, social groups 
mobilize extended relations to secure their livelihood. 
These relations have been termed ‘livelihood network’ 
and include all persons and collectives that participate 
in securing the livelihood of a selected group or family. 
People’s social interconnections or livelihood networks 
are thus a crucial part of people’s agency towards 
livelihood security. Livelihood networks are dynamic 
and change through shocks and other political, eco-
nomic, social or cultural influences, which often have 
the effect of closing options or opening new ones and 
narrowing or widening networks (Grawert, 1998,  
pp. 10‒20; 153‒176; Grawert, 1998a). 
Securing livelihood in violent conflicts 
and protracted displacement situations
The empirical insights presented below confirm 
and build on earlier extensive research on Afghans’ 
translocal networks that suggested that the pattern 
of chain migration not only pertains to labour  
migrants, but also to displaced people. 6 With its  
attention on how Afghans secure their livelihood in 
protracted displacement situations, this Paper thus 
shifts the focus from livelihood and translocal net-
works in migration studies towards a conflict and/or 
6 \  Usually it is difficult to distinguish people who arrived as refugees and 
were faced with protracted displacement situations from migrants; 
the distinction is merely a function of legal status. Scholars, therefore, 
have proposed to consider more strongly the similarities between  
migration and protracted displacement situations. Subsequently, our 
analysis disregards status ascriptions of Afghans as refugees or labour 
migrants because these categories inevitably become blurred in pro-
tracted displacement situations (Monsutti, 2005, p. 20).
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factors incorporate the nature of the immediate envi-
ronment of settlement—whether in a displacement 
situation, after return or in transit. Hence, livelihood 
options also depend on the enabling and disabling 
effects of established settler vs newcomer relations 
(what we introduce in the section ‘Applying a liveli-
hood approach …’ as ‘established–outsider relations’). 
If translocal networks are factored in, agency of dis-
placed people can be described as a function of trans-
local positionality (Anthias, 2008); agency manifests 
in translocal modes of living that vary in different  
degrees of emplacement and belonging8 and, subse-
quently, may lead to de facto integration—or not.9
Moreover, if translocal networks or households 
are viewed to encompass more than just bidirectional 
movement and exchange, where practices of em-
placement in one location do not replace the other 
but complement it, it has to be acknowledged that 
translocal modes of living also affect the surrounding 
context (Greiner, 2010, p. 137; Smith, 2011, p. 187; Anthias, 
2009, p. 12), i.e. the local neighbourhoods of origin,  
return and current residence. While this has been 
pointed out in particular in the literature on the  
migration–development nexus (Benz, 2014; 
Nyberg- Sorensen et al., 2002), scholars have also 
shown that development and social mobility (of new 
arrivals as well as ‘established’) in the migration, re-
turn or residence context is not an automatic 
governments can use migrants to put pressure on the ‘sending’ gov-
ernment towards agreements (e.g. to take migrants back to get aid). 
International political relations hence have a strong impact on the 
growth or decline of translocal networks and thus on their viability as 
a livelihood option.
8 \  Belonging marks the emotion-laden process of situating oneself as 
individual or group (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2012, p. 12); it encompasses prac-
tices of locality-generation, which produce “a structure of feeling … 
(by) particular forms of intentional activity and yielding particular 
sorts of material effects” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 182). According to Anthias 
(2006, p. 21), it is “through practices and experiences of social inclusion 
that a sense of a stake and acceptance in a society is created and main-
tained”. The different degrees of emplacement and belonging can also 
be described as multidimensional embeddedness (cf. Houte et al., 2015). 
If the creation of belonging is understood as a laborious act that,  
besides emplacement practices, also always encompasses boundary- 
making practices, it is obvious that the outcome is uncertain and  
dependent on multiple factors, not least structural (context) condi-
tions (cf. Mielke, 2016). 
9 \  See Mielke (2016) on the example of traditionally mobile groups in 
Kabul’s camps in a state of liminality, i.e. between seeking to belong 
through locality-generating practices and to (re)integrate in Afghan 
society vs. certain context-producing effects or structural conditions 
that increasingly prevent social mobility and de facto integration.
consequence of movement. 10 Thus, an individual is 
structurally situated or socially positioned and can 
generate a certain ability to position him- or herself 
in the respective context. In translocal networks, posi-
tionality (situatedness & situating, cf. Anthias, 2006) 
and, thus, agency, is determined by different factors 
such as age, gender, class, socio-economic status,  
ethnic belonging, education, legal status/ citizenship, 
whether voluntary or involuntary (forced and / or de-
ported) return or migration has been experienced, etc. 
Social class constitutes an important marker of 
positionality and thus informs agency, which is seen 
as a determining factor for the extent to which liveli-
hood can be secured and its quality. The concept of 
social class contains power relations that establish 
and consolidate inequality in ownership and access 
to land, capital, influential positions and sustained 
employment (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980). In Afghani-
stan, equality of citizens is institutionalized norma-
tively in the constitution, but in fact, is undermined 
by competing norms and practices rooted in patriar-
chal gerontocracy and patron–client relations with 
elements of feudal relations that normatively estab-
lish inequality. 11 Ethnic, cultural, religious and home-
land identities conceal class affiliation at least in sub-
jective perceptions (Tapper, 1983). Nevertheless, in 
this Paper, the authors endeavour to compare the live-
lihood options of lower- and middle-class Afghans, 
assuming that class differences have become more 
pronounced in the context of rapid urbanization, ex-
treme mobility and protracted displacement of large 
parts of the population due to wars and economic 
needs. In the context of countries like Afghanistan, 
where hardly any industrial or agricultural working 
class has emerged, ‘lower class’ mainly comprises the 
low-income groups of workers and self-employed out-
lined by the International Labour Organization (ILO 
& Samuel Hall, 2012) and those groups that Standing 
(2014) has termed the “precariat”, that is, those work-
ing and self-employed people who are denied labour 
rights and social services. The authors trace empirical 
10 \  Van Houte, (2015, p. 701), for example contradicts this assumption of 
the migration–development nexus for the transnational context.
11 \  For the difference between normative inequality based on privilege 
and inequality that requires sociological research cf. Offe & Wiesent-
hal (1980, p. 68).
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manifestations of lower-class Afghans not only within 
Afghanistan but also across borders. By focusing on 
the different ways, lower-class people secure their 
livelihood, and by contrasting this with insights from 
middle-class livelihood options in the same settings, 
we elaborate a comprehensive livelihood approach to 
protracted displacement situations.
Remarks on methods of field research
The research presented in this Paper is based on 
field visits, observations and discussions with  
Afghans from various backgrounds in the cities of  
Kabul and Herat in Afghanistan, Mashhad (urban) 
and Sirjan (rural) in Iran and Karachi and Lahore in 
Pakistan between October 2015 and March 2017 (see 
Map 1). With in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions, we contribute to knowledge on protracted 
displacement situations, presenting explanations 
that IDPs, returnees, refugees and deportees give for 
their decisions, actions, ideas, desires and criticism. 
Social research12 is difficult in Afghanistan, Iran 
and Pakistan for reasons such as inaccessibility of  
areas due to insecurity, political sensitivities when it 
comes to the subject of refugees and formal proce-
dures when acquiring research permits. In addition, 
research involving lower class Afghan refugees in  
Pakistan and Iran or displaced inside Afghanistan  
often means encountering particular practices—
starting from the very ‘illegal’ existence in cases 
where Afghans do not possess legal documents or 
other documentation that are acknowledged in the 
country of residence—that render data collection  
especially sensitive and the protection of respondents 
an additional challenge. It is mainly for these reasons 
that we preferred qualitative methods of research. 
However, another reason is that for our purposes, 
quantitative figures are questionable in at least two 
12 \  “What is working well in protracted displacement situations?” is the 
guiding question of the research project “Protected rather than prot-
racted. Strengthening refugees and peace” conducted at BICC with 
financial support of the German Federal Ministry of Economic Coope-
ration and Development (BMZ). Within its framework, a team of rese-
archers has been conducting case studies of South Sudanese and Con-
golese, Burundians and Somalians, Columbians and Venezuelans, 
Syrians, Palestinians and Iraqis, Myanmaris, Liberians und Sierra Leo-
neans (Bohnet et al., 2015; Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015; for South Sudanese, 
see Bohnet, 2016 and 2016a; for Myanmar, see Rudolf & Schmitz-
Pranghe, 2018) to which this Paper adds the case of Afghans.
 
respects: First, a lot of data that humanitarian agencies 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have col-
lected tend to be ‘snapshots’ or quantitative according 
to criteria relevant for the distribution of aid (Mielke, 
2017). Second, numbers and figures are not reliable in 
the local context 13, especially given that respondents 
tend to have no clear ideas about time and quantities 
or because they try to hide knowledge and information, 
especially regarding possession of property or received 
assistance to make themselves eligible for aid or other 
forms of assistance. 
We used snowball and purposive sampling to cover 
different groups varied according to age, gender, ethnic 
belonging and social class and focused the discussions 
with the interview partners on forms of agency (see 
list of interviews in Appendix II). For this Paper, we 
highlight a few cases that represent different protracted 
displacement situations for an analysis of how varied 
social groups that have to cope with displacement  
secure their livelihoods.
Structure of the Paper
We provide the accounts related to these cases in 
detail in Chapter 1. The case studies cover lower-class 
and underprivileged displaced people across the region, 
in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Each reported account 
is followed by an analysis of the respective individuals’ 
and groups’ experiences with regard to their livelihood 
activities, neighbourhood relations and translocal net-
works. The second chapter reflects on the differences 
in livelihood options and ways of pursuing livelihood 
security between the lower class and members of the 
Afghan middle class in protracted displacement situa-
tions in the region. The third chapter outlines the 
comprehensive livelihood approach that we suggest 
adopting for future research on situations of protracted 
displacement and outlines implications for refugee 
studies and policies. The final chapter summarizes the 
arguments made throughout the Paper. For readers’ 
background information, we provide a detailed over-
view of the refugee policies towards Afghans in Iran 
and Pakistan in the Appendix. 
13 \  For an overview of challenges relating to data deficits in urban contexts 
of Afghanistan, see UN Habitat, 2015, pp. 50–52.
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This chapter introduces various ways of securing 
a livelihood by lower-class Afghans. It collects case 
studies from IDPs living in irregular settlements 
(camps) in Kabul, from a deportee camp and an IDP 
camp in Herat, from pistachio pickers in rural Iran, 
poor workers and families in Mashhad, Iran, as well 
as in Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan. The majority of 
Afghans—either first- or second-generation—in pro-
tracted displacement situations, originate from rural 
Afghanistan. According to World Bank estimates, 73 
per cent of the Afghan population still live in rural 
settings today (World Bank, 2016). 14 The first example 
of lower-class people in protracted situations of dis-
placement is elaborated extensively, as it contains 
numerous aspects that also pertain to many other 
lower-class Afghans. The example shows that the 
same person can be an IDP, a refugee, a labour mi-
grant and a returnee repeatedly over time. This fun-
damentally questions a static perspective on people 
coping with protracted violent conflict and hence, 
the distinction between particular ‘target groups’ 
that informs the action of humanitarian agencies.
In irregular settlements in Kabul
Afghanistan’s violent conflicts surged between 
2014 and 2017. In 2016, about 600,000 persons and in 
2017, more than 445,000 people fled their homes due 
to armed conflict (UNAMA, 2017; UNOCHA, 2018). At 
the time of field research, in 2015 to 2016, more than 
40,000 IDPs were estimated to be staying in about 50 
‘camps’ in Kabul, among tens of thousands who were 
not allotted the label of IDP. The term ‘camp’ indicates 
that these are state-owned or private areas used for 
temporary housing (cf. Mielke, 2016). Occasionally, 
the police evict camps on behalf of influential indi-
viduals for private land use or for the establishment 
of a market in a municipality (Majidi, 2013). In ten out 
of the 22 districts of Kabul, irregular houses exceed the 
number of regular buildings; in eight out of these ten 
districts, there are more than 10,000 and in four dis- 
 
14 \  Afghanistan has seen unprecedented levels of urbanization not only 
since 2001 but even before that, during the decades of conflict. Where-
as only five percent of the population lived in cities in 1950, it was 20 
percent in 2001, which increased to 24 percent by 2014 (Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2015, p. 10).
Livelihood accounts of lower-class Afghans
tricts more than 20,000 irregular houses. A high 
number of poor people live in these camps, which are 
densely populated (GIRoA, 2015, p. 52). 15 Among the 
urban poor, numerous IDPs inhabit the camps. Their 
number has been on the rise since 2015.
In 2015, the European Civil Protection and Human-
itarian Aid Operations (ECHO) stopped funding  
humanitarian aid to the camps and so did the German 
Welthungerhilfe as a major implementing agency in 
Afghanistan, as they considered the camp population 
no longer to be a humanitarian, but a “chronic” case 
(interview with Dr Fashid and Mr Berger, Welthunger- 
hilfe, November 2015). This decision terminated previous 
measures addressing health, education and skills  
development for women as well as psychosocial proj- 
ects in the irregular settlements of Kabul. Only the 
most vulnerable people would receive wood, fuel and 
food during winter provided by a task force consisting 
of Islamic Relief, the World Food Programme and the 
Danish Refugee Council (interview with Welthunger-
hilfe, November 2015). 
An oral history account of a displaced man and 
his aunt who both live in an irregular settlement in 
Kabul is presented here at length, as it provides in-
sights into nearly all facets of life in ‘protracted  
refugee situations’ from the perspective of people from 
a low social class. They explain how the family left 
Afghanistan and kept moving on until they got to 
this camp, how they have been making a living, and 
which relationships they have had with the popula-
tion in the neighbourhood of the places they had 
stayed in. 16 
Irregular camp in Kabul
Tapa Bagrami 2 is part of Nasaji Bagrami in Kabul 
police district PD 8. It is an irregular camp 17 located 
in an industrial area opposite the Coca-Cola factory, 
where most premises are stores for construction ma-
terial supplies or factories. The camp consists of small, 
densely constructed mud houses with roofs partly 
covered with plastic sheets. Narrow pathways run 
15 \  In these districts, the population density reaches 25 up to 35 dwellings 
per residential hectare (GIRoA, 2015, p. 52).
16 \  As the interview partner put it, “we are illiterate and do not remember 
date and time”; therefore, throughout the following sections, years are 
derived from events we were told, aided by the research assistant.
17 \  Visited in November 2015.
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informal economy (Schoofs, 2015; Grawert et al., 2017, 
p. 27). These power relations affect even the poorest 
dwellers in the irregular settlements of Kabul.
INTERVIEW 1—PART 1
The interview partner represents 26 families. He 
reports that there are two more representatives of 
families in the camp, who have problems with each 
other. They always try to find some organization to 
provide things for them, but they do not “have a way”. 
The night before the interview, a baby had died of  
hypothermia due to the lack of heating. Many older 
women were consoling the family and therefore 
could not meet us for an interview.
Origin and first movement: From a village in Kapisa 
to a village in Nangarhar:The representative’s family 
belongs to the Pashtun Safi tribe. 19 It originates from 
Kapisa (north of Kabul), where the parents had been 
farm labourers in a village in Tagab district without 
owning a plot or house. Six related families left Kapisa 
by bus during the civil war [1990–1994] and spent about 
three years in a village near Jalalabad. The adult family 
members worked as land labourers there and managed 
to save some money, which they planned to use when 
moving on to Pakistan. When one relative was killed 
in a bomb attack there, the six families left and 
walked across the mountains on foot until they 
reached a place called ‘Tal’ near Peshawar in Pakistan.
Second movement: A village near Peshawar, Pakistan 
The six families did not know anybody in this area. 
The family heads contacted the representative of the 
area and asked him to give them a place to stay. He 
allocated them a plot near a refugee camp that was 
registered with the government of Pakistan. There, 
they built a shelter and, later, mud houses. Those living 
in the refugee camp received small kits and food  
rations. However, the six families were not registered 
in the refugee camp. The interview partner states: 
“Only those with power could register, those without 
power could not” and explained that ‘those with power’ 
were around ten or twenty Afghan families who had 
 
19 \  A major part of the Safi tribe lives in Mohmand Agency and Bajaur of 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan– 
Afghanistan border, where they have extended networks (see CAMP, 
2010).
through the settlement. There is no sewage system, 
so the waste from ‘toilets’ runs behind the houses. A 
few chickens are roaming between the houses, and at 
the edge of the settlement at the foot of a hill (tapa), 
cows and goats are grazing on scarce grass. The settle-
ment contains more than 150 families. 
The inhabitants have built their houses them-
selves from the clay ground, using wood, scrap metal, 
plastic and other waste materials. Rain damages the 
houses so that the inhabitants are always busy  
repairing them, digging out more clay with spades 
and wheelbarrows. The camp is an irregular settle-
ment where IDPs set up homes in 2010 without being 
registered.
Aid agencies have surveyed and clustered the in-
habitants to facilitate the distribution of materials 
such as stoves, wood and charcoal for cooking and 
heating, blankets, bedsheets, carpets and sleeping 
mats. For this purpose, three elected persons repre-
sent the camp population as members of the camp 
council and contact persons for the aid agencies.
The persons interviewed in Tapa Bagrami 2 camp 
in Kabul experienced several incidences of internal 
displacement, became refugees and returned volun-
tarily and spontaneously to Afghanistan more than 
once. People that are not taken care of by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
have to seek their livelihood on their own, and liveli-
hood options for poor, unskilled people only exist in 
the so-called informal economic sector. Micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises prevail in this sector 
and usually maintain a considerable degree of self- 
organization. 18 They often follow particular regulations 
emanating from informal institutions (Wilde & Mielke, 
2013). Nevertheless, in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings as in Afghanistan, power holders including 
state officials engage with the informal economy in 
complex ways, often entailing negotiated arrangements 
over taxation or regulatory policies. State officials 
may pursue informal economic activities themselves, 
having vested interests in mechanisms that fuel the  
 
18 \  The Afghan Ministry of Commerce and Industries estimates that 70 
to 80 per cent of SMEs are not formally registered because of their fear 
of bureaucracy and corruption (Mashal, 2014, p. 10).
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representatives “making contact with aid agencies” 
and then were allowed to be registered. 20 Moreover, 
the six families were never registered in Pakistan, as 
identity cards were not required at that time. In the 
words of the interview partner, “refugees were free”.
The six families made friends in the refugee camp 
and prayed in its mosque. They met many people  
because they lived near the road leading to the refu-
gee camp. Soon, the male family members found jobs 
as day labourers. The interview partner and some of 
his relatives got small carts to carry goods to the mar-
ket. He earned about 20 Rupees (US $0.65) per day. 
Other family members sold vegetables or worked as 
shop assistants. After some time, the interview partner 
also became a shop assistant, and later he worked as a 
vegetable trader. His brother brought the vegetables 
from nearby farmers, and the interview partner sold 
them. It was a small business. His two other brothers 
also were vegetable traders. Then the two brothers 
died with all their children and wives in an accident. 
Four families remained.
Analysis I : Family bonds and livelihood options;  
exclusion from the refugee camp and integration in the 
local ‘informal economy’21 
This part of the story indicates a strong inclination  
towards joining forces in extended families, even during  
displacement. Where possible, families seek support from 
aid agencies; where not, they take up occasional jobs in 
transport or trade and similar small businesses. This  
includes the children who have to contribute to the family’s  
 
 
20 \  This statement might hint at the dominance of one mujahedin faction 
in the refugee camp, to which the six families did not belong. The con-
tact might in fact well have been made with the mujahidin, not aid 
agencies.
21 \  According to ILO (2016), “the informal economy comprises half to 
three-quarters of all non-agricultural employment in developing 
countries. … It most often means poor employment conditions and is 
associated with increasing poverty. Some of the characteristic features 
of informal employment are lack of protection in the event of non- 
payment of wages, compulsory overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without 
notice or compensation, unsafe working conditions and the absence of 
social benefits such as pensions, sick pay and health insurance. Women, 
migrants and other vulnerable groups of workers who are excluded 
from other opportunities have little choice but to take informal 
low-quality jobs.”
livelihood in the low social strata. The death of male family 
members always strikes a heavy blow on the family’s liveli-
hood options. The story also contains a narrative of exclu-
sion through influential people, who considered this family 
not eligible for being included in the camp. The fact that a) 
the government of Pakistan did not insist on registering ref-
ugees at that time, b) Pashto was spoken as the common 
language in the receiving area and c) the ease of building  
relations with other Afghan refugees from the camp contrib-
uted to a rather easy integration in the local informal economy 
(cf. also Grawert et al., 2017a, pp. 30–34).  
 
Interview 1—Part 2
Third movement: Back to Nangarhar, Afghanistan: 
The four families returned to Jalalabad when the mu-
jahedin 22 had toppled the government of Najibullah, 
and Burhanuddin Rabbani became President [1992–
1996]. They stayed with other relatives in a refugee 
camp in Samarkhail near the town for some days but 
were not registered by the UNHCR. As they had come 
with their own tents from Pakistan, the four families 
stayed in their tents. Many IDPs from Tagab district 
in Kapisa region and Kandahar lived in the camp, 
which was big and still exists. The families tried to 
find jobs. The interview partner made bricks for a  
person who built a house in Jalalabad.
Fourth movement: To Punjab, Pakistan: About one 
month after the Taliban had taken over power in  
Kabul [1996], the interview partner and members of 
three related families left Afghanistan again and 
moved to Mansehra, Abbottabad, in Punjab. Some  
relatives remained in Jalalabad, among them his elder 
brother and mother. The four families rented a house 
in Mansehra. They gathered scrap metal and other 
things and sold them at the market. The contact with 
the Punjabis improved after the family members had 
picked up the language, Urdu. However, they were  
always treated as refugees, not as equals.
22 \  Mujahedin groups spearheaded jihad against the Soviet occupation 
forces in Afghanistan until their withdrawal in 1989. They comprised 
seven Sunni groups operating from Peshawar, Pakistan, which also 
formed the interim government of Afghanistan in 1992. Afghan refu-
gees in Pakistan and local commanders only qualified for assistance  
if they affiliated with and showed loyalty to one of the seven groups 
(Adamec, 2006, p. 265).
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how to build properly. [He mentions that therefore 
his house in Tapa Bagrami 2 is built well and is used 
to receive guests visiting the camp]. 
Sixth movement: Back to Nangarhar, then to Kabul:  
In around 2005, the interview partner returned to 
Jalalabad city, where he rented a house. He, however, 
was not able to find a job there. Therefore, he moved 
to Kabul with parts of his extended family. 
Analysis III: Family decision to return and to split up for 
livelihood security; skills acquisition abroad
The family network of the interview partner in Afghanistan 
encourages voluntary return to Afghanistan of the partial fam-
ily. The family splits up further as the men move to towns and 
start to support the family members left in the camp with their 
earnings. The movement expands to Iran, where the family net-
work has already extensions. Here, the man acquires new build-
ing skills which he makes use of after having moved to Kabul. 
The family has become involved in circuit migration 24 and has 
established a translocal network to secure their livelihood in a 
protracted refugee situation. There is only a very fine line  
between being an IDP or refugee and an irregular migrant.
Interview 1—Part 4 
Movement within Kabul: The family moved to Nasaji 
Bagrami in PD 8, to Qalai Ahmad Khan, an area behind 
the Coca-Cola factory where several IDPs had settled 
with tents. However, people attacked the IDPs, stole 
their belongings and destroyed their tents. The prob-
lem was that an organization of disabled people in-
tended to build houses for the disabled in the same 
area. The two groups had a fight; a camp inhabitant 
was beaten up by some of the disabled. The IDPs of 
Qalai Ahmad Khan called a council meeting (shura) 
and decided to attack the camp of the disabled. The 
24 \  From a global perspective, Afghans have established “a single com-
munity spread across a variety of sites” (Bammer, 1992, p. ix); a “trans-
national migrant circuit” (Rouse 1991, p. 14), where different locations 
play different roles. In Pakistan, there are places where Afghans have 
sought refuge among relatives in or around refugee camps when they 
were expelled from Iran or driven out of Afghanistan due to fighting. 
Iran offers better income opportunities and hence, is chosen as a place 
to earn money, even though living conditions in Iran are precarious 
due to the absence of international aid, in contrast to Pakistan  
(Harpviken, 2014).
Analysis II: Return—But not to the area of origin; repeated 
displacement; livelihood options in the informal economy; 
experience of exclusion from host community
Returning with their families to Afghanistan as soon as 
the political conditions changed has been common for many 
Afghans. As the families have no home they can return to, 
they pursue the same strategy as in Pakistan and settle with 
their own tents near a refugee camp. Again, they engage in 
occasional jobs. Political change–which was accompanied by 
violent fighting–drove part of the family out of the country 
again, to an area in Punjab Province (Pakistan), where they 
could make a living in the informal economy. This time, the 
language difference contributed to a feeling of exclusion from 
the host community; the families remained outsiders in this 
part of Pakistan. 
 
Interview 1—Part 3
Fifth movement: Back to Afghanistan, then to Iran, 
and back: After the US-forces had helped to remove 
the Taliban government [2001] and the interim admin-
istration headed by Hamid Karzai [2002] had taken 
over power, relatives in Afghanistan informed the 
families that Afghanistan was safer, and hence they 
decided to return to Afghanistan. 23 They were not 
part of a repatriation programme, but the UNHCR 
registered them when they crossed the border from 
Pakistan to Afghanistan. 
In 2004, the interview partner went to Kunduz, 
where he stayed in a rented house and worked as a 
casual labourer to send money for food for the family, 
which remained in the camp near Jalalabad. One 
brother went to Jalalabad city, another to another vil-
lage, where he stayed with his in-laws. The interview 
partner then travelled to Tehran, where he stayed 
with some relatives for about three months. He  
reports: “In Tehran, everything is clean. People’s  
behaviour is good. They are smart and soft-speaking.” 
He assisted his relatives in construction and learnt 
 
23 \  Between 2002 and 2004, Karzai had announced that the government 
would allocate land to returnees. He appealed to them as being  
Afghans who should return and join in the rebuilding of the country.
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Interview 1—Part 5 
Movement of the aunt and her family branch: The fam-
ily of the interview partner’s aunt had not joined the 
six related families, but moved to Kunduz during the 
civil war [1992–1996]. However, ‘mujahedin’ came to 
their house and forced the men to join the armed 
group and fight. She lost two brothers and a nephew 
in the war. The family left Kunduz and went to 
Shimali (north of Kabul), where they stayed during 
the Taliban rule [1996–2001]. Her husband did every 
kind of unskilled work, whereas she worked in vege-
table production on the land of others. However, in 
winter there was no work. They moved to Jalalabad 
and stayed in a place called ‘Taranuta’ near the town 
during winter, where her husband worked as a casual 
labourer. In summer, they went back to Charikar in 
Parwan province north of Kabul. They always stayed 
“in a tent like a Kuchi” 25. [After the US intervention in 
2001], they left Jalalabad and went to Tagab in the Kapisa 
region. There was fighting between the government 
and the Taliban. Insecurity was severe under the rule 
of Karzai. She was injured during a bomb attack. 
Since then, she has “memory gaps”. She re-joined her 
nephew only after he had arrived in Kabul in 2010. 
Analysis V: Precarious livelihood options with severe  
impact of death and injuries of family members
The story of the aunt, who remained an IDP throughout, 
nevertheless resembles the story of the rest of the family with 
regard to continuous re-combinations of livelihood options in 
casual work in rural and urban environments. Death and inju-
ries also strongly shape the conditions under which this part of 
the family is trying to secure their livelihood. The strength of 
family ties is evident as she joined with other parts of the dis-




25 \  The term ‘Kuchi’ popularly denotes Pashto-speaking groups of former 
and current (semi-)nomadic herders. A 2003 government survey estab-
lished the number of Kuchi in Afghanistan to be approximately 2.4 
million, of whom 1.5 million were reported to be still migrating with 
livestock (Weijer 2007, p. 12). Offsetting these numbers with the esti-
mates for the overall population of Afghanistan in the same year, it 
turns out that 10.5 per cent of the entire Afghan population are Kuchi 
and that 6.3 percent of the population are migratory pastoralists.
head (rais) of the organization of the disabled had an 
office and a bodyguard and intended to distribute 
plots to the disabled or sell them to others. However, 
people from the neighbouring communities attacked 
both the IDPs and the disabled and destroyed their 
camps. The contested land belongs to the Ministry of 
Finance, which sent the police to clear the land from 
all inhabitants. The interview partner’s family—still 
six or seven relatives—settled across the road in the 
industrial area, where gradually about 150 IDP families 
established the current camp. Now the land behind 
the Coca-Cola Company is protected by the police. 
Analysis IV: Violent competition among marginalized 
groups and movement from camp to camp; violent  
displacement by the police on behalf of a power holder; 
lack of governmental policy
The displacement from one irregular settlement to the 
other in Kabul has been a common feature for the poor of  
Kabul. In this case, two disadvantaged groups are competing—
and do not hesitate to use violence—for a place to settle 
down. The harsh action by the police and thus, the govern-
ment, points to a larger problem regarding irregular land  
seizures by powerholders and a lack of policies towards a 
solution for the issue of irregular settlements in Kabul and 
beyond (cf. also Mielke & Grawert, 2016; Mielke, 2016). The 
Ministry for Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) has not 
taken action despite numerous petitions by IDPs; the gov-
ernment refuses to connect the settlements to the town’s  
infrastructure because they are irregular. Aid agencies have 
proposed to turn to advocacy measures and establish dia-
logue platforms to support the cause of the poor. However, 
the MoRR has tightened the control of NGO activities 
claiming that any regularization or improvement will  
become a pull factor, enlarging the ‘camps’ even more 
(interview with Welthungerhilfe, November 2015).
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job opportunities for my sons. The government should 
pay attention and offer places for work.” Her sons try to 
earn some money washing cars outside the camp and 
get about 15 AFN (US $0.22) per car, like many other 
boys from the camp starting from the age of ten. ‘Legal’ 
car washers earn 200 AFN (US $2.95) per car.
The interview partner never attended school and 
runs a small unregistered transportation business, 
pushing small carts to deliver goods to shops in the 
nearby market. He had acquired practical skills from 
different jobs in construction and small business 
abroad. He is not yet married. Being the youngest son in 
the family, he had lived with his mother–who died in 
2013–and his sister until the time of the interview. In 
the meantime, 25 related families from the same area of 
origin in Kapisa region have moved to the IDP camp. 













Livelihood options of the camp population at the time of 
field research (November 2015): The livelihood of the inter-
view partner in the camp consists of aid supplies and 
casual labour. Occasional assistance comes in the 
framework of a UNHCR winterization programme and 
food distribution by the MoRR. A project of the German 
GIZ against youth radicalization has involved him as a 
football trainer. Tapa Bagrami 2 is the first place where 
he receives aid after all the years of displacement. His 
aunt was given a document that entitles her to some 
financial reward from the Ministry of Works and Mar-
tyrs’ Affairs as she had lost her brothers in the civil war. 
However, she had lost the document when she fled 
from home, and in the Ministry, they claim to have no 
record about it. Her request for the reward was rejected. 
She says, “we are living in a bad situation. There are no 
\ Map 2  
Movements of the interview partner and his aunt
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repeatedly called the police. They beat the boys and 
warned them not to serve customers again. Moreover, 
the IDP youth are often threatened by violent drug 
addicts roaming the camp and its neighbourhood. 
“Drug addicts come and fight with our youth. It is not 
a safe area to live in. The social environment with the 
neighbourhood is not good.” She also mentions that 
people come and try to prevent them from repairing 
or building the mud houses. “They do not allow us to 
build the camp. The walls were destroyed in the rain. 
People would come here and push us when we repair 
the walls.” The man explains, “they always send peo-
ple—workers of the Nasaji factory—to see the place, 
and if they see someone building, they will call the 
police and tell that we are grabbing land.” The IDPs in 
the settlement fear forced removal of the houses and 
suffer from repeated interference by neighbouring 
inhabitants when the IDPs try to repair their mud 
houses after rains and destructions, which altogether 
creates an unsafe environment.
Analysis VI: Persistence of precarious livelihood options; 
exclusion from community while family builds up a critical 
mass in the camp; contestation over political representa-
tion at camp level; failure of extending translocal family 
network to Germany 
This part of the story provides details of the current live-
lihood activities of the interview partners, which do not  
deviate from what they have tried to do in other places. The 
main problem is the competition with the ‘established’, 
those that have settled near the camp. Relationships are 
hostile, and there is not the least indication of inclusion of 
the new arrivals (Sanders, 2011) or ‘outsiders’ (cf. also Elias 
& Scotson, 2013). One of the reasons is the unsolved land  
issue in Kabul, but other reasons seem to be related to the 
fear of encroachment of ‘these others’ in the area. Within the 
camp, however, due to the high number of members, the family 
has established itself, and, due to his good reputation, the 
elders appointed the interview partner as an official repre-
sentative of a large part of the camp. Again there is competition 
with the previous representative which the elders solved by 
splitting representation among three persons. This indicates 
the establishment of elders as the most powerful and re-
mud house next door and sews sleeping mats which 
she sells. She joined the family when they stayed in 
the IDP camp behind the Coca-Cola factory. She lives 
with her aged husband and two sons, age 18 and 16. 
The boys support the family through car washing jobs.
Two brothers of the interview partner went to  
Germany in September [2015] and came back. They had 
faced a lot of problems there. The family was angry  
because they had spent so much money for the jour-
ney, US $600, which family members had collected for 
them. According to the interview partner, “we could 
have provided a shop for them here. If the German 
government paid the Afghan refugees money, they 
would all go back and live here.” 
Relationships within the camp and with the neigh-
bours: Both interview partners describe the camp 
neighbourhood as difficult. They report hostile acts of 
neighbours such as the destruction of the mud houses, 
violence perpetrated by drug addicts and competing 
groups interested in building houses on the same 
land. The land where the IDPs have settled belongs  
to the Ministry of Finance. If they build solid houses 
in this area, they will not belong to them. The IDPs 
repeatedly have requested the government to give 
them plots of legal land. 
The interview partner mentions another conflict 
at the current IDP camp. Previously, there was one 
single representative for the whole camp. However, 
he did injustice to the community. When donors and 
NGOs provided the IDPs with assistance, he took a lot 
for himself and his family. People started to support 
the interview partner, and the elders decided that 
there should be three representatives and the former 
one should only represent 36 families. They held a 
council (shura) meeting to find a just representative 
who would deal with the donors in a good way. They 
chose the interview partner because he can make 
contacts well and is fair. Now he represents 26 families. 
There have been no efforts towards reconciliation  
between him and the other representative.
The aunt states, “I am not feeling safe here.” Her 
son was stabbed and badly injured over a quarrel about 
his car washing job along the main road near the camp. 
Those working in the nearby carwash centre 
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one blocks it. Now there are two persons on one horse, 
trying to run toward two different directions. We 
have a proverb in Pashto, saying, “on a horse, there is 
one saddle. They have put two persons on one saddle.”
The aunt tells us that during the period of the 
election campaign [in 2014], Ashraf Ghani had invited 
the elders and told them that the IDPs would be  
allowed to stay on the land. However, “Ashraf Ghani 
has small hands like me” (indicating that he is physi-
cally not strong like the aunt). She asks, “Why did he 
lie? Why did he make promises and then did not do 
anything?”
The interview partner mentions that he had  
received “life skills training” by GIZ, which should 
enable him to raise demands. However, he believes 
that if he voices the IDPs’ interests in public, he will 
be punished. He believes that he cannot take this risk 
because he has to take care of his family.
Analysis VII: Demand for sustainable means of livelihood 
through training to avoid aid dependence; perception of 
political stagnation; fear of voicing IDP interests in public
The interview partner, as camp representative, does not 
ask for more aid, but for training and job opportunities and 
legal plots for housing. Currently, there is hardly any avenue 
for the camp inhabitants to create their livelihood security 
for the future, which would include a sustainable livelihood 
for their children. 
The context of this statement is that humanitarian and 
aid agencies’ funding has decreased so that they had to limit 
their work to specific assistance for particular target groups 
based on needs assessments and proposals submitted to  
donors. This assistance can only be provided as a response to 
very specific requests, such as winterization assistance for 
“slum” dwellers in Kabul, most of whom are long-term dis-
placed people. Aid agencies were even unable to meet these 
requests appropriately in 2015 because other hotspots of 
armed conflict attracted the bulk of donations. 28 The European 




28 \  Reports by staff of a range of humanitarian and development agencies 
during a workshop in Kabul in May 2016, convened by E. Grawert within 
the BMZ-funded research project, indicate that many aid agencies 
started operating in the countries neighbouring Syria and Iraq.
spected decision makers within the camp, although acting  
in the background, as it is the case in any other Afghan com-
munity. This part of the story highlights the manifold activi-
ties and the organizational engagement of the interview 
partner and his family in their affairs under highly adverse 
conditions and with a minimum of external assistance.
The attempt to send two family members to Germany 
was clearly driven by strategic considerations to expand  
the livelihood network beyond the region. Many Afghans  
believed, when the German government opened its borders to 
the growing number of refugees in September 2015, that the 
country needed more workers. 26 To them, this policy ap-
peared as a unique opportunity to arrange better support for 
the starving families through remittances to be sent by male 
family members earning money in Germany. This strategy 
failed in the case of the interview partner’s relatives.  
Interview 1—Part 7
Critical comments on humanitarian aid operations and 
the government: The interview partner criticizes that 
“assistance is not regular. They put us in a bad situation. 
They make us look for help from others, the MoRR 
and other organizations. … Support should not just be 
aid, but jobs–in cooking, driving, anything. Aid will 
affect our children; they will always ask for help.” He 
adds that IDPs should get vocational training for two 
years to learn a proper trade. “Vocational training is 
needed.”
Moreover, IDPs should receive plots legally on 
government land and be allowed to build houses. 
They should get job and income opportunities in an 
area where they can stay legally. The aunt adds, “the 
government should provide places for work and voca-
tional training, for example, tailoring. I am old, but I 
want my sons to have a better life in the future.”
The aunt tries to explain the deterioration of as-
sistance politically, stating: “There was one president. 
Now we have two. 27 One is doing something, the other  
 
26 \  This was frequently stated by Afghan interview partners in 2015 and 
2016.
27 \  The aunt refers to the so-called Afghanistan National Unity Govern-
ment elected in 2014, of which Ashraf Ghani is the president and  
Abdullah Abdullah the’ Chief Executive Officer’. Whereas Ghani is per-
ceived to serve Pashtuns’ interests above all, Abdullah is said to repre-
sent those of the Tajik community as second major section of the pop-
ulation (ICG, 2017).
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province outside the one still existing large camp 30 
have either worked as manufacturers of valuable 
niche products, such as carpets (Uzbeks and Turkmans 
in particular), become businessmen or, as poor workers, 
managed to immerse themselves in the local informal 
economy of Pakistan’s second-largest city Lahore. At 
the time of field research in late February and early 
March 2017, all Afghans were in a situation of either 
having to duck or expose themselves to above average 
harassment by the Pakistani authorities (esp. police) 
and what came to be known as ‘racial profiling’. 31 The 
background were two terrorist attacks; one on Lahore’s 
main traffic artery on 13 February and one on one of 
the famous shrines in Sindh province (in Sehwan 
Sharif) on 16 February 2017. The attacks were immedi-
ately blamed on Afghans (refugees) and even when  
it emerged in the course of the investigation that  
domestic groups were the perpetrators, authorities 
still blamed Afghanistan (and its people) for the  
attacks claiming that the responsible group of the  
Pakistani Taliban (Jamat al-Ahrar) had been harboured 
on Afghan soil. Consequently, Pakistan closed its border 
with Afghanistan 32 and started an unprecedented 
crackdown on Afghans 33 in Pakistan that saw 600 
people arrested 34 as part of the first-time country-
wide anti-terror operation Radd-ul-Fasaad that was  
 
30 \  The camp Kot Chandna in Mianwali was established in 1982 and,  
according to the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) in Punjab- 
Website (last updated on 10 April 2015), “The registered population of 
the Camp consists of 21,613 families and 132,058 persons but in fact 
presently 4,799 families and 27,273 persons are residing in and around 
the Camp” (Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees Punjab, 2015).
31 \  The term denotes a number of discriminating practices, e.g. inciting 
hatred against Afghans by the media and authorities, calling on Paki-
stanis to report Afghans to the authorities. For examples reported on 
the news, see Niazi (2017), “Pashtun profiling” (2017). 
32 \  The border closure lasted effectively until 21 March 2017, with a short 
two-day opening on-7-8 March to release the pressure on the stranded 
25,000 people and allow them to cross towards both sides. Among the 
stranded were many Afghans who wanted to go for medical treatment 
to Pakistan (with valid visa).
33 \  Arrests started immediately after the terror attack on the shrine in 
Sindh, cf. “205 suspects, mostly Afghan nationals, held in Punjab” (2017).
34 \  Pakistan’s Urdu newspaper Jhang (Lahore section) reported on 26 
February 2017 that the facilitators of Jama’t al-Ahrar included Afghans. 
Indicating the grossly negligent journalistic attitude of Pakistan’s  
media it is worth mentioning that in the same article the former  
Minister of the Interior was cited stating that Afghans had also been 
involved in the murder of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 as if this further jus-
tified the renewed crackdown on Afghans throughout Pakistan.
(ECHO) funded emergency measures in particular for  
returning refugees and undocumented Afghans (ECHO, 
2016), but not for people in protracted displacement situations. 
This indicates a gap between goals and practical achievements 
in providing “global and local solutions for displaced persons 
… towards self-reliance” (Council of the EU, 2016).
The critical statements of the interview partners about 
the failure of the government to keep its promises and im-
prove the conditions for the camp inhabitants by legalizing 
their stay on the land indicate two things. One is awareness 
about the political neglect of the conditions of the poor pop-
ulation. The other is the fear of being punished for claiming 
the demands of the poor in public, implying that the camp 
representative is conscious about the real power relations 
and therefore will not take risks that can severely affect his 
whole family.
As the above account indicates, these conditions 
pertain to the informal economy in Pakistan as well, 
and there is no difference when it comes to the infor-
mal economy in Iran. Like the interview partner in 
Tapa Bagrami 2, many lower-class Afghans have 
made their living in the informal economies of either 
country, arriving there as displaced people, refugees or 
as irregular migrants and sometimes a combination 
of all. According to the national policies and their  
enforcement in the destination countries, Afghans 
without legal stay and work permits currently risk 
being deported from both countries.
In the vegetable wholesalers’ market 
(Sabzi Mandi) of Lahore, Pakistan
In Pakistan, most Afghans live in the Pashtun- 
majority provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and  
Balochistan that border Afghanistan. In contrast, 
Punjab province with its capital Lahore has attracted 
fewer refugees. 29 Those who settled throughout the  
 
29 \  According to the only census of Afghans in Pakistan (conducted in 
2005), the bulk of Afghan refugees (87 percent) concentrated in the two 
border provinces with Afghanistan, then North West Frontier Province 
(renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) hosting 61.6 per cent and Balochistan 
hosting 25.2 percent. The remaining 13.2 per cent were registered in 
Punjab (6.8 per cent or 38,293 families), Sindh (4.5 per cent), Islamabad 
(1.5 per cent), and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) (0.4 per cent).  
Cf. Government of Pakistan, 2005, p. 17. 
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did not have a refugee card. 38 When the Pakistani  
government authorities had started to fine landowners 
who rented rooms to unregistered Afghans a couple 
of months earlier, his landlord had asked him to leave. 
The brother took his family and returned to Afghani-
stan along with 20 to 25 other families six to eight 
months before we met. Currently, he is trying to 
make a living as a day labourer in Kunduz. The inter-
view partner describes this as very challenging  
because his brother has to feed five children, and 
“there is war going on. … The condition in Afghanistan 
is bad. You wake up in one place or village and go to 
sleep in another because you have to escape during 
the day and take refuge somewhere else all the time.” 
This and the fact that they do not have land are reasons 
why the younger of the two respondents does not 
want to go back. Their father’s house is heavily dam-
aged, and they would need to invest a lot to do the  
repairs as even the boundary walls are destroyed. 
They cannot afford it.
Translocal networks, livelihood-generation and  
established–outsider relations (then): When the two  
respondents came to Pakistan (probably in the early 
1990s) it was on the request of their elder brothers 
who wanted to unite the family after their father’s 
death and also have their mother around in Sialkot 
(Punjab). The older respondent was six years old at 
that time. They could not afford education as they 
had to contribute to the family income. As children, 
they worked for 30 Rupees a day 39 in a local restaurant 
38 \  This refers to the ‘Proof of Registration’ (PoR)-cards the Pakistani 
government handed out to Afghan refugees who had registered in the 
one-time countrywide registration process during 2006-07 (following 
the census of 2005). Initially, the card allowed travel abroad and visa 
applications to third countries from Pakistan. The status of registered 
refugees/ PoR-cardholders is regularly extended based on the initial 
registration (see Annex I for details). Many Afghans who did not regis-
ter at that time due to fear or other reasons, plus those who sought 
refuge after 2007 did not have any possibility to register and get PoR-
cards. Over time, especially since the December 2014 public army 
school attack in Peshawar, the PoR-card came to signify a minimum 
standard of protection against all-too arbitrary harassment and dis-
crimination by the authorities. In contrast, Afghans without a PoR-
card, have since then been subjected to forced return, i.e. deportation.
39 \  The amounts mentioned in this paragraph cannot be converted ex-
actly because the dates given by interview partners were vague. The 
year 1998 is taken as reference (because historical online currency 
converting goes back 20 years (cf. https://www.oanda.com/currency/
converter/), the amount of 30 Rupees would equal US $0.68; 10,000 Ru-
pees equals US $227, 20,000 Rupees US $454 respectively; 1,000 Rupees 
US $22.7 and 2,000 Rupees US $45.40. 
launched on 22 February 2017. 35 The provincial apex 
courts initiated the legal underpinning for specifically 
targeting Afghans; the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Apex 
Body, for example, ordered a crackdown on unregis-
tered Afghans to take place under section 14 of the 
Foreigners’ Act implying their subsequent deportation 
to Afghanistan. 36  
Interview 2
Circumstances of movement and return of unregistered 
family member: We meet two brothers who have carved 
out a living as wholesalers for onions and potatoes at 
Sabzi Mandi Lahore. 37 The interview is being conducted 
as we are sitting among large stacks of onion sacks in 
the open with a makeshift roof to protect the goods 
from sunshine. Both brothers are illiterate. 
Their movement to Pakistan occurred as part of a 
chain movement of family members after two elder 
brothers with their families had moved to Pakistan at 
the beginning of the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan 
after the Soviet forces’ withdrawal in 1989. The reason 
why they left Afghanistan is described by the younger 
brother as mainly having to do with three factors: 
Their father was killed during the Soviet invasion just 
shortly before the troop withdrawal was completed in 
1989; they had lost livestock, and one of the brothers 
needed medical treatment. The family originates 
from rural Khanabad district of Kunduz province in 
northeast Afghanistan. Their father was a kuchi 
(semi-nomadic pastoralist). The elder brother is just 
over 35 years old, 28 of which he has lived in Pakistan— 
in his own account. The second respondent was born 
in Pakistan. The two interviewees have three other 
brothers, two of whom migrated to Pakistan around 
1989 and still live there. 
Another brother had returned to Afghanistan a few 
months before the interview because he reportedly  
 
35 \  According to Dunyanews.tv, “100,397 Afghan refugees have been reg-
istered in the province through biometric system” already by 26 February 
2017, i.e. four days after Radd-ul-Fasaad started. Cf. Dunyanews.tv (2017)..
36 \  Dawn: “KP apex body orders crackdown on unregistered Afghans”,  
14 March 2017, p. 7. Generally, if unregistered Afghans are arrested, they 
are being deported by the GoP Home Department. Five to six thousand 
Afghans were sent back from Karachi to Afghanistan between 2015 and 
2016. Interview with refugee protection agency, Karachi, March 2017.
37 \  On 28 February 2017
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(hotel) serving tea and washing dishes. The younger 
brother accounts how he came to Lahore at the age of 
14 or 15 years for want of more income. Their mother 
was sick, and the family went through a difficult 
time with many expenses. An ‘uncle’ had been work-
ing in Sabzi Mandi and told them that there was a lot 
of work available. They both worked in a local fruit 
market from early morning until noon on a daily  
basis and afterwards went to the vegetable market 
(sabzi mandi) for the rest of the day. Looking back, 
these years are described as learning years with low 
wages, hard manual labour (loading and unloading 
trucks for four years) but an opportunity to establish 
relations and trust with the local wholesalers. This 
enabled the interview partners to take a loan of  
between 10,000 and 20,000 Rupees and start their 
own wholesale distribution business. Asked whether 
the money was lent by Afghans or Pakistanis, he re-
plies that nobody even made a distinction between 
Afghan origin or Pakistani citizens at that time. 40 As 
members of a savings group, they had saved 6,-7,000 
Rupees 41 and borrowed the rest from relatives and 
friends. One of the interview partners explains: “I 
had built up a good reputation and relations with the 
elders in the market by always helping them; so 
everybody was ready to give me some money, that is 
between 1,000 and 2,000 Rupees”. 
40 \  Afghans and Pakistanis generally report that ethnic differences did 
not play a role throughout the period of war (Soviet invasion, civil war, 
Taliban rule) in Pakistan until the preconditions for refugee return 
were not met, i.e. at least 2002. At the political level, Afghans’ presence 
became increasingly politicized with the rise of Pakistani domestic 
terrorism. Among ordinary people, the politicization and institutional 
discrimination took effect in ostracizing Afghans especially because 
media and state officials actively supported it. The situation is worst 
since the Peshawar Public Army school attack with many casualties in 
December 2014. 
41 \  The practice of so-called casting committees is widespread in Pakistan 
and beyond. It involves a group of people who agree to give a certain 
amount of money to a particular person every month. The total amount 
thus collected from all members is then given to one of the members 
at a time and this continues until at the end all the members got their 
amounts back in lump sum. This amount is then given to one of the 
contributing members so that he or she can meet any major need. It is 
easier for anyone to take a relatively small amount in Rupees—in this 
example Rs. 300 (= 2.90 USD in February 2015)—out from their income 
every month than saving at home alone or over a longer term in a 
bank account. See Nasir & Mielke, 2015..
… and now: Everyday harassment. As the interview 
goes on, we learn that the brothers had three  
encounters with the police as recently as in the last 
36 hours preceding the interview (in the context of 
the police raids mentioned in the Introduction of 
this case study). First, the previous evening at five 
p.m., three police officers had come and taken them 
to the station to check their documents. They were 
allowed to leave because one police officer whom 
they knew ‘guaranteed’ for them. In the interview, 
they complain about the conduct of the police that 
amounted to pure harassment. Reportedly, the  
Afghan brothers told the police, “You cannot throw 
us out just like this; there is a process to follow. 
Send us to Peshawar, and there will be the UN … but 
you cannot just ask us to leave from one day to the 
other.” In a second encounter, the police came to 
their house at 2 a.m. and arrested two Afghans 
without PoR-card. Again, ‘friends at the police  
station’ managed to get their people released. In the 
third encounter, a police van turned up in front of 
the mosque at Sabzi Mandi in the morning and 
took in everybody who came to open their shops. 
The elder brother was agitated and reported how he 
had told the police, “Look, we have our card, our 
children go to school here, this is our home.”
Asked whether they feel lucky that they ‘have 
friends’ among the police, they explain that these 
are not actually friends, but they are police officers 
who can be bribed to get them out of custody. “They 
abuse us, they call us names … also we cannot nego-
tiate with them ourselves. We contact somebody 
who comes, talks to them and pays them … Some-
times, Pashto-speaking people (elders) from Peshawar 
come to help us, but they also suffer verbal abuses 
by the police.” The sum that has to be paid is not 
that high and apparently has not increased (since 
large-scale extortion intensified from 2015 on-
wards); it depends on how many people are arrested 
and how many police officers are there; on average 
between 500 and 1,000 Rupees (US $4.70–9.40) are 
paid. The brothers add that they also have friends 
they can rely on in emergencies; among them are 
Punjabi customers and suppliers.  
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had been to Afghanistan in the past 20 or 25 years was 
for a wedding. He says he had felt uncomfortable and 
unhappy there. 
To them, the most important conditions for a r 
eturn to Afghanistan are peace, the absence of war, 
the creation of a business environment and work  
opportunities. Another older man who joined the  
interview setting explains that he does not have a 
refugee (PoR-)card and wants to return before he gets 
expelled by force. However, he is unable to afford the 
transportation costs. In his view the UN should  
provide transportation and construction materials so 
that they can build up (their) houses and “be safe”. 
Asked whether they have received any information 
on return programmes and options, the elder brother 
suggests that all that Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
need is time. This would help 90 per cent of them; 
they could work for three more years, earn enough 
money and then go back. Not in a rush, like now,  
being pressured to leave from one day to the next. 
There is limited information about the situation in 
Afghanistan and what is available obviously does not 
satisfy them: “We are not sure about our country and 
that we can meet our livelihood needs there. We  
ask every one of our compatriots who comes from  
Karachi, Peshawar or other places whether somebody 
has been able to improve the conditions in Afghanistan. 
This is what we constantly discuss among ourselves. 
Has the UN or the United States done something? 
Possible progress or betterment is constantly on our 
mind.” Asked about the peace process in Afghanistan, 
the brothers confirm that they have heard rumours 
about the peace process between the Taliban move-
ment and the government but have no real opinion 
on it. 
According to the respondents, the police distur-
bances seriously started in 2013 “after Nawaz Sharif 
came to power”; since then they have been asked to 
go back to Afghanistan. Their standard reply is that if 
they had any possibility to return they would not be 
standing there discussing with the police, but it is 
impossible to return because there are no facilities  
in Afghanistan. Since the PoR-cards are no longer  
extended 42 and the government only issues paper 
documents as proof of extension, the police harass-
ment has increased considerably. The police usually 
argue that the card is invalid, and they do not ac-
knowledge the paper extension as they want to extort 
money. Moreover, access to goods and services has 
been restricted more severely in the perception of the 
respondents. For example, bus tickets or public hospital 
treatment are difficult to obtain now. They have to  
refer to private clinics and private medical stores  
that are costly. 43 Asked whether they ever hide that 
they are Afghans, the elder brother replies that they 
never lie. If they claimed to be Pakistani Pashtuns, for 
example, this would not help much because in this 
case they would be asked for the Pakistani identity 
card (CNIC) which they do not possess. 
Prospects of (forced) return: “Now we feel that we will 
have to leave OUR country”: Speaking about the prospects 
of (forced) return to Afghanistan, the elder brother 
states that they had always been confident that  
Pakistan would not throw them out. “Now we are 
afraid that we might have to leave, but how can the 
government of Pakistan throw us out? We are not 
strangers (ghair)!” Pointing to the difficult conditions 
in Afghanistan, he adds, “There is no longer any honour 
(izzat) for us in Afghanistan. We have our income and 
business in Pakistan; our children go to school here.” 
They do not want to go back to Afghanistan, “leaving 
here is leaving home”. The only time the elder brother 
 
 
42 \  The last one-year renewal of the PoR-cards occurred in December 2015.
43 \  The statement is underpinned by an anecdote of how one brother 
consulted a doctor in a private hospital a couple of days earlier. When 
asked for his origin and when he told the doctor that he was Afghan, 
he received a major bashing. The brother responded, reminding the 
doctor that every community includes people who do wrong things. 
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However, given that the next generation (their children) go 
to school in Pakistan, they might fare better in generating 
their livelihood and giving the translocal network a boost.
While the relationship with the surrounding community—
the ‘established’ in the terms of Elias & Scotson (2013)—was 
unproblematic in the past, the political developments in  
Pakistan over roughly the last ten years, i.e. the evolution of 
domestic terrorism and the subsequent misuse of Afghan 
refugees’ presence in Pakistan as scapegoats who any attack 
can be easily blamed on, have made relations difficult. Politi-
cization of their presence, populist spread of hatred, biased 
media reporting and discrimination through authorities 
(interrogation, checks, arrests, extortion) has become part  
of their daily existence; bribing the police and living with  
extortion practices constitutes part of the survival and live-
lihood-making of lower-class Afghans in Pakistan these 
days. The degree of agency the respondents have and the  
decision-making power over various choices decrease with 
every terrorist attack that is carried out and that the  
Afghans are blamed on (whether justified or not). According 
to the elder brother, if survival in Pakistan becomes com-
pletely impossible, they will be forced to return (being counted 
as ‘voluntarily’ repatriates). At the current point of time, 
choices still exist, agency is derived from and manifest in 
their network relations that provide moral and authoritative 
support when arrested by the police, for example.
The contradiction between seeing Pakistan as home and 
sharing nostalgic and vague feelings about Afghanistan as 
true place of belonging and origin is striking. It is clear that 
the actual relationship with Afghanistan is more emotional 
than substantial. Further, the respondents and their families 
would not be able to meet their livelihood needs in Afghanistan; 
the country does not offer them any perspective. There is no 
security lest peace, no employment, no land and no opportu-
nities that would allow investment in a future back there. 
Given their family’s socio-economic status (landless, low-in-
come) and long absence from the milieu of origin in Afghanistan, 
they are likely unable to negotiate the local power tapestries 
and social networks in their home district and province that 
would be necessary to be tapped to (re)integrate successfully. 
However, the more they are treated as outsiders (ghair) in 
Punjab, the more they feel forced to consider a return in the 
mid-term. They increasingly recognize that their efforts to 
achieve a secure livelihood according to their own measure do 
not prevent them from sliding into a status of outsiders in 
Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. 
Analysis: Translocal networks exist and persist but  
exclude material flows for livelihood-generation; estab-
lished–outsider distinctions have been markedly felt since 
2013 and determine unequal access and participation in 
societal affairs; voluntary return to Afghanistan is out of 
the question as long as survival is possible in Pakistan
The interview accounts show how among the illiterate 
poor, translocal networks play a facilitating role in generat-
ing a livelihood but only regarding information-sharing,  
enabling chain migration and providing non-material  
support. The two respondents migrated to Sialkot in Punjab 
because older family members had already settled there. This 
means that they did not take any risks of uncertainty about 
where to stay and how to survive when they left their home 
village in Afghanistan. Similarly, the move to Lahore was 
encouraged by the knowledge of an uncle who informed them 
about employment opportunities in Lahore’s Sabzi Mandi. 44  
The network extends beyond their family network to  
Afghans who regularly come to bail them out of police custody: 
a network relation of moral and authoritative support. The 
supporters have to be paid, of course. Lastly, the brother who 
returned to Kunduz with his family and family members 
who had always stayed behind or spouses who were recently 
married belong to the translocal network. Given that the  
respondents are poor to the extent that they–even as onion 
wholesalers in Lahore’s Sabzi Mandi–are unable to support 
the brother and his family back in Kunduz financially 
through sending remittances, the translocal network can be 
described as weak in terms of livelihood-generating effects.  
The social status of the respondents, e.g. as self-employed 
workers in the Sabzi Mandi, their lack of education and—
more significantly—the lack of robust documentation of 
their refugee status (including the denial of Pakistani identity 
documents even though by the time of the interview the  
majority of the family members had been born in Pakistan 
and never seen their putative homeland Afghanistan), their 
status of marriage in Pakistan and the lack of Afghan valid 
documents (especially Afghan passports with Pakistani 
visa) heavily influences their agency and thus voice in and 
access to local affairs. All these factors together constitute a 
risk to securing their livelihood on an everyday basis. 
44 \  In Pakistan and Afghanistan the vegetable markets (sabzi mandi) cater 
to the lowest income strata and provide mostly occasional jobs or daily 
labour for transporters, cleaners or karachiwalas (fruit and vegetable 
sellers who rent a hand-push cart and get vegetables on commission 
to sell throughout the day in the city).  
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Herat through Turkmenistan at that time. Most of 
them had lost their livestock. One of the elders recalls 
that he had had 2,000 ewes and 70 to 80 camels. War 
and drought killed most of them; the remaining live-
stock was looted. When he heard that Herat was safe, 
he came with his family.
One of the elders had left Faryab earlier [around 
1992] when the mujahedin toppled the government of 
Najibullah Ahmadzai 48 for which he had been working 
as a commander of the border police. He had arrived 
with his sheep and cows at Golran district in Herat 
province but sold his livestock when the Taliban 
forced him to leave Golran. He joined his relatives in 
Maslakh camp. 49
The elders tell us that when they arrived in 2002, 
there was a bakery, and humanitarian agencies  
distributed loaves of bread for free. The agencies had 
drawn a map of the camp and destined a place for the 
Kuchi families. For a short time, when Ismail Khan 
was governor [until 2004], many organizations were 
distributing food. At that time, the elders went to 
meet the then President Karzai and received a letter 
referring to Presidential Decree 104 50 according to 
which the IDPs should be given land. However, the 
government ignored the decree, and the elders lost 
the document. Free food distribution stopped, and 
they had to buy food at the market. Many camp inhab-
itants sent their sons to Herat city to find jobs in the 
market or to Iran for work. However sometimes, on 
their way back, robbers looted or kidnapped the men. 
The elders claim that “all younger men up to the age 
of 50 are working in Tehran”. They send money 
through the hawala system, and the elders collect the  
48 \  Najibullah Ahmadzai was installed as a president by the Soviet  
government in 1986.
49 \  People from Faryab also live in other communities in Herat.
50 \  Decree 104, officially the Executive Decree on Land Distribution for 
Housing to Eligible Returnees and IDPs, 2005, No 104, issued in Kabul 
on 6 December 2005 (15.9.1384) establishes the eligibility, mechanisms, 
and processes to allocate state land to IDPs and refugee returnees.  
Under this presidential decree, the Afghan land agency (ARAZI since 
2010) is charged with identifying arid and virgin land subject to distri-
bution under the decree and transfers this land to the MoRR, which is 
then responsible for distributing this land to IDPs and refugee  
returnees. According to the DoRR in Herat, Maslakh is a first case where 
Decree 104 is being implemented. The land on which IDPs are squatting 
was handed over to municipalities who subsequently issue their own 
decrees and can supply people with land (Interview with Mr Khatimi, 
DoRR Herat, November 2015).
In a camp for internally displaced  
persons in Herat
Maslakh, the largest IDP camp around the town 
of Herat, is located a few kilometres outside the town. 
It hosts more than 4,000, maybe 5,000 families many 
of whom arrived after the US intervention of 2001. A 
large group of inhabitants had been farmers or pasto-
ralists in Faryab previously but have settled into 
camp life for a long time. They have long given up 
their previous way of life and remained without 
skills to take up work in a town like Herat. Besides 
Kuchi families, who are the majority in the camp, 
there are also about 300 Hazara and Tajik families. 45 
Residency is largely organized according to ethnic  
belonging. The standard of services is low; there is no 
electricity, and only recently wells have been dug and 
pumps installed. There is a small market, a Qur’an 
school and one public school for girls and boys up to 
grade nine in the camp. 
Interview 3
Account of a group of Kuchi elders in the IDP camp:  
We visit the compound of one elder, a Kuchi man, 
who is the deputy head of one of the five community 
development councils (CDCs, vernacular: shura) of 
Maslakh camp. 46 His wife and another elder join the 
discussion, and later, the other members including 
the head of the shura sit down with us. The houses 
consist of one room each and are made of mud with a 
mud wall around the compound. We are invited to 
the ‘guesthouse’, a room with mats and a carpet, with 
the rules the shura had decided and the IDP policy 
written on the wall.
The elder tells the interviewers that most of the 
families moved from Faryab near the border of Turk-
menistan to Herat when Dostum seized Mazar-i Sharif 
and took over control of the north of Afghanistan [in 
2001]. 47 A large group of Kuchi people had come to 
45 \  Hazara and Tajiks are separate ethnic population groups that can be 
categorized as Dari-speakers (although the Hazaras’ own language is 
Hazaragi) in Afghanistan’s official two-language framework. Many 
Hazaras and Tajiks live in Herat province.
46 \  In November 2015 and again in April 2016
47 \  The men refer to the ousting of the Taliban in Mazar-i Sharif by 
Northern Alliance forces in 2001.
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The five CDCs each represent 350 houses—those 
that have a door opening to the street. Members of 
the CDCs are mixed to some extent; the elders claim 
that theirs include Pashtun groups of different back-
grounds. The Hazara in the camp have their own CDC. 
The elders are satisfied with the new governor 
who congratulated them on receiving the land. They 
report that previous fears about insurgents threaten-
ing the area have not come true. They emphasize that 
they are well-connected with the government. 52 
When asked if they would like to raise sheep and goats 
again, the elders give a positive answer, but caution 
that they cannot afford it. 
We also visit the small mud house of about 
twelve square metres in the same compound where 
the women are staying. The house has a corner made 
of mud for cooking with wood, some pots and a kettle, 
a bast mat on the floor, mattresses around, a heap of 
blankets in another corner, things covered by a carpet 
on a wall and about 20 people–six women of different 
ages, many girls and a few small boys are sitting in a 
circle in the house. In front of them is wool in plastic 
bags, and many of them are making yarn threads 
rolled up in balls for carpets. 
Account of Kuchi women at Maslakh camp
An older woman explains that ten families live in 
the compound. One middle-aged woman tells us: 
“We came from Faryab province about 15 years ago 
due to fights. We came here directly. The Uzbeks 
killed my husband and then we came to Herat. We 
did not go back because Herat was peaceful and secure. 
However, we do not have anything here. We need and 
want land, and we do not have water. There is one 
shallow well borehole [in 2015], and we are always 
fighting with one another over using the well because 
there are so many people who need the water [this 
changed when the new well was constructed in 2016]. 
 
 
52 \  The emphasis may be a response to widespread distrust of the Kuchi 
in the region. Other camp inhabitants believe that some of the Kuchi 
sons were recruited by criminal gangs or the Taliban and that the 
Kuchi elders have weapons in their houses. Some local government 
officers are afraid of the camp inhabitants as they might have insur-
gents among them.
money from people they know at the border or in Herat. 
The wives and children of the men remain in Maslakh 
camp while the husbands work in Iran illegally with-
out documents. Some women started to make carpets 
from wool which they got from shopkeepers in the 
market. 
Development plans and desires of Kuchi camp inhabitants: 
The elders explain that they like the place and have 
given up their nomadic life. They emphasize that 
they will stay here as they have built their houses 
and have shallow wells here. They claim that the gov-
ernor had informed them that the department of  
agriculture owned this land and had handed it over 
to the municipality which was supposed to transfer 
400 square metres of land plots to each IDP family.  
According to them, the government had promised 
that the families would have to pay only a low price 
in instalments. During our visit in 2017, it was not 
clear whether the government had registered all the 
families living in the camp.
The elders report that the United Nations Human 
Settlements Program (UN-Habitat) had indicated 
that it would bring development to Maslakh. At our 
second visit in Maslakh camp in April 2016, UN-Habitat 
had dug a new well with a pump run by solar power 
for each of the five camp areas represented by a CDC. 
The local government had bought the solar panels 
with the funds of the CDCs. 51 Meanwhile the local 
government of Herat had demarcated the camp area 
to become a township of Herat. The elders anticipate 
that the mud houses will be demolished; there will 
be trees and better houses and a market; roads will be 
built as well as public places, schools and clinics, 
planned by UN-Habitat. The communities are involved 
in the planning process through the five camp CDCs, 
which delegate one person each to the overarching 
monitoring and evaluation council. There is contention 
among the elders whether UN-Habitat will pay any 
compensation when the houses are demolished. They 
report that the governor had told them that the econ-
omy would improve. The communities are expected 
to contribute their labour force to cover ten per cent 
of the cost. 
51 \  The CDCs have received block grants from the World Bank within the 
Afghanistan National Solidarity Programme since 2003.
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Analysis: Legal access to land and housing is most impor-
tant for IDPs; adjustment from aid receivers to family 
networks extending to Iran and taking care of IDP needs; 
communities of people from the same area of origin and 
similar ethnic background have formed in the camp; the 
IDPs do not believe that aid agencies will provide the 
planned development measures. The relationship with the 
local government and other camp communities is ambiguous. 
Women also request land, better and healthier housing, a 
clinic and, also, more and better-paid job opportunities. 
They expect the government and aid agencies to provide 
this to them. They do not want to raise livestock again 
but miss the freedom of movement they had in their  
previous life.
As has been shown for the IDPs in Kabul, also in Herat, 
the issue of obtaining a legal plot where people can build a 
house to stay is most crucial for the displaced people inter-
viewed. Differently from Kabul, in Herat, the Decree 104 has 
started to materialize. Land was handed over to the munici-
pality which decided to give it to the IDPs. The Kuchi inhab-
itants have changed from nomadic life to camp life and have 
adjusted to the growing need to pay for their food and other 
items. While the younger generation contributes to this by 
working in Herat town or Iran, the women make balls of 
wool in their houses. The elders are eager to see the results  
of the plans made for upgrading the camp and are annoyed 
by the slow pace of development. The Kuchi families have  
remained closely connected to others originating from Faryab. 
Even though the houses in the camp are small and made 
from mud, the women appreciate living in a peaceful place. 
Over the years, they have adjusted to a way of life that differs 
from the nomadic life they had led previously. Their view  
differs from the older men in the camp who stated that they 
would be happy if they were allowed to raise sheep again. The 
women, although they have to give their earnings to their 
husbands and are confined to their houses, are content doing 
work and earning an income. Like the other interview part-
ners, they expect services and a legal plot to be provided by 
the government or humanitarian agencies and assume that 
life would significantly improve under these conditions. 
When we moved here, Ismail Khan 53 helped us in the 
first years, but there has been no assistance from any-
one since he left Herat.”
The woman recalls the past in Faryab province. 
As Kuchi, they were used to having freedom of move-
ment there; but now they are confined to small houses 
“and feel very bored”. The other women complain  
that there is no clinic in the camp and no source of 
income for them. Therefore, they make threads rom 
the wool that the shopkeeper provides and then he 
collects the yarn. The women receive 40 AFs (US $0.58) 
per kilogramme of yarn, which requires four days of 
work. They hand over the money to their husbands. 
They claim that they do not have money for health 
treatment, only for food.
The older woman reports that there is a women’s 
council with five members in the camp. One member 
is the sister of the household head, and there are two 
members from the Hazara inhabitants. “We have 
gathered twice since the establishment of the council, 
and we have not met since then. We were told that 
they would give us sewing machines, a processing 
machine for noodles, carpet weaving equipment and 
wool. We were also promised other assistance.”
The woman concludes that life is peaceful in  
Herat, and that they want to stay here. Even if there is 
peace, they will not want to resume the previous life 
of herding sheep and goats; they want to do some 
other work or at least get land where they can stay. 
Then their life can improve. Currently, the family has 
only one room where they all live and where she 
bakes bread and cooks food. The smoke of the fire 





53 \  Ismail Khan was the governor of Herat from 1992 to 1995, then again 
after the US intervention in 2001 until 2004, and after that, he was 
Minister of Energy and Water in the central government (2004–2013). 
He is affiliated to the Jamiat-e Islami party and an influential power-
holder in western Afghanistan (Masoud, 2015).
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bulldozers; therefore the government had stopped the 
destruction for the past two years. The head of the 
council describes the tension and its solution as fol-
lows: The deputy Minister of Defence came and made 
a speech, telling the IDPs that they had to leave and 
should return to their own provinces. If they did not 
go, they would be considered as members of al-Qaeda, 
kidnappers, or drug smugglers. When a representative 
from the Pashtun community wanted to speak, the 
deputy turned him down and called him an al-Qaeda 
man. Then a man from the Hazara community spoke 
up and proposed that the government either should 
provide the IDPs with shelter anywhere in Afghanistan 
or destroy the camp and kill all people or open the 
border so that they could leave Afghanistan legally. A 
representative of the municipal government said that 
the IDPs were innocent people, but that ‘the engineers’ 
from the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) and the UNHCR who claimed to help the people 
were thieves and divided food among themselves  
instead of serving the camp inhabitants. The meeting 
ended without any decision. The deputy Minister said 
that he did not have the authority to shelter the IDPs 
but assured them that no more bulldozers would come.
One elder, who is an imam at the mosque, adds 
that before that meeting there had been many dis-
putes between the Hazara and Pashtuns and a strong 
repudiation of the Hazara by the Pashtuns. However, 
due to the bold words of the Hazara representative 
during the meeting, the Pashtuns appreciated the 
ability of the Hazara to speak on behalf of the whole 
community, and after that the relationship improved 
considerably. He says, “now the Pashtuns also protect 
us.” He refers to an incidence where someone from 
Herat claimed that part of the camp had been built 
on his land and started farming near a spring at the 
nearby mountain. Some Pashtuns drove him away. 
The camp inhabitants believe that this incidence had 
been incited by others, not by the man himself. The 
imam emphasizes that it is good that the Pashtuns 
are there as the government is “more careful with 
them” and they have built up more resistance against 
being displaced from the camp.
Interview 4
In the Hazara quarter of Maslakh camp: We are invited 
into the living room of a mud house, roofed with 
wooden beams and furnished with a carpet and  
pillows. A very small door leads to the adjacent room 
where there are several women. The large compound 
is surrounded by a mud wall.
Seven older and young men receive us in the 
room. Some of them are members of the Hazara shura 
in the camp. They originate from different parts of  
Afghanistan, among them Day Kundi and Bamyan 
and had left due to disputes, family quarrels and 
drought in their home areas. They had no land or 
property there but had stayed on a rented plot of land 
on which they had been farming. They came to Herat 
province during the Taliban era between 1996 and 
1999. At that time, many IDPs arrived in Herat and 
settled in an area near the police station; first a few 
hundred, then more than 1,000 families. After 2001, 
some people who had owned land in Afghanistan  
returned to their villages. The head of the shura had 
tried to flee with his family to Iran, but they were 
captured and deported. 
The men complain that the main shortcoming at 
Maslakh camp is the lack of income opportunities. The 
son of one of the elders works in the camp’s market; 
others work in construction or services, making 
bricks or carrying goods to the shops. One son is in 
Iran, and another one is employed at the customs 
loading and unloading trucks. Three women weave 
carpets for low wages; a company brings the material 
and buys the carpets. The women receive wages of 
20,000 AFN (US $291) per six square meters of carpet 
produced. The men tell us that all of them sent their 
children to school.
The men explain that the houses in Maslakh 
camp were constructed by NGOs and the government, 
and the inhabitants built rooms like the one we are 
in. Under the government of Karzai (2004-2014), bull-
dozers would come and destroy self-made houses in 
the camp. Luckily, the interview partners stayed in 
the middle of the camp and were saved. Some people 
left the camp. The men report that Pashtuns put fam-
ilies inside the houses or threw stones at the 
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sometimes did farming in one place and then in  
another. Now I have a shop, and I have a sewing  
machine and I do any kind of tailoring work for  
people. I was poor before and I still have to work  
hard. Life in Uruzgan was somehow better than here, 
because I was easily earning enough to support my 
family.”
The man explains that the family had to leave 
their farming tools and household items behind 
every time when there was a fight and escape without 
carrying anything with them. Luckily no family 
member was injured. He decided to leave Uruzgan 
due to repeated fighting and thought that his life 
would improve in Herat as there was no fighting 
there. He moved directly to Herat with his six children 
and his wife. A Herati man advised them to settle in 
Maslakh camp. They joined another IDP who went to 
this camp.
Livelihood activities in the camp: The interview partner 
reports that when they arrived, they had only two 
blankets, a kettle and some tea glasses brought from 
Uruzgan. The “other IDP” who had brought them to 
the camp gave the family a small room and provided 
them with food for the first day and night. There was 
a shallow well installed by the UN from which the 
camp inhabitants took the water. On his second day 
in Herat, the interview partner started to work in a 
brick manufacturing company. He tells us that this 
was very heavy work that made him very weak, and 
that he and his family had only bread with green tea 
for seven days. Then they were able to buy other food 
items. After one year, the UN built two rooms where 
the family could stay, and the man built surrounding 
walls for the compound. They still live in the compound. 
After seven or eight years of working in the brick  
factory, he bought a sewing machine and then 
opened his shop. No one else from the family works. 
His two elder sons attended one of the schools in Herat 
city and one is studying at the university in Balkh 
province and another one at Herat University. In the 
course of the talk the man admits that he got in trouble 
economically. “I am the only one working and I  
have taken loans from my neighbours and from 
shopkeepers.”  
The members of the Hazara shura had not received 
the information that the land was legalized; they 
were only informed about the five wells UN-Habitat 
was building and about plans that a joint shura would 
be established in the camp. The head of the Hazara 
shura said, “maybe they have not informed us yet”.
Analysis: Land and informal work of younger people and 
women are crucial for IDP livelihoods; those who have 
land are more likely to return home; those without land 
remain in a situation of protracted displacement and over 
the years start to struggle for the right to stay. This 
struggle can have a uniting effect on camp inhabitants 
from different ethnic groups who otherwise distrust or 
disrespect each other 
People without land and property are more likely to  
remain IDPs as this may provide them with access to assis-
tance (maybe even land and legal housing in the future); 
those who still have land may return home when the armed 
conflict subsides. The Hazara IDPs sustain their families’ 
livelihood through informal work of the younger generation 
and the women like IDPs from other groups in the camp. 
Government policies aiming to remove the camp by force have 
been a threat to the camp inhabitants, but through the resist-
ance by Pashtun groups combined with the respect or fear the 
government has towards them the IDPs were able to stay. 
From the perspective of the Hazara elders, their representa-
tive’s outspoken criticism of the government’s attempts to 
remove the camp had dissolved previously tense relations 
with the Pashtuns by clarifying their common interest. It  
remains unclear why the shura of the Pashtuns has already 
been informed about the legalization of the land and that of 
the Hazara not; however, the elders did not show any embar-
rassment in front of us.
Interview 5
Account of a shopkeeper in a tailoring shop in the camp 
market:  The interview partner arrived from Uruzgan 
province in 2002 where he had been a land labourer. 
He says, “I did not have my own land and I had to do 
farming some time in one place for one person and 
some time in another place for another person. My 
life was like that of a Kuchi (nomadic), because I 
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send his children to school and even to university—albeit at 
the price of being highly indebted to some of his social envi-
ronment. The good relationships with the neighbours proved 
to be crucial for the success as they helped him to get started 
and later provided him with loans. The man considers the 
conflicts over water as something related to the adverse con-
ditions of camp life and not as a personal issue, which helps 
to maintain the good relationship in the neighbourhood. He 
and his family never relied on aid; however, he criticizes, like 
other IDPs, that aid agencies were there but that there was 
no visible result of their activities. He considers mainly the 
government to be responsible for developing the camp into a 
township with basic services and demands cooperation by 
the camp inhabitants to this end.
In a deportee camp in Herat
Deportation can be defined as “the forced removal 
of foreign nationals from a given national territory” 
(Drotbohm & Hasselberg, 2015, p. 551) and hence, as 
the forced return of people to their country of origin. 
This affects mainly those who are considered irregular 
labour migrants and their families who lack a legal 
stay and work permit; however, according to policy 
shifts, refugees can become part of this category 
when their registration cards expire or when they 
stay as undocumented refugees in the region. 55 The 
extent to which the police of a country deports people 
depends on government policies, bilateral treaties  
between the country of origin and destination of mi-
grants and the seriousness of implementing policies 
and regulations. 
Since 2006, incidences of deportation or de facto 
forced but officially ‘voluntary’ returns of Afghans 
from Iran have increased. Since 2014, hardly any vol-
untary return has taken place from Iran; those who 
arrived in Afghanistan were predominantly depor-
tees—mostly lower class Afghan men and boys who 
migrated and were caught. In 2015, 239,992 Afghans 
were deported from Iran. In 2016, the number in 
 
55 \  According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 35 percent of  
Afghans residing in Iran either hold no civil documentation or have 
expired documents (NRC, 2017).
The man tells us that the government has never 
helped them and that only once did an organization 
distribute food items to them in a winter season after 
elders of this camp had complained to the local gov-
ernment’s Department for Refugees and Repatriation 
(DoRR). He claims that no one asked them anything 
when they arrived, neither did anyone register them. 
After one year, NGOs started to come to the camp and 
have done surveys “about 20 times”.  
Neighbourhood relationships and security: The inter-
view partner states, “I am very happy about the people 
of Herat. They have tried to help us from the first day 
we arrived here. My sons have studied in Herat and 
have made many friends. I and my family are invited 
to weddings and other gatherings in Herat.” However, 
later during the talk, he admits that the family had 
problems with the neighbours over water [in 2015; 
the new wells solved the water problems]. His way  
of dealing with conflicts in the neighbourhood is 
avoidance or mediating. When there are any issues 
between his neighbours, he tries “to make them calm 
and mediate between them”.
The man states that he used to feel secure in Herat. 
However, this has changed recently. “For the past year 
[2014/15], I haven’t felt safe, because we hear in the 
news that Taliban attack and capture places, and the 
government does not have control over all of Afghani-
stan. I am afraid now because Taliban can be every-
where. There are security issues, and I don’t feel safe”. 54 
Analysis: A story of relative success of an IDP who started 
as a land labourer, became a factory worker and then a 
shop owner and sent his sons to university; good relation-
ships with the neighbours who help the IDP through 
times of hardship are crucial.
The account of the shopkeeper reveals that the availability 
of unskilled employment (here in a brick factory) can provide 
the basis for a career as a small entrepreneur. It remains  
unclear how the man acquired sewing skills, but he seems to 
be able to secure the livelihood for the whole family and to 
 
 
54 \  In fact, there has been an increase of armed violence in Herat  
province committed by the Taliban since 2014 (cf. UNAMA, 2015, 2016).
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there, and how they were caught and deported.  
Although they had come from different provinces of 
Afghanistan (Faryab, Takhar, Kapisa), Nimroz had 
been the starting point for their movement to Iran. 
From there, each of them had been taken towards the 
border by a pick-up truck, got out of it near check-
points and walked around them, entered another car 
and finally walked to the border for eight up to 24 
hours until they could cross it. Then a car took them 
to Tehran. Being trafficked from Nimroz to Tehran 
costs 1.5 million Toman (US $450). Each boy had rela-
tives in Iran who sent them the money to pay for the 
traffickers. The relatives expected the boys to work in 
Iran and pay the money back from their wages. 
One of the boys had helped farm his father’s land 
together with his brother. One month ago, he had  
decided to travel to Iran to work there. He was arrested 
by the police when he was on his way to work. Two of 
the boys had left Afghanistan only one week ago. 
Both came from Takhar in north-east Afghanistan 
where one had worked in a bakery and the other  
one in a food shop. They planned to look for work in 
Tehran, but the Iranian police arrested them when 
they were near Tehran province. Another boy had 
moved to Iran two months ago and was caught by the 
police one week before our visit. He had finished grade 
seven, left school and unsuccessfully looked for a job 
for one year. He travelled to Tehran where he worked 
for one month. Then he was arrested on the way to 
his job. Another boy had been in Iran previously and 
had been arrested near Shiraz four months ago.
At the police station, the boys had to pay 500,000 
Toman (US $150). Otherwise, the police would mistreat 
them and beat them and then put them in a detention 
camp. As the boys did not have money, the relatives 
deposed the amount in a bank account on their behalf. 
The Iranian police took the boys to the Afghan border. 
IOM officers received them there. The IOM only takes 
deportees who are under age or sick, accommodates 
them and sends them back to their families.
Nearly all the boys plan to try again to go to Iran 
for work to pay the money back to their relatives. 
Only one boy says that he will not do it but return 
home and work on his father’s farm again. He had 
creased to 246,838 (IOM Afghanistan, 2017a) and in 
2017 to 276,088 (IOM Afghanistan, 2017). 56 
The province of Herat has about 2.5 million in-
habitants of whom the Central Statistical Organization 
of Afghanistan identifies more than one-third (33.4%) 
or 808,000 persons as ‘migrants’ (CSO, 2017, p. 29). This 
term covers IDPs, deportees and returnees who have 
remained in Herat although this is not their area of 
origin as well as people (mainly Afghans) coming 
from Iran or elsewhere abroad. In Herat city–with an 
estimated population between 500,000 (Leslie, 2015,  
p. 8) and 800.000 (Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan 2015, p. 12)–47 per cent of the inhabit-
ants are ‘migrants’, of whom 43 per cent came from 
other districts of Herat province, nearly 30 per cent 
from other provinces in Afghanistan and 27 per cent 
from abroad, mainly Iran (CSO, 2017, pp. 30-31). In every 
village and quarter of the town, there are different 
IDPs, from Gholghan, Kushki Konat, Shindand, Farsi, 
Badghis, Ghor and Faryab. Their arrival has a substan-
tial impact on the economy and job opportunities. 
They work for less pay than the Herati people so that 
these often lose their jobs. Therefore, many Heratis 
have left for Iran.
Since the 1990s, the Iranian government has  
used deportation as a threat looming over the Afghan 
irregular migrants and as a political wildcard towards 
the government of Afghanistan. However, as a matter 
of fact, the Iranian rulers had neither seriously engaged 
in forced repatriation nor strictly enforced the control 
of Iran's border with Afghanistan (Rohani, 2014, p. 21) 
until about 2015. The IOM is running camps in Herat, 
where people who have been deported from Iran are 
taken care of for a short period of time and receive 
the transport fare to return “home”. 
Interview 6
We visit one of the rooms in Ansar camp 57 at the 
outskirts of Herat, where we meet six boys, between 
12 and 17 years of age. They were taken to the deportee 
camp the day before our visit. The boys explain why 
they had crossed the Iranian border, how they lived 
56 \  Between January and June 2018, IOM registered 179,000 deported  
Afghans from Iran, whereas 132,000 persons returned to Afghanistan 
on their own accord (IOM, 2018a).
57 \  Visited in November 2015.
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camp in Shiraz for several days and had to pay 56,000 
Toman (US $18.50) municipality tax. The police beat 
them when they were noisy, smoked or did not obey. 
One boy was pushed into a car with the hands tied  
on his back. The police would keep them in the camp 
until their number reached at least 500; then they 
would take all of them together to the Afghan border. 
All boys had their fingerprints taken in Iran. 
Seven boys have friends or relatives in Shiraz; one 
boy went to Shiraz because his trafficker suggested it. 
The boys report that nowadays the traffickers do not 
recommend going to Tehran. The usual payment to 
be trafficked from Zabul, Afghanistan, to Shiraz is 1.6 
million Toman (US $530). The boys pay in monthly  
instalments. Most of them knew their traffickers  
before, and if not, one would guarantee for the other 
that he will pay. They also knew that the trafficker 
could reduce costs or make payment due later, after 
the boy had gotten a job in Iran. The boys claim that 
the cheapest way is through Balochistan province of 
Pakistan, which costs only 1.2 million Toman (less than 
US $400). Five of the boys are indebted to traffickers. 
In Iran, four boys had jobs in construction, two in 
farming or garden work, one in tiling and one in plas-
tering. Some boys heard rumours about Afghans who 
had gone to fight alongside the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards in Syria; one boy was approached by a taxi 
driver from the army who suggested connecting him 
to the Iranian Army so that he could join the Syrian 
war, but he refused. Another boy had a friend who 
went to fight in Syria. He tells us that he was offered 
six million Toman (nearly US $2,000), but he still did 
not want to join. 
One of the boys explains that being the eldest son, 
he will go again to Iran. In his home area, he cannot 
work for the government–the Taliban would kill him. 
Another boy has to support his mother and therefore 
has to go back to Iran. Two further boys will go again 
to pay back their debts. Three of the boys intend to 
look for work in their home village or try to join the 
Afghan Army as they cannot afford to leave for Iran 
again.
received the money from his brother. The others are 
certain that their relatives in Iran will pay for the 
trafficking a second time. They all are aware that as 
soon as the Iranian police take their fingerprints, it 
will become hazardous to be caught again as this will 
mean three to six months of detention in prison.
Plans, desires and rationales of the deported boys:
The boys tell us that they will be kept in the  
deportee camp in Herat for one or two days and then 
be sent to their families, either accompanied or just 
receiving money for the transport. They intend to 
spend some time with their families before they try 
again to cross the border to Iran. They explain that as 
a labourer in Iran, they can earn up to 700,000 Toman 
(US $234) per month, and if they find jobs in shops or 
supermarkets, about 500,000 Toman (US $150). The 
best jobs are in construction, where labourers can 
earn up to 1.3 million Toman (US $434) per month.
The boys claim that there are no jobs in Afghani-
stan for them; therefore they have to leave the country. 
The father of one of the boys had died four months 
ago. As his mother is already old, it is now up to the 
boy to care for the family. Another boy says that his 
parents did not want him to go to Iran. When he  
returns, they will keep an eye on him so that he does 
not leave again. A third boy explains that he is the 
eldest son. His father has a small vegetable shop, but 
as there is no business, he is just hanging around. 
The first boy summarizes, “we do not have work here, 
so therefore we will have to go again.”
Details about being trafficked and caught: During a 
second visit of the Ansar deportee camp, 58 we meet 
eight unaccompanied (male) minors who had spent 
between ten days and one-and-a-half years in Iran 
before they were deported. Two of them had never  
attended school; four went to school until grade four 
and one until grade eight. One boy was older and had 
completed his Bachelor at Kabul University and 
worked with his relatives as a carpenter in Tehran. 
Four of them had gone to Iran and had been deported 
before; one of them four times. One boy had been  
imprisoned for two days when he was caught for the 
second time; others had not, but were detained in a 
58 \  In April 2016.
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Analysis: Eldest sons are under pressure to support their 
families; wages in Iran are attractive; boys get into a  
vicious cycle of indebtedness and repeated illegal border 
crossings irrespective of experiences of detention; Iranian 
Army officers recruit young Afghan illegal migrants for 
war in Syria.
The accounts of the young boys indicate that in the tra-
dition of the rural areas where most of them come from, as 
eldest sons, it is their responsibility to contribute to the live-
lihood of their families. However, paid occupations are hardly 
available in rural Afghanistan. Therefore, they are attracted 
by the opportunity to earn more money compared to Afghan 
average wages when they manage to find employment in 
Iran. This livelihood option is not only supported by some 
family members, but, it seems, also by some of the parents. 
Relatives advance the money for traffickers to take the boys 
across the border. This means that the boys are highly in-
debted not only because they have to pay back the money 
paid to the traffickers but also as they have to send money 
home to their families. Hence they have very few options in 
Afghanistan; either to become traffickers themselves or join 
armed groups or the national army, or try to cross the border 
again after having been deported. While the boys are aware 
of the risk of being beaten up, tortured and imprisoned by 
the Iranian police, they see no other option to fulfil their role 
to contribute to securing the livelihood of their families.  
Although most of the boys do not claim violent conflict or 
displacement as a reason for leaving Afghanistan, the ac-
counts of some boys indicate that the conflict context in 
their areas of origin has an impact on their decision to seek 
jobs abroad, for example, when they feel threatened by Taliban 
groups while working for the Afghan government. The  
reports of the boys however indicate that in Iran they may 
witness attempts of recruiting them for fighting by the  
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. This confirm media 
reports about young Afghans joining the war in Syria on the 
side of the Iran-supported Syrian government (HRW, 2017).
The deportee camp inhabitants are not only boys under 
age but also families. One example sheds light on the moti-
vation for a family to take the risk of staying illegally in Iran
Interview 7
Account of a deported family: A woman explains  
that she was arrested two days ago together with her 
husband and her two-year-old child and then deported. 
The family had started the journey from Kabul to 
Nimroz about 25 days ago. When they reached  
Kerman, they were arrested and deported to Nimroz. 
They started again and crossed the border from  
Nimroz to Iran. Somewhere near the city of Shiraz, 
the Iranian police arrested them and deported them 
to Herat. 
The woman tells us that about 14 years ago, she 
and her father, mother and siblings had moved from 
Pakistan to Iran. Her parents got Iranian passports 
and now have a small construction business there. 
Three years ago, she got married in Iran to an Afghan 
man from Maidan Shahr, Wardak province. After one 
year, they left Iran and moved to Maidan Shahr to 
stay with her husband’s family. The area was under 
Taliban control, and there were no jobs for them. 
Whereas people who had land were farming, she and 
her husband did not have land. As her husband had 
been working as a construction worker in Iran, he 
then tried to find a similar job in Kabul. However, he 
failed and came back home with no money. The family 
depended on his father for their daily expenses. These 
conditions made them decide to leave Afghanistan 
for Iran again.
Analysis: Lack of land and jobs pushes rural families to 
cross the border to Iran illegally; families split up between 
Taliban-controlled areas, government-held towns in  
Afghanistan and Iran 
The report of the woman shows that a combination of 
lack of land and employment for unskilled rural men, the 
need to sustain a family with children and job opportunities 
and relatives in Iran provide sufficient incentives for a whole 
family to undertake the risky illegal journey to Iran. As in 
the case of the deported boys, desperation about the lack of 
livelihood options in Afghanistan prevails. Failed attempts 
to secure livelihoods in rural and urban areas induce the 
family to try and cross the Iranian border again. 
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work permit 62, which is required whenever they 
change employer. Frequent change of employer is 
common for casual labourers in construction, one  
of the most common occupations of Afghan men in 
Iranian towns. As illegal workers, Afghans are perma-
nently at risk of being deported.
Afghan lower class people tend to live in the 
cheaper quarters of Iranian towns forming particular 
townships that may be nicknamed ‘Little Kabul’ or 
similar, as they acquire a shape that Iranians consider 
typically Afghan. These townships are also home to 
lower class Iranians, as in Golshahr, one of the eastern 
suburbs of Mashhad, with more simple and less 
well-maintained houses than in other quarters avail-
able for low rents from Iranian landlords (cf. also  
Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005).
Public buses that move between these suburbs 
and the city centre are full of Afghans going to work 
in the wealthier quarters in the morning and return-
ing in the evening. Whereas in general, Iranian citi-
zens treat Afghan immigrants with politeness, they 
express a lot of clichés and prejudices as soon as 
these Afghans leave the bus. It is common among 
Iranians to describe Afghans as not educated, hard 
(unskilled) workers, being after money, pretending to 
be poor but in fact running huge profitable businesses 
such as carpet trading, being terrorists, and mothers 
being prepared to send their sons to the war in Syria 
with the Iranian army to acquire high compensation 
payments when they die as martyrs. Some believe 
that Afghan refugees are treated better than Iranians 
(observations and informal talks in the women’s 
compartment in public buses in Mashhad, October 
2015). Afghan women often feel uneasy in the presence 
of Iranian women and tend to remain among their 
peers, avoiding closer contacts with Iranians beyond 
work relationships or being schoolmates. The behav-
iour of Iranians and Afghans—superficial politeness 
62 \  Obtaining/renewing a work permit costs nearly as much as one 
month's wages. Therefore, many Afghans in towns are hired without a 
work permit as cheap and compliant labourers doing jobs that Iranians 
would not do for low payment. Besides in construction, Afghans work 
as shopkeeper assistants or cleaners, household helpers or carriers, 
that is, in more or less invisible service jobs (interviews with Afghan 
wives of construction workers in Mashhad, October 2015).
In Mashhad, Iran
The majority of registered Afghan refugees and 
migrants stay in Iranian towns. A census conducted 
in 2006 showed that 32.7 per cent of these lived in 
Tehran (with about 15 million inhabitants in 2015), 
and 13.3 per cent in Mashhad, the second-largest city 
of Iran (2.7 million inhabitants in 2015) (Omidvar et al. 
2013, p. 357; estimates by geographers of the University 
of Tehran 2016 ). 59 Whereas the standard of living in 
Iran is significantly higher than in Afghanistan, the 
legal barriers for regular employment or business  
are also high, and Afghans depend on the goodwill of 
authorities and Iranian hosts to stay and make a living. 
With initially whole families moving to Iran, women 
were able to enter the labour market and contribute 
to livelihood-generation (where permissible) 60 and 
enrol their children in schools. The fact that they  
insisted on seeking education for their children 
proved to become a significant variable for refugees’ 
upward social mobility (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005). 61 
Until 1995, Afghans had access to subsidized food 
and health care as well as free education in schools 
but were not permitted to own businesses, land, or 
properties. Working as street vendors was not permitted 
even to Iranians, but was one of the illegal income- 
creating activities for Afghans in Iranian towns  
besides low-wage employment and casual labour  
(Rajaee 2000, pp. 47-48, 56-57). When the subsidies 
were cut, and work permits became more expensive 
in the 1990s, most Afghans stopped renewing their 
59 \  Conference “Political Reordering of Space and Optimal Governance  
of Tehran City” at the Center of Excellence in Political Geography at 
Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, March 7–8, 2016.
60 \  Women worked, for example, in a prayer shop or an NGO in Mashhad; 
sometimes they joined political activities; especially Hazara women 
were active in the Afghan Shi’a party Hezb-e Wahdat in Mashhad 
(interviews with a university professor in Mashhad and a film producer 
in Kabul, March 2016).
61 \  Afghans who had arrived during the Khomeini regime (1979-1989) 
had received a green card, and their children were allowed to attend 
school like Iranian children. Afghans who arrived later no longer had 
this privilege. Nevertheless, many Afghans, even if they were labourers, 
sent their children to school in Iran until they completed primary 
school and if possible, beyond, thereby making every effort to keep the 
children in school despite obstacles set up by Iranian teachers, the 
authorities (temporary stay permit) and relatively high fees (interview 
with a returnee in Kabul, March 2016). 
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and tolerance while dealing with each other but sus-
picion and prejudices once the other is no longer 
there—turn their relationship into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Many Afghans without legal documents are second- 
generation immigrants and have never been to  
Afghanistan. 63 They have adapted to the Iranian way 
of life and managed to earn an income. 64 The poorest 
among them mainly consist of female-headed house-
holds, households with male heads with a low level of 
education, low socio-economic status, unemployment 
or precarious job status, families belonging to the 
Sunni community and Afghans without a legal resi-
dential status. For these groups, marginalization does 
not only mean income poverty but often also food 
insecurity (Omidvar et al. 2013, p. 356) and dropping 
out of health care schemes (interview with a lower 
class family in Mashhad, 2015).
Analysis: Lower class Afghans form the lowest segment 
of society in Iran, doing work that Iranians despise and 
being socially marginalized and excluded. 
Exclusion is a mutual process that reinforces itself 
through prejudices, fear and suspicion. Nevertheless, work-
ing in Iranian towns has remained a valuable livelihood  
option for lower-class Afghans whose job opportunities 
dwindled in Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, the policies 
and policy enforcement of the government of Iran always 
have been ambiguous. Perceptions of cheap Afghan labour 
vary as being useful in sectors like construction and agricul-
ture, as cannon fodder in Iran’s proxy war in Syria, or as 
threatening when Iranians fear that Afghans compete for 
jobs, as in the fields of informal business, trade and services. 
63 \  The stricter law enforcement in Iran against undocumented Afghans, 
the statelessness of many second-generation Afghans and the grim 
future perspective prompted many young Afghans to try and escape to 
Europe through the Bulgaria route or across the Mediterranean Sea in 
2015 (author’s interviews with Afghans in Tehran and Mashhad, 2016).
64 \  According to a survey of second-generation Afghans in Iran, nearly  
36 per cent have integrated and acculturated themselves, whereas  
33 per cent have maintained a separated social life. 17 per cent have 
undergone a process of downward assimilation due to low job opportu-
nities and nearly 14 per cent have been marginalized (Abbasi-Shavazi 
& Sadeghi 2015).
Around Al-Asif Square of peri-urban 
Karachi, Pakistan
The Pakistani harbour metropolis of Karachi is 
famous as the “city of migrants”. It started in 1947 
with the foundation of Pakistan and the city’s trans-
formation from being a harbour town to a state’s  
capital. This transformation attracted many Muslim 
refugees from India. 65 Two immigration movements 
can be identified since then: The economic signifi-
cance Karachi acquired from the 1950s onwards 
caused internal rural to urban migration of diverse 
sectarian and ethnic groups from all over (West)  
Pakistan to settle in Karachi in search for work and 
income. After the war in 1971, immigrants from Bang-
ladesh (East Pakistan) also settled in the city. It became 
the economic centre of Pakistan (even when it lost 
the capital status in 1958), with an estimated 12 mil-
lion people (2005), at the time of writing 14.9 million. 
66 In 2005, estimates spoke of about 500,000 people of 
Afghan origin residing in Karachi, who made up 
about 10 per cent of the workforce in the construction, 
transport and wholesale and retail sectors (CSSR, 2005, 
p. 6). In spring 2017, informed interviewees estimated 
the number of Afghans in Sindh province, including 
Karachi, at 120,000 to 130,000 persons; 60,000 of 
whom are registered PoR-card holders. 67 
The melting-pot character of Karachi conditioned 
that even before the outbreak of violent conflict in  
Afghanistan in 1978, Pashto was one of the languages 
prevalent in the city, and not only Pakistani Pashtuns 
but also Afghans entertained prior relations with  
 
65 \  The population of Karachi more than doubled within one year from 
425,000 in 1947 to 1948 due to the influx of 472,000 refugees over a period 
of roughly nine months. In the 1941 census, its population was 386,000, 
in 1953 more than 1.3 million people. Cf. Ansari, 2013, p. 377.
66 \  The current figure is taken from Table 7 of the Provisional Census 
results (PBS, 2017). Population estimates have to be read with care for 
several reasons: On the one hand, all estimates from 1999 to 2017 were 
based on extrapolations of the census of 1998. Afghans and non-citizens 
were never included in the census, and until 2006-07 no census of  
Afghans in Pakistan has taken place. On the other hand, especially for 
Karachi the population estimates have to take account of administrative 
changes in the local urban governance framework. Here, several 
switches occurred between 2001 and today, with models like city dis-
trict and metropolitan area incorporating also surrounding rural areas 
into the city realm and erasing the distinction of urban vs. rural until 
this was reversed again (cf. Hasan et al., 2015, p.33).
67 \  Interview with SHARP-representatives in Karachi, March 2017.
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business partners and relatives in the city (CSSR, 2005, 
p. 17). Various interviewees—Afghans of diverse ethnic 
backgrounds and professions—mentioned this conti-
nuity in March 2017. Although the interviews (see  
Appendix) were conducted in a guesthouse of the l 
ocal community leader (Akakhel), interviewees not 
only resided in the Al-Asif apartment blocks but 
came from the larger Sohrab Goth area and reported 
about their livelihood-making and relations with  
Afghan settlements throughout Sohrab Goth. 68  
Although the Afghan refugees were supposed to be 
accommodated in camps, so-called Afghan refugee 
villages, the two provinces Northwest-Frontier and 
Balochistan along the border with Afghanistan, Karachi 
and its outskirts witnessed a considerable refugee  
influx in the 1980s. 69 Afghans who by majority hailed 
from different Pashtun tribes, either managed to 
move to Karachi after having registered in one of the 
Afghan refugee villages or they went there directly. 
Initial settlements were razed during violent turmoil 
in the mid-1980s when immigrant ‘Afghan Pashtuns’ 
were not distinguished from Pakistani Pashtuns in 
Karachi political fights between different ethnic fac-
tions. Interviewees mentioned several living areas 
around Al-Asif Square with different degrees of poor 
living conditions where destitute individuals squat 
on government land without tenure security. At Al-
Asif Square itself, the apartment blocks house a mix 
of residents, from more affluent, middle-class traders 
and skilled workers to lower middle and low-class  
labourers. In 2005, the number of residents was esti-
mated at 20,000 (CSSR, 2005, p. 12), of whom between 
68 \  Sohrab Goth was once a rural area 25 kilometres north of the city 
along the main Karachi-Hyderabad highway. With the (administrative) 
devolution scheme of 2001, it was included in the city administration 
because the scheme abandoned the rural‒urban distinction. From its 
infrastructure and settlement character, it is best described as a 
peri-urban area today. Interestingly, the (formerly nomadic) Akakhel 
tribe that is said to dominate affairs in Al-Asif Square since at least 
1994, has a history of seasonal migration from Afghanistan to Pakistan 
and seasonal/ winter camping in this area for decades, if not the entire 
20th century at least (cf. CSSR, 2005, p. 8 and interviews with Akakhel 
elders and other residents in Al-Asif Square in March 2017). The first 
Akakhel apparently settled down in the Sohrab Goth area in the 1960s, 
received domicile certificates and were later given Pakistani citizen-
ship (interviews, March 2017). 
69 \  By the mid-1980s, only one of more than 300 Afghan refugee villages 
was not located in these two provinces, but in Punjab (Mianwali) 
(Ghufran, 2011, p. 947). There were no camps in Sindh Province, the  
capital of which is Karachi.
60 (CSSR, 2005, p. 12) and 75 per cent (Interview, March 
2017) were Afghans of different ethnic backgrounds 
(except Hazara) and the remaining 40 to 25 per cent 
were Pakistani Pashtuns. In the 1990s, an additional 
wave of refugees arrived after food aid and other sup-
port was stopped initially for the Afghan refugee vil-
lages. For example, Jhangabad, near Al-Asif Square on 
the Super Highway, evolved as a result of this (CSSR, 
2005, p. 12). It is not developed and in transition from 
a basic squatter camp to a katchi abadi (irregular 
housing area without tenure security). It is home to 
garbage collectors, vegetable and market sellers and 
unskilled day labourers. Sohrab Goth’s Afghan popula-
tion is estimated at 90,000 (2017); many of the resi-
dents are second- or third-generation migrants. 
One Uzbek respondent, 55 years of age and 31 years 
in Pakistan (PoR-card holder) at the time of the inter-
view (March 2017), reported how the Afghans increas-
ingly settled in Sohrab Goth area. They (he had a family 
with two children by then) set up tents and founded 
an Afghan basti (village) which came to be known as 
refugee camp, and they even received ‘rations’ from 
the government of Pakistan. He worked in a nearby 
company as a low-skilled labourer, tried carpet weav-
ing for some time and daily labouring jobs; the family 
had to collect shrubs and fuelwood for cooking and 
heating near the settlement. Amenities like gas for 
the stone housing blocks came later, only after 5,000 
to 6,000 more people had arrived. He reports how his 
father’s house in Khanabad in Kunduz Province, was 
destroyed by Soviet forces. Today, Taliban rule beyond 
the main road. Nevertheless, because of the land that 
is still bringing some income, he visits Khanabad 
twice a year. His parents also came to Pakistan, and 
his mother is buried in the graveyard nearby. Besides 
land and trade relations, social networks are solidified 
through marriage arrangements.
The large-scale absence of formal support as it 
was provided in Afghan refugee villages in the other 
provinces, barred many Afghans in Karachi from  
education. Interviewees complain about the lack of 
access, not a single government school is located in 
the area, whereas madrassa education was possible 
until these Islamic schools were banned in 2001. This 
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does not protect Afghans from police harassment, extortion 
and detention. Lower-class Afghans fear that the balance 
between being able to eke out a living and being extorted and 
discriminated against by the police and rangers might soon 
be disrupted. None of the respondents is willing to go back 
to Afghanistan, however. Existing networks and occasional 
visits provide sufficient information and indicators that 
cause them to categorically reject that they can make a living 
in Afghanistan. The networks are mainly immaterial, but 
the asset base of lower-class Afghans is diverse. Marriage 
relations and land property in Afghanistan, the harvests of 
which can be tapped to some degree, provide the substance of 
translocal networks.  
In an agricultural area in Kerman  
province, Iran  
With the onset of a “closed-door policy” (Rohani, 
2014, p. 20) of the Iranian government from 1988 on-
wards (see section on History of refugee policies in 
Annex 1), two parallel processes could be observed: 
On the one hand, Afghans were no longer registered 
and, because they tended to stay in Iran, their status 
became illegal. Under these conditions, a process of 
downward assimilation of Afghans started, with  
Afghans accepting less payment than offered to  
Iranians for the same jobs (Rajaee, 2000, pp. 50, 56-57). 
On the other, Afghans increasingly crossed the border 
to Iran illegally during the Afghan civil war (1992-
1996) and the Taliban regime (1996-2001), seeking  
seasonal unskilled jobs in agriculture, construction, 
mines and quarries as well as casual work in urban 
markets and businesses (Rohani, 2014). Many unreg-
istered Afghan refugees and irregular migrants 
henceforth have avoided the towns and sought job 
opportunities in the rural areas of Iran where the  
social tensions appear to be lower (Tober, 2007).
leaves the better-off with the option to send their 
children to private schools and offers the poorer fam-
ilies an excuse to send their sons to work from a 
young age (cf. CSSR, 2005, p. 15, 27). In the health sector, 
the situation is slightly better. Although a newly built 
government hospital is not functional as there is no 
staff, a UN hospital is accessible to the Sohrab Goth 
Afghans. 
Police harassment and extortion is a central chal-
lenge for the poorest. They report that the majority of 
their income goes into bribing the police. Even garbage 
pickers have to pay 20 Rupees (US $0.19) upon entering 
and exiting one street. The police do not acknowledge 
the PoR-card extension and night raids with arrests 
are common, even though the arrested have the cor-
rect papers. In such cases, they bribe officers with an 
average of 6,000 Rupees (US $57) to get out. In many 
cases, the arrested or their relatives contact repre-
sentatives of SHARP, an implementing agency for  
the UNHCR, for legal assistance. This organization is 
reportedly preferred to the Commissionerate for  
Afghan Refugees (CAR) because of its practical legal 
assistance and experience. CAR representatives “only 
speak to large groups of refugees and represent them 
towards government officials” (Interview with vege-
table seller, March 2017).    
Analysis: Less outsider-status because of Karachi’s genesis 
as a migrant city, livelihood niches as in Iran, and close 
connections with Afghanistan
As in Iran, lower-class Afghans form the lowest segment 
of society and occupy a niche providing hard manual labour. 
Al-Asif Square resembles a microcosm where many unskilled 
jobs cater to the Afghan community itself because of its high 
concentration in the peri-urban outskirts of Karachi. Even 
though Afghans are an equal group among all immigrants 
that form Karachi’s population, Karachiites and ordinary 
Pakistanis have observed that there is more of a distinction 
between Afghans and Pakistani Pashtuns, and both groups 
of Pashtuns encourage the boundary-drawing between  
Afghans and non-Afghan Pashtuns respectively. Just like in 
other areas of Pakistan or Iran, their precarious legal status 
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Analysis: Refugee and irregular migrant categories become 
blurred in response to policy shifts towards deterring im-
migration; circular migration between Afghanistan and 
Iran as a livelihood option for the extended family; acqui-
sition of new skills in construction in Iran
The account of the Afghan worker discloses a blurred 
category of an irregular migrant and refugee, a typical feature 
as shown by the stories of the deportees. A combination of 
the need for cash income and political threat (here through 
Taliban groups) pushed him across the border; he has  
remained in touch with his family in Afghanistan and has 
visited them several times, then returned to Iran to continue 
working and sending money home. He plans to return finally 
when the conditions improve. As a construction worker, he 
has acquired new skills; as a farm worker, he has been able 
to make use of his previous occupation. Afghans in Iran  
frequently do both types of work, as Iranians would not 
work in these fields for the amount paid to Afghans. 
Interview 9
Account of an Afghan pistachio picker in the fields out-
side Sirjan: The owner of a pistachio farm introduces 
us to one of his farm workers who had arrived in  
Kerman from Ghazni, Afghanistan, in 2008. The farm 
owner and his wife are present during the interview. 
During the interview, the farm owner is smoking an 
opium pipe and offers it to the interview partner, but 
he refuses and enjoys a piece of melon instead.    
The interview partner had rented and run a  
supermarket in Ghazni and lived there with his  
extended family of eight or nine including his son. 
He mentions that his home area has been under the 
control of Taliban fighters since 2004 and that he had 
been on their side. He left Ghazni because there was 
fighting, and it had become impossible for him to 
work there. After he had initially joined the fighting, 
he did not want to continue. He first went to Mazar-i 
Sharif, spent nine days there and then travelled to 
Nimroz where he crossed the border to Iran. He had 
friends in Kerman and went there by bus—he says 
no one controlled the passengers on the bus, so he  
arrived safely.
Interview 8
Account of an Afghan farm worker near Sirjan, Kerman 
province: We meet an Afghan worker on a farm near 
Sirjan, a small town south of Kerman. 70 He origi-
nates from Farah province, where he has a farm of 
four hectares and had cultivated wheat and barley, 
grown pomegranates and raised sheep and had “good 
water” there. Then his wife died. He left his parents 
and children at the time when the Taliban conquered 
parts of western Afghanistan including Farah 
[around 1995]. He says that the Taliban came and left 
two or three times, then they stayed. He went to Iran, 
“because no money, no work. Taliban are dangerous; 
they cut heads”. He travelled straight to Kerman, 
where he found jobs in construction, mixing soils 
and making bricks. After two or three years, he  
returned to Farah and left again to continue working 
in Iran. He believes that he learned enough to work 
in construction in Afghanistan in the future.
He married an Afghan woman in Kerman. Initially, 
he used to have a work permit, but it expired. Never-
theless, he visited his family in Farah seven or eight 
times in all these years. He reports that it has become 
difficult to cross the border to Iran. Last time he went 
through Balochistan, Pakistan, with traffickers trans-
porting “fourteen people in a small car like sheep” 
and entered Iran through Zahedan. One year before 
our interview, his second wife died, and he left Kerman 
after 17 years. He went to Sirjan to work on farms there.
The interview partner still has his land in Afghan-
istan. His parents work in the field and rent out part 
of the land. His children are married and live in Farah. 
He says, “They are okay there. It is easier when I send 
money, although it is little”. If the situation changes, 
he would like to return to Farah; however, the Taliban 
are still strong in Farah. Therefore he cannot go.
70 \  In October 2015.
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Analysis: Job opportunities in Iran to secure families’ live-
lihoods in Afghanistan attract not only Shi’ites but even 
“Taliban” who have lost their economic basis and had to 
face social demise due to fighting in their home area;  
remittances are transferred through the Iranian employer 
acting as a broker
The account of the pistachio picker with a Taliban back-
ground in Iran indicates, first, that income opportunities in 
Iran attract Afghans who are not necessarily Shi’ite (the 
dominant faith in Iran and also, of the high number of  
Afghan Hazara staying in Iran). Second, it shows that the 
connections the government of Iran has built with some of 
the Taliban since 2014 do not only materialize at high political 
and military levels (Levkowitz, 2017), but that there are Taliban 
supporters among the irregular migrants and refugees who 
flee from the violence in their Afghan home areas like any 
other Afghan to secure their livelihood in Iran. Relationships 
with Afghans who are considered as ‘friends’, as well as good 
relations with the employer, who helps with the money 
transfer to Afghanistan (taking advantage of the fact that 
he can have a bank account, and certainly, taking some fees 
for his services), alleviate the stay in Iran. While the support 
of undocumented persons by Iranians provides some protec-
tion, at the same time, this creates dependence on the good-
will of the Iranian protectors, who profit from the brokering 
services.      
The account also reveals the importance of family bonds 
within Afghanistan which, like in the previous case, are 
maintained by occasional visits home and remittances. To 
finally return is the desire, but to a peaceful and economically 
attractive environment, not to an area at war. In this regard, 
the interview discloses an ambiguous position of the man 
with regard to war and peace, as, even though he occasionally 
joins the fight, he longs for peace and would even be ready to 
participate in peace negotiations if he was given a chance. 
We were not able to identify in the interview whether he had 
joined the fighting on the side of the Taliban for ideological, 
financial or ‘loyalty display’ reasons.
Finally, this case reveals the difficulties in categorizing 
Afghan displaced persons or irregular migrants according  
to social class. The interviewee’s work as an agricultural  
labourer suggests that he belongs to the lower class. 
Like his friends, he started working in various 
pistachio farms of the province, digging, making 
compost and harvesting. He tells us that he would 
like his family to come to Kerman; however, as long 
as the Taliban do not permit this, this is quite impos-
sible. In 2011, he returned to Ghazni. He stayed with 
his family for three months and joined the fight of 
the Taliban for one month. Soon, he “was tired of 
them” and left Afghanistan for the second time,  
returning to Kerman. This time, he had an Afghan 
passport. He sends part of his earnings to the farm 
owner’s account who, in turn, transfers it to the  
account of an acquaintance at the border. From there, 
the remittances enter Afghanistan and reach the 
man’s family.  In Kerman, he is in touch with other 
Afghans and stresses that he has no problems with 
the Afghans in the area. He mentions, however, that 
they avoid talking about politics here. He tells us that 
he may go back again and fight for the Taliban.
The wife of the farm owner is getting very  
nervous, because she realizes that this Afghan worker 
has been fighting together with the Taliban. The  
interview partner emphasizes that as a good Muslim, 
he never lies. He reports that he had studied theology 
for eleven years and adds that he had been a mullah 
in Ghazni and talked to the people in the mosque. He 
says that he has memorized the Qur’an and could  
immediately recite large parts of it by heart.
Asked about his plans and desires, the interview 
partner answers: “An easy life, relax, and work ... live 
without tensions, and work”. He adds that it will be 
important to end the war first. Asked if he was inter-
ested in participating in the peace process, he replies 
that he would like to be part of the negotiation process, 
“part of the solution”. He would speak for the refugees 
and their interests. He says that participating in  
the peace process will not be easy for him, however, 
because he is with the Taliban, and the government 
will not accept him.
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Pakistan and Iran have added new options with war 
recruitment in Syria for the Iranian regime (Quds 
Forces), seasonal fighting in either Afghanistan or  
Pakistan with Taliban groups or joining the Afghan 
national defence forces. 72 While these options are 
only taken up by a very small minority of displaced, 
the most common activity to secure one’s livelihood 
is to embrace options in the informal economy in the 
displacement context. As the examples throughout 
this Chapter have shown, these include child labour—
often thus perpetuating the systematic exclusion of 
lower-class children from education–and women’s  
informal work from home (Kuchi women spinning 
wool, making yarn threads). Men take up occupations 
in market niches, often involving specialized garbage 
collection, labouring in local markets and the like. 
Where aid agencies have ceased to provide food  
rations and cooking fuel, collecting wood in the sur-
roundings of settlements constitutes another segment 
of securing a livelihood. 
Importantly, the ability to negotiate a family’s 
everyday existence in informal settings—be it that 
one, several or all of the family members do not have 
the required status documents to stay in host contexts 
during displacement–is a cornerstone in securing 
one’s livelihood during displacement, and it also  
intersects with neighbourhood relations. It encom-
passes the constant assessment of the trade-off  
between advantages and disadvantages of staying in 
exile, i.e. the relative livelihood security (although it 
has to be laboriously achieved from day to day) vs  
discrimination and constant fear of arrest (especially 
in Pakistan) and deportation (rampant in Iran). 73 
72 \  Armed conflicts often create livelihood options in the shadow economy, 
such as smuggling, trafficking, arms sales, ancillary jobs for armed 
groups, looting, extortion, kidnapping, or joining armed groups as 
mercenaries or as paid fighters.
73 \  The general threat of arrest and deportation has been much more 
prevalent in Iran over the last decades given the existence of different 
formal status ascriptions to Afghans by the authorities and state  
administrative persecution of Afghans outside the formally defined 
channels, which also changed over time. In comparison, many  
Afghans in Pakistan were less discriminated against (of course, with 
regional and temporal variance)–both economically and legally–given 
the informal nature of the social, economic (and particularly employ-
ment) sector in Pakistan. As described in the previous sections, slow 
change set in after 2001. The situation worsened with the ensuing ‘war 
on terror’ – manifest in the census of Afghan refugees and a subse-
quently introduced distinction between those with a legal status 
However, his past as an educated mullah and shopkeeper in 
Afghanistan would instead make him part of the middle 
class. As the man has lost his shop and freedom to choose 
(otherwise he would have taken his family to Iran), depends 
on unskilled work to sustain his family and on occasionally 
joining the war as a combatant, he appears to represent a 
case of downward social mobility.
Summary: Livelihood options of lower- 
class Afghans
The previous empirical material and analyses  
relied on selected narrative interview accounts of 
people whom we considered lower class because they 
a) did not have any assets (such as land or houses or a 
shop) 71, b) no or little formal education or c) were 
working as casual labourers. Some people shared all 
of these three characteristics, others one or two of 
them. Equipped with these limited assets and capa-
bilities, the livelihood options of lower-class Afghans 
are diverse but on a low threshold level. Wherever 
possible, Afghans try to preserve their way of life 
within the extended family in one place because in 
their perception this is the best way to protect them 
from physical harm. Nevertheless, economic misery 
and needs but also the trajectory of violent conflict  
in Afghanistan have caused families to split up and 
expand existing or establish new translocal networks. 
Seasonal migration of entire family sections has 
always been a feature of certain segments of lower- 
class Afghans (e. g. winter stays in comparably warmer 
Jalalabad or the peripatetic mobility of harvest workers, 
trinket sellers and the like), as have the strategic  
efforts put into building translocal networks (before 
the outbreak of violent conflict mainly for enhancing 
options of labour chain migration).
However, the wars and increasingly adverse polit-
ical conditions in the neighbouring host countries  
 
 
71 \  Some of the interviewees have assets ‘back home’, e.g. land that rela-
tives or children use for securing their own livelihood. In one case, a 
respondent was able to travel to his land from Karachi twice a year 
and get his owner’s share of the harvest.
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Thus, the involuntary submission to discrimination 
and extortion—also bribing has to be afforded—can 
also be categorized as a livelihood option. This and 
the social network- and trust-building with the 
neighbouring social context in the best case provides 
Afghans in Iran and Pakistan with similar chances as 
local citizens, e.g. to obtain access to the housing 
market, land, or business licenses. In settings where 
the ‘outsider’ status of displaced people is less felt by 
them (e. g. in Peshawar), Afghans are also more easily 
able to take loans from neighbours and immerse 
themselves in local society.             
This said, however, it is important to be aware 
that even among these lower-class people, there are 
significant differences with regard to the category of 
future livelihoods. Some of them manage to send 
their children to school and even higher education so 
that the next generation may have the opportunity of 
middle-class livelihood options leading to a profes-
sional career in Afghanistan or abroad. Education and 
skills acquired during the displacement phase/s are 
likely to have a positive effect on future livelihood- 
making because they add options to the range of  
activities family members can undertake to secure 
livelihoods. Then again, in the regional social context 
where there are neither a rule of law nor governmental 
pro-poor policies, education does not suffice for social 
upliftment. As some of the accounts of those we have 
identified as lower-class people indicate, links with 
power holders are crucial for social mobility–and the 
fall of a power holder is likely to have an adverse  
effect on his followers. 74
(proof of residence, i.e. PoR-card) and those without and culminated 
after the Peshawar school attack in late 2014. Since then, the threat of 
arrest and deportation exists equally in Pakistan for non-PoR card-
holders. 
74 \  The account of the Kuchi elder in Maslakh camp who had been an 
officer in the regime of Najibullah and, after the regime was toppled, 
fled with his livestock, sold it and became an inhabitant of the IDP 
camp is a case in point. The mullah who sided with Taliban in Ghazni 
and worked as a pistachio picker in Kerman province in Iran may be 
another example for the reliance on powerholders.
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and Pakistan, money and socio-economic status have 
become more important for official local acceptance. 
This is especially true in Pakistan where, after  
Afghan refugees irrespective of their socio-economic 
status were allowed to settle down wherever they 
wanted, Afghan businesses constitute an important 
part of the national, even if largely informal, economy. 
Afghan entrepreneurs have dominated several sectors 
of the Pakistani economy for decades, e.g. the trans-
port sector and carpet-making and trade (even 
though via intermediaries). The ongoing ousting of 
Afghans from Pakistan implicates losses for Pakistan’s 
economic production and affects employment. 76 On 
the flipside, sentiments against Afghans are growing. 
A Pakistani businessperson and member of the Paki-
stan Carpet Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
in Lahore stated that the Afghans should ‘go back’. 77  
A Pakistani carpet seller in Lahore’s Landa Bazaar  
explained, “all the Afghans who used to be around 
this bazaar left four to five days ago because of the  
attacks”, alluding to the comprehensive security  
operations by police and rangers following the bomb 
attacks that took place just a few days earlier (see the 
empirical sections on Pakistan). They are back “where 
they belong. Afghans are not only carpet weavers and 
traders; they are also terrorists.” 78 This statement 
captures the current attitude shared by many Paki-
stanis towards Afghans that reportedly has evolved 
since 9/11. The blanket insinuation of Afghans being 
terrorists affects those most strongly whose features 
can clearly be identified to be of Afghan origin.
76 \  For example, one carpet trader mentioned that he employs 40 Pakistani 
workers for carpet finishing (washing and cutting) alone. Interview in 
Lahore, February 2017.
77 \  He explained, “50 to 70 per cent of the Afghans in Pakistan have  
already left to Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is getting 
better. Of the ones I know personally, about 70 per cent are gone. Those 
remaining have established their businesses here; their kids go to 
school. However, now the businesspersons are also leaving. Their pre-
ferred destinations are Norway, the US, Canada and India. It takes 
about two years for them on average to sort out business closure and 
arrange their departure. This is beneficial to our local carpet industry” 
(interview with Pakistani carpet trader, Lahore, February 2017).
78 \  Interview, Lahore, February 2017.
In the following, we briefly point out findings 
from the analysis of interviews with people from the 
In the following, we briefly point out findings from 
the analysis of interviews with people from the middle 
class in protracted displacement situations in Afghan-
istan and its neighbourhood. We will show how these 
markedly contrast the livelihood-generation of lower- 
class displaced people, because members of the middle 
class can rely on assets / dispositions and access  
opportunities that are not available to the lower class 75, 
including relationships with influential individuals 
and their social networks. The argument is made in 
three steps: First, we provide analytical insights from 
our interviews on how middle-class Afghans handle 
the challenges of integration and established‒outsider 
relationships in the displacement context. Second, 
we look into the relocation context after the return 
and specifics concerning the organization of the  
return movement to Afghanistan. Third, we discuss 
the large-scale refusal of Afghans (especially of the 
middle class) to return. Even if return is emotionally 
aspired to, it is generally considered not safe and  
for many Afghans not at all realistic in the current 
circumstances because sustainable livelihoods can-
not be secured. The Chapter ends with a summary of 
class differences in livelihood options by comparing 
those of the lower class vs the middle class.   
Specifics of local integration in the  
displacement context
Regarding local integration, poor and middle- 
class Afghans have long faced common challenges 
that in the past had more to do with the ethnic back-
ground than with social class. In the early days after 
the Afghan refugees’ arrival in the 1980s, the Iranian 
and Pakistani people unanimously welcomed them. 
They were considered muhajerin (refugees)–a term 
also used for the Prophet Mohammad’s forced exodus 
from Mecca to Medina. However, under conditions of 
increasing pressure from the authorities of both Iran 
75 \  These include, for example, access to higher education until the final 
exam, a professional career, property such as ownership of a house, 
land, a shop, etc., employment in government, in private companies or 
in media agencies.
Middle-class livelihoods in situations of protracted 
displacement
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barriers (language, behaviour, food, lifestyle, differ-
ences in parents’ employment status), temporary stay 
permits and lack of same rights as Iranians have;  
often Afghans try to hide their origin or try “not to 
enter the Iranians’ space.” 81 To circumvent discrimi-
nation, Afghans have established schools for Afghan 
children in areas densely populated by Afghans, such 
as Golshahr in Mashhad. These schools are unli-
censed and charge lower tuition fees than Iranian 
schools do. Moreover, enrolment does not require  
residence permits. According to Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), “Iranian authorities have issued warnings  
to these schools and have sporadically closed them 
down” (Bezhan, 2017).
It goes without saying that young Afghans in par-
ticular struggle with severe identity problems. A Pash-
tun Afghan student at the University of Punjab,  
Lahore, who was born in Haripur Hazara 82 refugee 
camp and currently studies on a foreigner’s admission 
slot, reports from an incident when they had a Japa-
nese guest lecturer who—upon learning that he was 
actually Afghan—burst out, “you are the terrorist  
people”, and walked away from him in front of his 
classmates. Now, when he is asked about his origin, 
he usually replies that he is from Peshawar and does 
not mention Afghanistan. He adds, “now we are  
[being called] ‘Hindus’ because of the Indian engage-
ment with the Government of Afghanistan” which is 
looked critically upon by the Pakistani government. 83 
“Earlier it was just that they called us Afghans or refu-
gees.” 84 Another Uzbek Afghan student shared his 
coping strategies to avoid discrimination at his faculty, 
saying, “I look like a Chinese. They [in my department] 
love me because I am the Chinese guy.” Another 
81 \  Student in Mashhad, March 2016; lecturer and film producer in Kabul, 
March 2016; cf. also Noghani & Akhlaghi, 2014.
82 \  Hazara refers here to the Hazara district in Pakistan, which is dis-
tinct from Hazara Afghan connotation. The student’s family hails 
from Sherzad district of Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan and  
returned after “22 to 25 years in the camp” to Jalalabad (Nangarhar’s 
provincial capital) in 2007. For his studies at Punjab University, he  
obtained an official study visa. The study expenses amount to US $1,000 
per year plus fees. His father–a shopkeeper and clothes trader–has  
reportedly taken a loan without interest; his brother remits from  
London to afford his education (interview in Lahore, March 2017).
83 \  Because of the Pakistani–Indian political enmity since partition in 
1947 (cf. Harpviken & Tadjbakhsh, 2016).
84 \  Interview, Lahore, March 2017.
Today, legal status and possession of a passport 
increasingly depend on the policies of the host country 
and thus constrain people from the middle class in 
the same way as from the lower class. The difference 
between the lower and upper middle class lies in  
the absence or presence of connections to influential 
figures (political and other authorities) and their net-
works which might be able to navigate access barriers. 
The interviews in Pakistan revealed, for example, that 
because in Pakistan the legal documents are only  
as strong as their holder/s, lower class Afghans are 
deprived of their rights, i.e. obtaining SIM-cards,  
driving licences, admission to schools and hospitals. 
In contrast, middle and particularly high(er middle) 
class Afghans benefit from the highly corrupt system 
and large-scale absence of the rule of law. In the 
words of one respondent, “the law is for poor people … 
for rich people there are no problems, the only ones 
who have any problem are poor people.” 79 
Middle-class Afghans who had lived in Iran  
explain how Hazaras, in particular, feel discriminated 
against in Iran, being mocked about their way of 
dressing or their ‘Mongolian faces’. “The Iranian  
government does not like the Hazaras despite the 
common Shi’ite religion, because of their faces”. 80  
Afghans feel that Iranians look down on them. Several 
interview partners talk about the discrimination of 
Afghans in education institutions, which has always 
been blatant both in Iran and Pakistan. Afghans in 
Pakistan speak of systematic discrimination in the 
Pakistani education system, stating that only two per 
cent of those with a secondary school leaving certificate 
(‘matric’) can join high schools and claim that there 
is not a single Afghan national who is pursuing a 
PhD in Pakistan. The institutional administrative 
hurdles are too high. In Iran, middle-class Afghans  
in Iran fared better than their poorer compatriots,  
because Iranian schools used to demand higher school 
fees from Afghans with temporary stay permits than 
from Iranians. In schools and universities, Afghans 
prefer to have Afghan friends; “they get along with 
Iranians but do not become friends” due to cultural  
 
79 \  Retired businessman, Lahore, March 2017.
80 \  Head of shura in Jabrail, Herat, April 2016.
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food, electricity, water, housing, TV). 86 In the case of 
Pakistan, especially middle-class Afghans reflect on 
the negative influence of the Pakistani media and 
populism in politics that target Afghans as terrorists 
and contribute to public hatred (ethnic profiling).  
As one interviewee put it, “each time Ashraf Ghani 
[Afghanistan’s president] says something wrong 
about Pakistan it affects us here immediately. We are 
arrested in droves the day after the news.” 87 Also, the 
recently launched policy directives of the government 
of Pakistan have complicated their situation. The  
order to landlords to no longer rent to Afghans or the 
ubiquitous checks and arrests mentioned in the pre-
vious section are cases in point. Unlike lower-class 
Afghans, middle-class Afghans like entrepreneurs 
and students often actively seek the connection with 
Pakistani authorities as a pre-emptive strategy to 
avoid harm from their extended families and wards. 
They usually have the paperwork ready and patiently 
fill in forms at police stations about the family mem-
bers living with them; they seek information on new 
extensions of the documents now replacing the PoR-
cards. Several interviewees showed a minimized copy 
of the latest extension letter that they carefully lami-
nated and carry with them all the time in case they 
are being stopped and need to argue with coarse  
police officers whose main aim is extortion.    
According to interviewees’ accounts, local inte-
gration was practically (even if not legally) given in 
Pakistan until 2014 at least. Most interviewees insisted 
that during social interaction it is neither visible nor 
tangible that they are non-Pakistanis. 88 The high 
number of bi-national marriages especially until 2008 
 
 
86 \  Film producer in Kabul, March 2016..
87 \  Interview with Afghan-origin NGO worker in Islamabad, March 2017.
88 \  Interviews with carpet traders and a student, Lahore, March 2017. 
Within Pakistan, however, there is broad intra-societal ethnic- and 
class-based discrimination that is also perceived by Afghans residing 
there. Especially because of the ethnic dominance of Punjabis and 
their administrative and other discrimination against Pashtuns from 
the (north- and south-) western part of the country, especially the tribal 
areas (FATA), Afghan Pashtuns are also subject to prejudices and dis-
criminate behaviour and sometimes share the grievances of members 
of these groups of Pashtuns, e.g. from South-Waziristan. As one human 
rights activist pointed out, although there are many Pakistanis who 
are more vulnerable than Afghans in Pakistan, only refugees enjoy 
broad advocacy of legal rights (interview in Islamabad, March 2017).  
graduate from Balochistan reports that misleading 
people about their origin is a common strategy that 
also Afghan Hazaras in Quetta (Balochistan’s provin-
cial capital) apply; “they change their accent to protect 
themselves and mislead people who could think that 
they are from Afghanistan”. 85
In the Iranian context, issues with identity are 
caused by frequent attempts to return to Afghanistan 
and renewed movement because the standard of living 


































85 \  Focus group discussion, Lahore, March 2017.
Box 1  
Narrative reflection of a second-generation Pakistani  
citizen with Afghan origin
The Punjab University graduate who hails from Quetta, Balochistan, 
is a second-generation Pakistani and CNIC-holder (Pakistani citizen-
ship). His father and grandfather originated from Helmand in Afghan-
istan. His grandfather moved from there to Balochistan as a recruit of 
the British Indian army. The graduate complains that despite his  
being a second-generation Pakistani, a regular scholarship holder at 
Punjab University with a BA in Sociology and MA in Psychology,  
currently a guest lecturer and a core member of the university’s rugby 
team, the segregation and stereotyping “is all the same. As Afghan in 
Quetta you are not liked; if you are caught speaking Persian you get 
shot… if you speak a different Pashto you are suspicious; if you come 
over here [to Lahore, Punjab], you are also questioned. If you have a 
beard and wear shalwar kameez [traditionally-cut local dress, common 
among Afghans and Pakistanis], you are suspected and looked at 
strangely. I am in a Pakistani rugby team; half of my team members 
would not shake hands with an Afghan team member.” Talking further 
about his experience in Quetta, he adds, “If something happens,  
Afghans cannot leave the house because they are afraid of being targeted 
and made responsible. The businesses of Pakistani Pashtuns in Quetta 
completely depend on Afghans. But now [in these circumstances] these 
customers withdraw from relationships, take a step back, corner Afghans 
and treat them as outsiders.” 1 He goes on arguing that Afghans have 
suffered a lot and are deeply traumatized because of decades of conflict. 
Referring to himself as Afghan again, he states, “We want to move on, 
we don’t want to be in conflict 24/7. It’s like we have been painted and 
the colour won’t go off; nobody can see who or how I am under that colour.”  
1 \  Interview, Lahore, March 2017.
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were part of a longer chain of movement events. 92 As 
Monsutti had expressed already in 2005, migration is 
normal for Afghans, and large parts of Glimpses from 
interviews indicate how fragile their residence status 
was—in previous living (‘host’) contexts (see Box 1 
above)—and still is.. For example, one Turkman inter-
viewee pointed out how the GoA considers Afghani-
stan’s Turkmen to be refugees from what is now Turk-
menistan whereas Turkmenistan sees Afghan 
Turkmen as a threat to its domestic security. In an-
other example, an Uzbek woman from what is today 
Uzbekistan had married an Afghan Uzbek before  
conflict-induced displacement caused them to restart 
in Pakistan (interviews in Lahore, March 2017). the 
Afghan society are not rooted in land. Their culture is 
shaped by mobility. Links between people are estab-
lished over a long distance, and social relations are 
more decisive than places (Monsutti, 2005, p. 19).  
Specifics of return and reintegration in 
Afghanistan
Under the conditions of enhanced efforts by the 
governments of Iran and Pakistan to drive Afghans 
out of their countries, middle-class repatriates can 
rely on strong networks that lower class people do 
not have. These networks may include relatives who 
host the returnees temporarily; they may own land 
and properties to settle down or to use as an asset to 
obtain other property and/or seed money. 93 Moreover, 
strong networks generate seed capital from relatives 
abroad. One respondent describes, for example, how 
having a transnational network of family 
92 \  Glimpses from interviews indicate how fragile their residence status 
was—in previous living (‘host’) contexts (see Box 1 above)—and still is.. 
For example, one Turkman interviewee pointed out how the GoA con-
siders Afghanistan’s Turkmen to be refugees from what is now Turk-
menistan whereas Turkmenistan sees Afghan Turkmen as a threat to 
its domestic security. In another example, an Uzbek woman from 
what is today Uzbekistan had married an Afghan Uzbek before conflict- 
induced displacement caused them to restart in Pakistan (interviews 
in Lahore, March 2017).
93 \  Abbasi-Shavazi et al. report that return to Afghanistan was “considered 
to be more viable for those with capital and/or assets, or with educa-
tion or literacy, or skills; respondents aspired to save sufficient capital 
prior to returning to Afghanistan in order to purchase property there” 
(2005, p. 1).
is witness to this. However, such families have been 
facing administrative difficulties, and experienced 
personal tragedies since Pakistan’s anti-Afghan policy 
peaked in 2015/16. The CNICs of Afghan-origin males, 
who married Pakistani women and had (in some cases 
most likely illegally) obtained Pakistani citizenship 
previously, were blocked. 89 Especially the educated 
and young respondents articulated some degree of 
dissatisfaction with the Pakistan(i government and 
people); since 2015 they have been sensing distrust 
and have had the impression that Pakistanis look 
down on Afghans. The feeling of juridical inequity,  
e. g. the lack of de facto protection, 90 in the view of 
some middle-class Afghans, is harder to accept than 
the deprivation of other rights (e.g. obtaining driving 
licenses, bank accounts, SIM-cards 91, exclusion from 
government jobs, property ownership, rental contracts 
for houses, private company registration). It affects 
business people in cases of business conflicts, in  
particular, e. g. when some Pakistanis do not want to 
pay the service or product delivered by the Afghan 
entrepreneur.  
Among the better-off Afghan residents in Lahore 
and Sohrab Goth/ Al-Asif Square in Karachi, many 
have had a migration background before their dis-
placement to Pakistan (see Box 1 above). Several Uzbek 
and Turkman Afghans reported that their parent gen-
eration had migrated from the former Soviet Union 
to northern Afghanistan. Thus, for them, the renewed 




89 \  Legally, only Afghan women married to Pakistani men could get  
Pakistani citizenship. Children from marriages of Afghan men and 
Pakistani women are stateless (interview with a lawyer in Islamabad, 
March 2017). Thus, Pakistan has acquired the largest number of state-
less people in the world (Interview with GIZ-SAFRON advisor, Islamabad, 
March 2017).
90 \  According to the constitution, Afghan PoR-cardholders can file com-
plaints (First Information Report, FIR); however, no police station will 
accept and register a FIR in practice.
91 \  According to various interview accounts, Afghans in Pakistan had 
SIM-cards and bank accounts under their own name. However, this 
has become increasingly problematic since 2014. Registering a SIM-
card now requires a lot of effort and usually support and assistance is 
required from a Pakistani rights-NGO.
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Hazaras and Pashtuns sounds irreconcilable in many 
of the Hazaras’ accounts documented in the inter-
views. Their persecution during the civil war in the 
1990s by Tajik and Pashtun militias of the various 
warlords has added to their grievances of being dis-
criminated against by the Afghan state since its very 
inception (Ibrahimi, 2012, 2017; cf. also Monsutti, 2005). 
As returnees from Iran, Hazaras and others are dis-
criminated against because of their Iranian accent, 
but the fact that Hazaras are also discriminated 
against because of their race multiplies their percep-
tion of discrimination. One university lecturer stated, 
“It is easier for a Hazara to make friends with a Dutch 
or a French person than with a Pashtun. The gap is 
deep. The way they behave, their mindset, how they 
throw the money to you, does not show respect–as if 
they want to eat you … whereas even though the cul-
tural difference with a French person is huge, we can 
accept our difference”. 95 Thus, all communities prefer 
to settle down in neighbourhoods of members of the 
same ethnic group. 96  
Specifics of middle-class ‘non-return’
While the prevalence of ‘strong networks’ among 
middle-class displaced people seems to suggest that 
they would readily agree to repatriate because of their 
comparably better prospects for reintegration, the 
field data shows the high reluctance of this group to 
return. Many see no perspective in Afghanistan; very 
few voluntarily return from Iran and Pakistan; return, 
de facto, is forced. Importantly, the interviews indicate 
that the better the Afghans are established as entre-
preneurs with their businesses, the less they feel 
pressured to leave. 97 Thus, voluntary, de facto forced 
return involves mainly poor Afghans. This was cor-
roborated by explanations obtained from several Af-
ghan-origin carpet traders in Lahore who mentioned 
that almost all of their contracted Afghan carpet  
95 \  Film producer in Kabul, March 2016
96 \  This leads to almost ‘segregated’ settlement patterns in the high  
return areas, especially Kabul, but also Herat and Jalalabad. See Mielke 
(2015) for Kabul.
97 \  Representative of this is the interview with a Tajik storeowner in one 
of Lahore’s posh markets who had lived in Pakistan for 29 years at the 
time of the interview in February 2017.
members—including some in Canada, Australia, the 
United States or European countries, Iran and cities 
in Afghanistan–provides safety. “It works like a back-
up. If a family member faces a problem, the Australian 
or Canadian members help–or even the family part 
in Iran”. 94 Social networks are crucial, also for finding 
employment. Whereas this is also true for those from 
the lower class, the middle-class networks enable 
them to establish relations with influential people 
who can be helpful in obtaining well-paid jobs or 
public positions. Commonly, these networks are 
based on kinship or ethnic ties (cf. Monsutti, 2005; 
Harpviken, 2014).
Besides strong networks, skills and education are 
noteworthy entry points for context-situated ‘suc-
cessful’ (re)integration after return. Due to education 
and training, which middle-class displaced people 
can afford in contrast to the urban lower-class, they 
enjoy better starting conditions upon return. Com-
bined with the other factors–strong networks with 
seed money, contacts to holders of influential posi-
tions, information-sharing, eventually own property 
or assets–the reintegration and return trajectories of 
middle-class Afghans are highly distinct from that of 
their lower class countrymen who lack most if not all 
of these resources.
As in displacement contexts, ethnic boundary- 
drawing between Afghans of various backgrounds  
becomes virulent after their return to Afghanistan or 
their relocation after internal displacement. Group 
identities are narrowed down to one’s own ethnic 
group or extended family in the context of competi-
tion for access and resources to generate livelihoods 
in a highly politicized context. This has been most 
pronounced in the case of Hazara returnees (see Box 2 
below). Not only do they have to grapple with new 
stereotypes as being returnees but also with old-time 
patterns of racial discrimination. The gap between 
 
 
94 \  He adds, “However, whereas in Afghanistan families used to have 
close ties and helped each other, in modern families, they start to be 
more individualistic; uncles and aunts do not help, only brothers,  
sisters and parents” (film producer in Kabul, March 2016).
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of facilities, e. g. quality schooling, employment and 
investment infrastructure, constitutes the other side 
of the coin. “We can neither stock carpets in Afghani-
stan nor have a showroom because of the instability 
and bad security situation. The risk that the goods get 
burned because of bombs, etc. is too high. Also, it is 
cold in Afghanistan. We would not be able to wash 
and colour carpets for five months of the year. Then, 
there is no efficient export system.  
our areas as well”. Another one adds, “Even if you find a way to work in 
Afghanistan, you are subject to extortion by the Taliban and Daesh. It’s 
a war-like situation. If you have a patient [somebody in need of medical 
treatment] you do not get anywhere [because services are not available].” 
Focus group discussion with Uzbek carpet entrepreneurs in Lahore, 
March 2017. Another interviewee active in an NGO facilitating return 
to Afghanistan stated that people often refuse to go back because of 
political enmities they have, especially with the Taliban (interview, 
Islamabad, March 2017).
weavers had left. While most of them returned to  
Afghanistan, few moved to Peshawar–with the effect 
that the traders lost a pool of workers: “Large carpet 
weaving ‘factories’ had existed in Haripur, Peshawar, 
Quetta and other places. (…) Those Afghans who go 
back cannot work as carpet weavers, using their 
skills; they have to sell goods or so in the bazaars now 
or find daily labouring jobs. It’s a pity when carpet 
weaving masters go back, and their skills are lost.” 98
The reasons why middle-class representatives are 
reluctant to return are highly insightful. Just like 
their poor compatriots, they are also concerned  
about the overall (deteriorating) security situation in 
Afghanistan, both in urban and rural areas. 99 The lack 
98 \  Interview with carpet trader originating from Farah, Lahore, Febru-
ary 2017.
99 \  The head of one business family involved in carpet-making describes, 
“If we go back to Afghanistan we cannot get our land back or rebuild 
our houses. Now it is not just the Taliban but Daesh has a presence in 
Box 2  
Settlement of Pashtuns and returning Hazaras in Herat
Many Pashtuns from central and southern Afghanistan moved to Herat under the rule of the Taliban (1996-2001). Their immigration to Herat 
was accepted by the Heratis because Pashtuns had supported the governor of Herat, Ismail Khan (himself a Tajik), who was well respected by the 
Herati inhabitants during the 1990s. After the ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, many Hazaras returned to Herat from Iran and many other 
parts of Afghanistan, buying land and settling down, for instance in the Jabrail quarter of Herat. However, most Heratis rejected the newcomers 
as they suspected that Iran paid them as a strategy to increase the Shi’ite population. They were also rejected due to local causes related to a power 
struggle between Afghan parties that took on a sectarian dimension when the governor Ismail Khan disarmed the Afghan Hezbollah party led by 
a Shi’ite. 1 This power struggle culminated in violent clashes and the ban for Hazaras to celebrate Ashura during Muharram 2 by Herati author-
ities. After the mediation of a joint council of religious leaders, the Hazaras were granted the right to celebrate in their neighbourhoods, but not in 
other public places. With armed fighting surging again since 2014, newly displaced people from various Afghan provinces such as Faryab and Farah 
where Taliban groups had expanded their control sought refuge in Herat. Herati citizens are concerned that their modest economic wealth cannot 
be maintained when insecurity is driving investors out of the country, and increasing numbers of newcomers settle in the town. Many fear a crisis 
due to growing unemployment, and Herati labourers consider Hazaras and people from Badghis and Farah as competitors for jobs because they 
work for much less pay. Heratis also fear terrorist attacks from newcomers endangering the comparatively peaceful life in the town. This said, 
when seven Hazaras were cruelly murdered by putative Daesh-Khorasan in Afghanistan in Ghazni in November 2015, people from all groups– 
Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras–took to the streets in huge protest demonstrations, signalling unity and the potential for reconciliation 
among the ethnic groups. 3 Still, distrust remains, as expressed by the head of an Afghan NGO in Herat as follows: “The ember is still there. It 
needs a small wind to restart the fire. We are working hard to wipe it out”. 4 
1 \  Khalid Ali Ahmad, who later became head of the intelligence (NDS).
2 \  Muharram is the first month in the Islamic calendar and the time when some Shi’ites celebrate Ashura, the mourning about the murder of Imam 
Hussein, the grandson of Prophet Mohammed.
3 \  Interviews with the local head of an Afghan NGO and with Hazara elders of Jabrail council in Herat, April 2016; see also Qazi, 2015.
4 \  Interview in Herat, April 2016.
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Rather than returning, the carpet traders admit 
that they have seriously considered the option of ask-
ing for third-country asylum. However, they express 
that there is no proper information available to them 
about this option. “All the NGOs have vanished after 
9/11. We just rely on NGO support in cases of trouble,  
e. g. when we are in need of SIM-cards or want to rent 
places. The situation in Pakistan is getting worse 
every day. Whether it be obtaining SIM-cards, proper-
ty or bank accounts–we cannot do it.”  that they have 
seriously considered the option of asking for 
third-country asylum. However, they express that 
there is no proper information available to them 
about this option. “All the NGOs have vanished after 
9/11. We just rely on NGO support in cases of trouble, e. 
g. when we are in need of SIM-cards or want to rent 
places. The situation in Pakistan is getting worse 
every day. Whether it be obtaining SIM-cards, proper-
ty or bank accounts–we cannot do it.” 103 
Summary:  
Class differences in livelihood options
The insights from interviews with members of 
the Afghan middle class, i.e. those with (some sort of) 
assets, (higher) education and access to other em-
ployment than daily labouring, highlight significant 
differences compared to Afghans from the lower class. 
First of all, the quality of networks stands out, i.e. 
what has been termed above ‘strong networks’. These 
entail persons (relatives and other resource persons) 
and flows that can generate material support, such as 
seed money for settling down or investments like 
opening a shop or other business. Second, contacts or 
access to influential persons due to the immaterial 
(education, skills, status or family background and 
existing networks) and material assets (property) are 
common and help to secure their livelihood in dis-
placement situations and upon return. They provide 
access to employment, shelter, and assistance. The 
 
 
103 \  Interview with carpet business trader in Lahore, February 2017.  
Afghans were never officially allowed to purchase property in Pakistan. 
However, it was common practice to obtain land or real estate through 
Pakistani middlemen or bribes. With the crackdown on Afghans since 
2014 this has become increasingly impossible.
Here we can call the haulier at noon, and it will 
be on the road by night. In Afghanistan, until recently 
it took three months to arrange exports. Now re-
forms have been implemented and sending would 
take five to seven days. However, this requires a lot  
of bribes. Also, there is no efficiently organized carpet 
association.” 100 
Similarly, Afghan transport and liquid gas com-
pany owners in Iran (in joint ventures with Iranian 
citizens) rely on customers in the region. They prefer 
having their main offices in Iran and making invest-
ments in Iran rather than in Afghanistan. Reasons 
range from high corruption of Afghan government 
authorities, lack of skilled workers and engineers in 
Afghanistan to security risks. In line with Iranian law, 
they employ Iranians for operations in Iran; some 
use undocumented Afghan workers for loading and 
unloading. They only hire Afghan drivers and workers 
for transports through Afghanistan. 101 
The interviews in Pakistan carry the general  
undertone that all of the respondents would happily 
take on Pakistani citizenship; they deeply regret that 
there is no such opportunity or legal way to obtain 
citizenship in Pakistan. Representative of the remarks 
by middle-class businessmen were comments like 
these: “We have spent 36 [25, etc.] years in Pakistan, 
we are familiar with everything here. We should get 
more rights, our own land and offices because we are 
settled here. We need further progress here. Going 
back is not an option. We tried hard to obtain  
export licenses, but they are always denied to us. […] 
My brother left Pakistan in 2002 for Turkey with US 
$30,000. After five years, he received the Turkish citi-
zenship–in 2008; he is safe, settled and well estab-
lished. One of his sons serves in the Turkish military; 
one is a police officer. I wish we had these possibilities 
in Pakistan, too. Our sons and family members are 
also qualified to work in the government services 
here.” 102 
100 \  Carpet trader in Lahore, February 2017; for the changes in transport 
regulations in Afghanistan cf. Grawert & Shirzad, 2017.
101 \  Focus group discussion with Afghan transport company Chief  
Executive Officers in Mashhad, October 2015; cf. also Grawert & Shirzad, 
2017.
102 \  It is worth mentioning that Afghans are excluded from government 
employment in Pakistan (interview with carpet business trader in 
Lahore, February 2017).
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remarked in one interview, “We were among the 
lucky refugees. We saw the problems of the other  
refugees who did not have relatives in Pakistan.” 107 
The empirical sections above show further how 
networks help to negotiate an individual’s or family’s 
position in the displacement context as well as ‘back 
home’. In exile, social and cultural skills of adaptation, 
expanded social ties to different locations, the ability 
to move goods and money across borders and, in the 
ideal case, free movement of persons between dis-
persed family locations are the basis for successful 
integration of refugees. Altogether, this has the effect 
of minimizing risks due to the spatial and economic 
diversification of livelihoods, which sustain family 
parts in the long run (Monsutti, 2008, p. 71). The abili-
ty to overcome constraints connected to the refugee 
status and to afford education, a work permit, some-
times even informally ‘owning’ a flat, 108 opening a 
joint venture, accumulating capital to buy property 
in Afghanistan upon return, or arranging for resettle-
ment distinguish the middle from the lower class.
Middle-class Afghans with education and skills 
sought to move to urban areas, e. g. the towns of Tehran, 
Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz or Qom in Iran and to Quetta, 
Peshawar and Karachi in Pakistan where they often 
run joint ventures with Iranians 109 or teach in Afghan 
schools under semi-legal conditions or make use  
of opportunities in the labour market. Lower- class 
Afghans in Iran, however, work as unskilled labourers 
in construction or petty trade, as shopkeeper assis-
tants or cleaners, household helpers or carriers in 
towns and as agricultural labourers in the rural areas 
of Kerman and the southern provinces. In Pakistan, 
most of the lower class Afghans initially got absorbed 
in refugee camps that concentrated just across the 
border from eastern Afghanistan, i.e. in Pakistan’s  
 
 
107 \  Son of a former army officer in Kabul, November 2015.
108 \  Middle-class Afghans in Mashhad managed to ‘own’ their flats 
based on an informal “deed of title negotiation between the buyer and 
seller without official government registration” that allows for legal 
recognition (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005, p. 30).
109 \  Afghans in Iran are not allowed to buy a house or a vehicle unless 
they have registered a joint venture with an Iranian partner.
networks of middle-class Afghans are spatially and 
economically more diversified and constitute an  
important factor in their successful risk aversion in 
comparison to the rather ‘weak networks’ of the 
members of the lower class. The quality of the infor-
mation exchanged in the latter, and the low-level  
material support that is dominating the flows among 
the lower class often reduces their networks to provide 
moral support and roughly enough material support 
to ensure survival and the maintenance of dignity in 
their own measures in conflict settings.     
As a rule, the socio-economic status of the middle- 
class respondents enables them to arrange a some-
what organized movement into exile or refuge and a 
somehow ‘ordered’ arrival. Mobility has to be afforded 
104 and backed socially by ‘strong networks’ even if it 
means seeking refuge because of forced displacement. 
Historically, Afghan refugees who had had government 
positions or were scholars and had fled for political 
reasons during the different waves of displacement 
(1978/79, 1990/91, 1994-1998) used, for example, their 
assets and networks of relatives and acquaintances 
and sometimes professional networks 105 to arrange 
shelter, assistance (access to UNHCR-card) and  
employment. Even access to a refugee camp with free 
education and food distribution was alleviated through 
connections with a political party, power holder or 
warlord. 106 Confirming the contrast to lower class 
people’s displacement trajectories, a respondent 
whose father had social ties to Peshawar and Quetta 
104 \  Cf. among others Monsutti (2005, pp. 150-205), where he describes the 
routes Hazaras used during the 1990s, indicating the costs involved 
and the ways of money transfers to finance circuit migration between 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.
105 \  This is also a strategy of business people. For example, one store-
owner in Lahore’s Liberty Market pointed out how he had developed 
close relations with the employees of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul 
before the outbreak of the war in 1979 and that the embassy’s driver 
helped his family to move to Pakistan (interview in Lahore, February 
2017). In another example, a carpet trader in Lahore reported that his 
father had had business ties with shops in Quetta before 1979 (inter-
view in Lahore, February 2017). Local delegate-representatives (wakil) 
in Zahir Shah’s government and important families had access to  
political asylum but often did not use this possibility because they 
hoped their displacement would only be temporary and they would 
able to return soon (interview with son of Turkman wakil in Lahore, 
February 2017).
106 \  Interview with a journalist in Kabul, November 2015, who also men-
tions that the ‘cost’ of this beneficial relationship, was to induce a 
family member to join a warlord’s armed group.
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livelihoods. Established-outsider (or settled-arrivals / 
citizen- newcomer) relations underlie this dilemma 
and amplify exclusion which is most painfully felt by 
lower-class Afghans. Citizenship for Afghans in Paki-
stan and Iran or the regularization of their legal stay 
(status), especially for those born in either country or 
the families living there in the second generation, is 
a desired but unattainable option in the current  
political circumstances.      
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and out-
side of Peshawar (former Northwest-Frontier Province, 
now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). 110 As in Iran, Afghans are 
not allowed to open their businesses or establish 
trade in Pakistan, where this restriction strongly  
affects, for example, the carpet traders of Afghan ori-
gin. As Afghans (even with valid documents), they are 
unable to acquire a membership in the Pakistan  
Carpet Trade Organization which is a precondition 
for obtaining export licenses. In consequence, Afghan 
carpet businesses have to partner with a Pakistani 
trader or middleman to be able to advertise and 
showcase their work at national and international 
exhibitions and sell internationally. The label under 
which their products are sold is always ‘Made in  
Pakistan’ (cf. Recknagel & Tahir, 2007). Nevertheless, 
middle-class Afghans are highly reluctant to leave 
Pakistan and return (to misery and war) as long as 
the prospects of sustainable livelihood cannot be met 
in Afghanistan.
Despite the different options of securing one’s 
livelihood that middle- and lower-class Afghans have, 
other factors such as the ethnic framing of group  
belonging and livelihood chances, as well as the  
restrictive national refugee policies, inhibit Afghans’ 
agency and activities to secure a sustainable liveli-
hood. Current context conditions—which also include 
the lack of government support for IDPs inside  
Afghanistan—at most allow ad hoc and temporary 
measures to secure livelihood with a constant risk  
of loss. The fact that options of obtaining business  
licenses or property in displacement contexts abroad 
are withheld and, more generally, the difficult access 
to land and other assets undermine sustainable 
110 \  Monsutti (2005, p. 168) observed that the Hazaras rarely stayed in 
refugee camps in Pakistan and did not ask international aid agencies 
for assistance in return or repatriation. They pursued strategies of  
social advancement in urban settings such as Quetta. According to 
interview accounts, the Pakistani government allowed Afghans to 
leave the refugee camps and settle throughout Pakistan as of 1996  
onwards. The UN food programme ended in the early 1990s, which 
caused the commissioner of the biggest camp of Afghan refugees  
then, in Swabi, to issue documents for Afghans that they could go 
wherever they wanted in Pakistan. Subsequently, the governors of all 
four provinces in Pakistan reportedly agreed and signed the according 
documents (interview in Lahore, February 2017).
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Building on notions of entitlement and access to 
resources, the livelihood approach takes up the per-
spective of people’s agency and identifies the liveli-
hood options people use to make their living in a given 
context and period of time, and how they maintain 
the basis of making a living for the future. 112 It is  
pertinent to consider that the notion of livelihood  
involves more than the everyday survival or supply  
of (assumed) basic needs and more than material 
provision, entitlements or access to food. Scholars 
have also included access to social capital and exam-
ined the combination of ‘livelihood resources’ in the 
pursuit of different livelihood strategies such as in-
tensifying or extending cultivation or migration 
(Scoones, 1998). For the use of development agencies, 
these insights have practically materialized in the 
‘livelihood framework’, developed by the British Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID) (DFID, 
2001). 113 Central to the framework is the analysis of 
the range of formal and informal organizational and 
institutional factors that influence sustainable liveli-
hood outcomes. 
extended the notion of ‘resource’ beyond its economic content and 
included dispositions, such as location-based factors, belonging to a 
social community, authority and social status in the meaning of the 
term. In this sense, resources of individuals or collectives enable or 
constrain their access to further resources, with the effect of empow-
ering or disempowering individuals or groups.
112 \  Livelihood research deriving from rural studies revealed that the 
priority of peasants in contexts of long-term drought was to save 
seeds—even for years—until the rain comes back to resume their pre-
vious activities as peasants as soon as possible after the drought. Fam-
ilies split up activities between their members, with some taking jobs 
as wage labourers, some as temporary migrants, other members making 
some money as petty traders, collecting wild fruits, taking alms or 
food from wealthy family or community members and collecting food 
from the distribution points of international aid agencies, among other 
things. All these activities were interim solutions for survival until the 
impoverished and starving rural people could go back to their fields 
and sow the grain they had kept to be able to resume being peasants 
(De Waal, 1989; Gray & Kevane, 1992; Grawert, 1998).
113 \  “The framework depicts stakeholders as operating in a context of 
vulnerability, within which they have access to certain assets. Assets 
gain weight and value through the prevailing social, institutional and 
organizational environment (policies, institutions and processes). This 
context decisively shapes the livelihood strategies that are open to 
people in pursuit of their self-defined beneficial livelihood outcomes” 
(Kollmair & Gamper, 2002, pp. 4-5).
This chapter briefly reviews how livelihood 
emerged as an analytical approach highlighting that 
it goes beyond mere basic needs provision, including 
the notion of a dignified life. Based on the insights 
from empirical research provided in the previous chap-
ters, we suggest that incorporating the established–
outsider figuration as a lens and translocal networks 
as livelihood options—and indeed livelihood pillar in 
the case of Afghans—develops Chambers’ concept of 
sustainable livelihood further by enhancing its appli-
cability to protracted displacement situations. The last 
section examines implications of the elaborated 
comprehensive livelihood approach for refugee stud-
ies and refugee/ aid policies. 
Livelihood as an analytical approach  
to protracted violent conflicts and 
displacement
How people secure their livelihood has preoccupied 
social scientists as well as development agencies since 
the early 1980s when mass migration of drought and 
famine refugees in the Sahelian countries brought 
the precarious situation of large population groups to 
the attention of scholars and the public. With Sen’s 
entitlement approach (Sen, 1981) as a lens to study 
how the great Asian and African famines of the 1940s 
to the 1970s unfolded at the micro-level, Chambers 
first developed the notion of ‘sustainable livelihood’ 
emphasizing that it is “secure control by the people 
over resources that can provide them with adequate 
livelihoods” (Chambers 1988, p. 11). In academia, the 
entitlement focus that pointed to the deprivation of 
access to food supplies was subsequently expanded 
by a broader notion of ‘access’ to resources. Scholars 
of gender studies, in particular, differentiated between 
access to and control over resources, pointing to the 
power relations involved (Gallin et al., 1989; Goetz & 
Gupta, 1996). Later, Ribot & Peluso (2003) defined 
‘access’ as the ability (and hence, ‘power’) of various 
social groups to benefit from a certain resource. 111 
111 \  According to Ribot & Peluso (2003), individuals constitute nodes in 
larger webs of social relations where power manifests itself. These 
individuals rely on bundles of power to claim and enforce access. The 
conception of power resources being bundled in individuals is a purely 
analytical, albeit useful, exercise to understand differential access  
patterns and their dynamics (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 158). Mielke (2015) 
Applying a livelihood approach to protracted  
displacement situations
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Livelihood takes on different forms according to 
conditions and context because livelihood options 
and people’s measures of their way of life are changing 
over time and vary significantly between different  
societies and sub-societies, social classes and cultures. 
The livelihood options of displaced people hinge on 
protective measures by governments, aid agencies, 
and most importantly, on relationships with mostly 
family or community members as well as host com-
munities. Livelihood as an analytical concept hence 
requires an understanding of the context and the  
dynamics in society or sub-societies under scrutiny. 114 
In livelihood studies, core activities and social  
arrangements that are indispensable for livelihood 
security within a certain group or sub-society in a 
certain period have been characterized as ‘pillars of 
livelihood’ (Grawert, 1998; Grawert 1998a). These pillars 
vary according to the special features and structures 
of sub-societies and the conditions they are in. The 
empirical case of the Afghans suggests that the sig-
nificance translocal networks have for their efforts to 
secure livelihood take on the quality of a livelihood 
pillar. 115  
The established-outsiders figuration as 
a new lens in livelihood studies
As empirical research in Afghanistan, Iran and 
Pakistan has revealed, people in protracted displace-
ment situations face the empirical fall-out of govern-
ment policies at the societal and, in particular, the 
community and neighbourhood level. Thus, the rela-
tionships within societies that host people in pro-
tracted displacement situations and the existence of 
social inequalities influence the success of translocal 
networks as a livelihood option, especially for the 
lower class. According to De Haan (2017), social 
114 \  Moreover, scholars take into account the range of available and  
newly emerging options people use to secure their livelihood as well 
as options that get lost or are locked up by particular actors or through 
certain events. For example, food aid only tends to treat the symptoms 
of a crisis but does not lead to sustainable livelihood conditions (cf. 
Buchanan-Smith, 1990) and can even block livelihood options in the 
long term.
115 \  In addition to the discussed lenses of livelihood options and pillars, 
livelihood studies further distinguish ‘livelihood sectors’ (Grawert 
1998, pp. 10-15; cf. also Grawert, 1998a).
Only in 2012 did humanitarian agencies adopt 
the livelihood approach for displaced people and  
refugees (UNHCR, 2012). In this context, the original 
intention of development agencies to establish an  
approach that focusses on people’s agency has given 
way to a highly bureaucratic and technical approach 
that inevitably tends to objectify people as ‘target 
groups’. Accordingly, the livelihood programmes of 
development agencies have been criticized from a  
research perspective, as they are establishing “frame-
works, toolboxes and flow diagrams with mechanic 
feedback arrows and little historical and theoretical 
depth” (Haan, 2017, pp. 3-4).
From an analytical perspective, the livelihood  
approach examines the agency of individuals and 
groups towards making use of available livelihood  
options. It includes the particular social relations,  
attitudes, and culture that are associated with the 
economic activities of a specific social group. Securing 
livelihood in times of emergency involves a range of 
activities of collectives (in some cases, possibly also of 
individuals) within their social environment and 
through social interaction with the aim of retaining 
(or re-gaining) the basis for resuming what the group 
considers as ‘their way of life’ when the emergency is 
over (Grawert, 1998). Power relations and social posi-
tions—bounded by social class, caste, ethnic group, 
gender, age, among others, with varying permeability—
determine to what extent different persons or groups 
can access and make use of livelihood options. Espe-
cially in times of emergency, social groups mobilize 
extended relations to secure their livelihood. These 
relations have been termed ‘livelihood network’ and 
include all persons and collectives that participate in 
securing the livelihood of a selected group or family. 
People’s social interconnections or livelihood net-
works are thus a crucial part of people’s agency  
towards livelihood security. Livelihood networks are 
dynamic and change through shocks and other polit-
ical, economic, social or cultural influences, which  
often have the effect of closing options or opening 
new ones and curtailing or widening networks 
(Grawert, 1998, pp. 10-20; 153-176; Grawert, 1998a).  
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group of the established was more cohesive and better 
organized as they had been together longer than the 
newcomers. Their superiority evolved because of in-
tensive interaction over generations, and the presence 
of outsiders increased social control among the  
established. Outsiders were denied access to common 
activities of the established. The group of the estab-
lished enhanced cohesion by reinforcing markers of 
identity that were derived from characteristics of the 
role models of the best performers of their group.  
The outsiders, on the other hand, were stigmatized 
according to identity markers derived from their 
weakest performers. The established used this differ-
ence to reserve social or political positions for their 
members, reinforcing their cohesion, while members 
of the outsiders were excluded. Over and above, the 
outsiders identified themselves with the negative 
characteristics allotted to their group and accepted 
the established as superior. However, as soon as the 
position of power occupied by the established eroded, 
counter-stigmatization started to occur. Potential 
consequences are conflicts and violence in the com-
munity (Elias & Scotson 2013, pp. 11–27). 
These findings by Elias and Scotson question the 
sole importance of power derived from material 
wealth, ethnicity, education and other resources that 
ostensibly explain power differences between estab-
lished community members and displaced people or 
refugees. 116 Moreover, these insights are gained when 
the dynamics in these communities are observed 
over a longer period, not only with regard to the arrival 
of IDPs, refugees or returnees but also to the long-
term development of interrelations within the group 
of the established, their ways of creating coherence 
and the role the interdependency with the IDPs or 
refugees plays in this regard. Understanding the figu-
ration between host communities and displaced per-
sons as well as between communities of origin and 
returnees can explain why (re-)integration may fail 
116 \  Methodologically, they suggest considering the descriptions by 
members of the established communities of the displaced or refugees, 
the characteristics attached to the established by the newcomers, and 
the self-description of each group. The research underlying this Paper 
followed this approach as closely as possible, albeit with limitations 
due to practical (security) constraints during fieldwork in Iran, Afgha-
nistan and Pakistan.
exclusion as a phenomenon that stems from patterns 
of distribution of economic wealth can be addressed 
through “a layered analysis of exclusionary practices 
encountered by the poor when organising their liveli-
hoods” (De Haan, 2017, p. 6). Beyond access to resources 
and opportunities, power relations and “impeding 
structures” (ibid.) form the layers of livelihood. Studies 
that analyze people’s livelihood through these layers 
can identify the power relations that exclude and 
marginalize certain social groups and thus perpetu-
ate poverty (De Haan, 2017, pp. 6-9). 
This relational approach builds—among many 
others—on an early study Elias & Scotson (2013) pub-
lished in 1965, which provides insights into interde-
pendencies and power relations emerging in the figu-
ration between the established and outsiders. As this 
appears to be a crucial figuration that displaced people 
frequently find themselves in, and as the relational 
dimension has re-surfaced on the research agenda, 
we suggest incorporating the figuration perspective 
more systematically in the concept of livelihood 
when applied to violent conflicts and protracted dis-
placement situations. A closer look into the function-
ing of the established‒outsider figuration reveals how 
the relationships in host communities can affect 
livelihood options. 
In their book on established and outsiders, Elias 
and Scotson (2013) use the term ‘figuration’ for a rather 
solid pattern of interrelations that tends to perpetu-
ate a power imbalance, a sense of inequality, and  
entrenched perceptions of a community consisting 
of superiors and inferiors. Based on research in a 
small homogeneous community, they developed an 
empirical paradigm, which can be used to identify 
common structures and problems affecting much 
larger and differentiated societies as well as reasons 
for differences in functioning and how they develop 
according to different conditions (p. 10). The scholars’ 
observations revealed that power differentials 
emerged due to differences in internal cohesion and 
degree of organization within the two groups. The 
COPING WITH PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT \ E. GRAWERT & K. MIELKE 
54 \ \ WORKING PAPER 2  \ 2018
Implications for refugee studies and 
policy approaches towards Afghan  
displacement
Migration research has established that sustainable 
livelihood options influence migration decisions 
(Grawert, 1998; Fratzke & Salant, 2017). Our findings 
point out that in violent conflict and protracted dis-
placement situations, sustainable livelihood options 
determine return decisions (whether assisted or not) 
and influence the prospects of local integration in 
displacement or after return. With the example of 
the displacement of Afghans we have shown that the 
consideration of translocal networks 117 and estab-
lished‒outsider relations is vital for local integration, 
return and (re)integration in the return context. We 
argue that these insights have implications for re-
search and policy design intending to aid displaced 
people. 
Most research on return and the reintegration of 
refugees looks into the processes and effects of the 
three durable solutions 118 for protracted refugee situ-
ations 119 proposed by the UNHCR. 120 These solutions 
are closely linked to the idea of international law (of 
nation-states) and methodological nationalism 
(Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002) that prescribes clear 
categorizations of belonging to nation-state entities 
(citizenship). This has the effect that support for dis-
placement, return and integration is designed from a 
statutory legal perspective, which resembles govern-
mental priorities in dealing with migration. In this 
logic, the subjects of migration—people who have 
been displaced, refugees, returnees, repatriates—are 
rendered objects that have to be administered and 
taken care of. These particular temporal and 
117 \  While refugees from other countries with long-term war face almost 
the same challenges and conditions, not all refugee populations build 
translocal networks as one of several livelihood options.
118 \  These are: Voluntary repatriation, resettlement abroad and integra-
tion within the host community (UNHCR, 2017). 
119 \  The UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as a situation  
“in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable 
state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and 
essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled 
after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break 
free from enforced reliance on external assistance” (UNHCR, 2004) 
120 \ . Cf. among others Stein, 1986; Couldrey & Morris, 2004; Hathaway, 
2005; Black & Gent, 2006; Bradley, 2007; Long, 2013; Gerver, 2015.
or end up in renewed migration. Considering both 
groups equally and identifying potentials for integra-
tive dynamics within the figuration can explain suc-
cessful (re-)integration (cf. Mielke, 2015a). 
To sum up, established‒outsider figurations 
shape the social interaction between displaced people 
and the host communities in neighbouring countries 
as well as in different (mostly urban) communities in 
the country of origin where displaced people mostly 
settle after return. Even when returning to their former 
community, they will face significant changes due to 
the time lapse or due to new dynamics in the local 
community; moreover, the returnees themselves will 
have changed during their long absence (Warner, 
1994). As the empirical case studies have shown,  
people in protracted displacement situations often 
find themselves as outsiders in the new communities 
they have joined or in the changed communities they 
return to after years of displacement. Securing the 
livelihood in these different contexts requires building 
supportive relationships to get access to existing live-
lihood options and, more often than not, seeking to 
find livelihood niches at the margin of the (host) 
community. The insights obtained from qualitative 
interviews with Afghans in Iran and Pakistan high-
light how legal constraints such as limitations of 
work permits and business licenses and the insecure 
legal status of residency often induce displaced people 
to make their living in the irregular economy, always 
under threat of being arrested or deported. These con-
ditions prevent an equal status and the potential of 
(re-)integration as equals in the community, thus 
consolidating the established‒outsider figuration  
between those who have stayed in the community for 
a longer time and consider themselves as the estab-
lished and the newcomers, who are perceived and 
tend to perceive themselves as un-equals and outsiders. 
The established‒outsider figuration thus has to be  
regarded as a crucial—formative and limiting—aspect 
of the livelihood options of people in protracted dis-
placement situations. 
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offering them and the lower class population in the 
host communities training and skills upgrading, 
thus opening up various new livelihood options. This 
strategy neglects the collective approach Afghans 
usually adopt towards securing their way of life as 
families, and hence, the translocal networks that 
they have built towards this end. The aid agencies 
thus remain mainly at the economistic level of pro-
viding entitlements (often paid for by the agencies or 
through financial transfers to the governments of the 
host countries) and do not provide livelihood security 
in the comprehensive sense outlined above. 
Political entitlements are largely excluded from 
livelihood assistance. In the current policy frame-
work, one of the most obvious characteristics of  
refugees is the fact that they are deprived of the  
entitlement to the status of citizenship, which is the 
basis of entitlements to land, housing, work, property, 
business licenses, education and health services. The 
UNHCR, through bilateral or multilateral agreements 
with governments, provides temporary entitlements 
to the minimum of humanitarian needs. IDPs, on the 
other hand, lose the entitlements to land, housing, 
and property, although they remain citizens. Depend-
ing on their social class, IDPs and refugees can afford 
to (re-)gain entitlements, or—as the narrations of 
lower-class Afghans show, they cannot. 
Our findings point out that agency matters, albeit 
with varying degrees as it is primarily determined  
by social class, and that it realizes its potential in the 
social (translocal) network relations that often span 
continents. Given the significance of self-organized 
translocal networks of displaced Afghans for extended 
livelihood options and, in consequence, a dignified 
life according to their own measures, the support  
of translocal networks and collective approaches to 
secure livelihoods (e.g. targeting extended families) 
could take on the significance of another (fourth) du-
rable solution for Afghans (cf. Grawert & Mielke, 2018).
socio-political signifiers do not indicate facts but reflect 
the context in which refugee policies have emerged 
and are implemented, and they shape the perspective 
of a large part of (critical) refugee studies. 121 
The conceptual approach and empirical insights 
of this Paper contribute to a strand of research on 
protracted displacement that adopts a historical per-
spective and takes into account that in contexts of 
protracted violent conflicts, aid usually declines after 
some years. This means that the lives of displaced 
people and refugees transform; they rely on their 
own (cap)abilities (agency) and might integrate at 
a specific location temporarily or longer, develop be-
longing, become ‘normalized’ and ‘established’ while 
at the same time entertaining relations with their 
family and friends in the origin context and contexts 
stemming from previous stages of forced migration. 
Despite large-scale evidence of such processes and 
the consideration of agency of displaced people in 
several academic papers and books, 122 these insights 
have hardly informed policies so far. 
In 2012, the UNHCR and other agencies assisting 
refugees agreed with the governments of Afghanistan, 
Iran and Pakistan on a ‘Solutions Strategy for Afghan 
Refugees’. One of the portfolios developed in this 
strategy is called “improved and diversified livelihood 
opportunities and enhanced food security” (UNHCR, 
2014). It focuses on training and skills improvement 
for refugees in various professional fields to alleviate 
inclusion in the local labour market and business  
environment of Iran and Pakistan as well as reinte-
gration in Afghanistan. The strategy also includes a 
portfolio labelled “social and environmental protec-
tion of refugees and returnees, as well as assistance 
and support to host communities” (UNHCR, 2014) in-
dicating that the UNHCR and the three governments 
acknowledge that tense established‒outsider relations 
will not serve reintegration in Afghanistan or local 
integration in the neighbouring countries. However, 
the solutions strategy addresses the refugees and 
members of the host communities as individuals, 
121 \  For a comprehensive review of research perspectives on return and 
reintegration of refugees cf. Grawert, 2018.
122 \  Cf. for example, Monsutti, 2005; Muggeridge & Dona, 2006; Monsutti, 
A., 2008; Omata, 2012; Harpviken, 2014; King et al. 2015; Paasche, 2016; 
Porobič, 2017.
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Class affiliations determine the extent to which 
networks enable substantial material flows and sup-
port that allow displaced people, returnees or those 
on the move to participate in the sub-society they are 
temporarily or newly part of before, during or after 
displacement. The empirical data illustrates the dif-
ference in livelihood options of lower- and middle- 
class Afghans. It also shows how assets—partly chan-
nelled through translocal networks—and the 
existence of the translocal connections itself open 
livelihood options and contribute to maintaining the 
members’ way of life. It is pertinent to consider that 
livelihood options of the lower class are mostly pre-
carious. The networks more often than not provide 
moral support and the minimum material support 
necessary for bare survival. 
Violent conflict and political or economic disrup-
tions have a substantial impact on the availability of 
livelihood options; for example, armed conflicts often 
create livelihood options in the shadow economy, 
such as smuggling, trafficking, arms sales, looting, 
kidnapping, joining armed groups as mercenaries or 
as paid fighters, etc. This contributes to expanding, 
perpetuating and exacerbating the violence and often 
blurs the original cause of conflict. New livelihood 
options may open up through special relationships 
with local powerholders who dominate the war econ-
omy. Many previous livelihood options tend to erode 
or become blocked entirely, at least temporarily. 124 
Empirical studies show that even after the original 
conflict subsides, war economies and the associated 
power relationships tend to persist for a long time, 
leading to so-called fragile and conflict-affected set-
tings (NIMD, 2016; Grawert et al., 2017, p. 11). Therefore, 
violent conflicts and their repercussions lead to the 
displacement of large numbers of people, forcing 
them to compete with others for scarce resources  
in safer areas of the same country or neighbouring 
regions or to flee further to far-away countries or  
another continent. The livelihood options of displaced 
 
124 \  For Darfur, cf. Grawert, 1998, pp. 73-77; 199-203; Grawert, 2015, pp. 272-
278; 295-297; for Afghanistan, cf. Strand, 2013 and Goodhand & Mans-
field, 2013; for the features of war economies in general, cf. Ballentine 
& Nitzschke, 2005, p. 2. 
Livelihood studies have not systematically been 
adapted to contexts of violent conflicts and protracted 
displacement. This Paper contributes to closing this 
gap in research. By tracing the specifics of livelihood 
options of lower-class Afghans in protracted displace-
ment situations—via comparison with members of 
the middle class—this Paper has enhanced Chambers’ 
concept of sustainable livelihoods and developed it 
further for analytical application in conflict and dis-
placement contexts. The renewed occurrence of high 
numbers of Afghan refugees since 2015 123 allows us to 
make this a most eligible case for a study of how people 
are coping with protracted displacement inside and 
outside the country, with forced mobility and forced 
immobility in camps, multiple places of temporary 
stay and scattered families securing livelihoods—
among other options—by weaving translocal networks.
The elaborated comprehensive livelihood approach 
defines securing livelihood as enabling a social 
group’s life in dignity according to its own measure, 
thus ‘maintaining its way of life’. The constitutive 
components of the suggested approach are livelihood 
options—one of many comprises the flows that net-
works enable—and established‒outsider relations. We 
have argued that translocal networks are established 
because they offer the prospect of upward  
social mobility, that they can be used to escape vio-
lent conflict settings and thus, offer protection. In  
Afghan displacement, translocal networks should be 
considered as a livelihood pillar, because in their  
significance they are indispensable for securing col-
lective livelihoods of a family or extended group. 
Translocal networks are forged strategically to secure 
livelihood; at the same time, networks form the basis 
and prerequisite of other livelihood-generating activ-
ities. Among Afghans, networks have long been estab-
lished and their number, density and significance 
have amplified since the outbreak of violent conflict 
40 years ago. 
123 \  With more than 250,000 Afghan refugees arriving in Europe in 
2015/2016 (IRC, 2016).
Conclusions: Livelihood in violent conflicts  
and protracted displacement situations
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people hinge on protective measures by governments, 
aid agencies and, most importantly, on relationships 
with mostly family or community members as well 
as host communities.
In the context of the newly escalating violent 
conflict in Afghanistan, increased violence in Pakistan 
and the mounting economic crisis in the three coun-
tries, the option of securing one’s livelihood through 
translocal networks has declined. This has driven  
Afghans who have already been in protracted dis-
placement situations to flee on to other countries  
including Europe and Australia, extending their fam-
ily networks further. Even though large numbers 
were forced to return to Afghanistan, as they have 
only very limited livelihood options there, they are 
likely to move abroad again—to prevent destitution 
or because of renewed displacement through armed 
conflict and (the threat of) violent attacks. At the  
current juncture, insecurity and the lack of a future 
perspective generate a massive crisis with regard to 
the ability to act towards maintaining the way of life 
for large numbers of lower-class Afghans.
Policymakers and implementers can draw two 
lessons from the insights of this Paper: 125 First,  
development and other assistance for displaced per-
sons need to adapt to the logic of Afghan translocal 
networks and their role in sustaining a livelihood. 
Systematic attention must be paid to options that 
support lower-class Afghans in enhancing self- 
organizing capacities on the move and in the dis-
placement and return context. Second, the findings 
on the significance of established‒outsider relations 
show that applying this concept would be another 
worthwhile intervention point to use as leverage for 
support which ultimately enables the returnees or 
arrivals eager to integrate in a host context to partici-
pate in the local sub-society, that is, ensure access to 
land, shelter, education and employment. A move 
away from treating displaced people as objects to-
wards acknowledging them as subjects with agency 
and implementing programmes that strengthen the 
latter in protracted displacement situations is badly 
needed to alleviate the narrowing prospects for self-
help of extended families in securing a livelihood.
125 \  For further policy implications of the analysis and detailed recom-
mendations see Policy Brief 5/2018 by Grawert & Mielke.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ASA alternative stay arrangement scheme ASA
ACC Afghan citizen card ACC 
CAR Commissionerate for Afghan Refugeesy  CAR
CDC community development council CDC
CNIC  computerized national identity card CNIC
CRP Comprehensive Regularization Plan CRP
DoRR Department for Refugees and Repatriation DoRR
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FATA
FIR First Information Report FIR
GoA Government of Afghanistan GoA
GoI Government of Iran GoI
GoP Government of Pakistan GoP
IDPs Internally displaced persons IDPs
IOM International Organization for Migration IOM
IRR Iranian Rial IRR
ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISAF
MoRR Ministry for Refugees and Repatriations MoRR
MRRD Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development MRRD
NADRA National Database and Registration Authority (of the Government of Pakistan) NADRA
NDS National Directorate of Security NDS
PoR card proof of registration card PoR card
SAFRON Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (of the Government of Pakistan) SAFRON
SSAR Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees SSAR
UN Habitat   United Nations Human Settlements Programme UN Habitat
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNOCHA
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 Numeric data on displacement and return of Afghans in Iran and Pakistan
Iran Pakistan
Number of documented refugees 951,142 in 2018 (UNHCR, 2018b),  
thereof three per cent (less than 30,000)  
in refugee camps
1,391,921 in January 2018 (UNHCR, 2018)
Estimated number of  
undocumented Afghans
1.5 to 2 million (Willner-Reid, 2017);  
2 million (European Commission, 2018;  
based on BAFIA estimation)
up to one million (ECHO, 2017a)
Percentage of second- or  
third-generation refugees
74 per cent (UNHCR, 2016)
Number of refugee returns  
(‘voluntary repatriation’ by UNHCR)
920,161 (2002–2014) (UNHCR, 2015);  
6,096 (between January 2015 and November 2017)  
(UNAMA, 2016a; 2017; UNHCR, 2017a; 2017c);1  
1,428 (between 1 January and 30 September 2018)  
(UNHCR, 2018c)
4,357,683 (2002–October 2017)  
(UNHCR, 2017e)2;  
59,020 (Jan–Dec 2017);  
11,735 (between 1 January and 30 Septem-
ber 2018) (UNHCR, 2018c)
Percentage of refugee returns  
born in exile
31 per cent (IOM-UNHCR, 2018, p. 6) 21 per cent (IOM-UNHCR, 2018, p. 6)
Share of refugees returning to  
province of origin
32 to 60 per cent; 68 per cent planned to move to Kabul in 2017  (UNHCR, 2017c)
Kabul (and for returnees from Pakistan particularly Jalalabad) are preferred destinations for  
settlement, mostly for reasons of perceived insecurity, lack of housing, shelter and land in refugee 
returnees’ areas of origin (UNHCR, 2017c).
Number of refugees who  
departed for resettlement
13,765 (1999–2014) (UNHCR, 2015);  
2,082 (between January 2015 and June 2017)  
(UNHCR, 2016a; 2017d)
10,082 (1989–2014) (UNHCR, 2015, p. 2)
Number of deportees  
(forced return)
917,743 (2012–15) (IOM 2015, p. 4);  
194,763 (Jan–Dec 2016) (IOM, 2017a); 
271,982 (Jan–Dec 2017) (IOM, 2017); 
350,122 (Jan–03 Nov 2018) (IOM, 2018b)
19,237 (Jan–Dec 2015) (IOM, 2016); 
22,584 (Jan–Dec 2016) (IOM, 2017a); 
4,106 (Jan–Dec 2017) (IOM, 2017, p. 2); 
2,048 (Jan–3 Nov 2018) (IOM, 2018b)
Number of spontaneous returnees 1,099,136 (2012–15) (IOM 2015, p. 4);  
248,764 (Jan–Dec 2016) (IOM, 2017a); 
194,321 (Jan–Dec 2017) (IOM 2017); 
308,468 (Jan–3 Nov 2018) (IOM, 2018b)
100,042 (Jan–Dec 2015) (IOM, 2016);  
225,470 (Jan–Dec 2016) (IOM, 2017a); 
94,034 (Jan–Dec 2017) (IOM, 2017); 
26,556 (Jan–3 Nov 2018) (IOM, 2018b) 
Main areas of residence of refugees Tehran (33%), Khorasan Razavi (16%), Esfahan (13%), 
Kerman (8%), 30% dispersed in other provinces  
(ECHO, 2017)
Peshawar and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  
(43 Afghan Refugee Villages, 62 per cent), 
Quetta and Balochistan (10 Afghan  
Refugee Villages, 20 per cent), Karachi,  
Lahore and Mianwali Afghan Refugee  
Village (Punjab, 11 percent) (UNHCR, 
2018; percentages from Roehrs 2015)
1 Registered Afghan refugees who apply for voluntary return and repatriation are eligible for US $200 paid by the UNHCR for travel expenses, setting 
up a household in Afghanistan and paying costs of living for about six months (UNHCR, 2017c).
2 “The number of refugees repatriating to Afghanistan has fluctuated over the years and has decreased substantially from around 450,000 in 2005 to 
58,211 in 2015. 2016 saw an increase of over 381,275 returns which was the highest recorded number of returns since 2005” (UNHCR, 2017e, p. 1). 
Annex I: 
Data-factsheet on Afghan displacement
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Iran Pakistan
Regional framework Tripartite Solution Strategies for Afghan Refugees (SSAR)3 
regional multi-year strategy, currently past its second phase, 2015–174 
Operational counterpart of  
the UNHCR
Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs  
(BAFIA) of the Ministry of the Interior of the  
Islamic Republic of Iran
The UNHCR and BAFIA coordinate the refugee  
assistance and operate with “multi-functional 
teams for key intervention areas at a technical level 
and advocacy for progressive policies at senior man-
agement level” (UNHCR, 2016, p. 3). UNHCR close-
ly cooperates with line ministries such as the minis-
tries of health and education.5
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees 
(CAR) under the Ministry of States and 
Frontier Regions (SAFRON) of the Govern-
ment of Pakistan
CAR was established by the Government of 
Pakistan (GoP) in 1979 with branches in 
each province and a Chief Commissionerate 
in Islamabad.
Documented Afghan refugees Since 2003, documented refugees have received a ref-
ugee identity card (amayesh6 card) from the GoI. 
Amayesh cards have to be renewed regularly and 
allow refugees access to basic health services and, 
since 2008, to attain work permits for 87 specified 
job categories (UNHCR, 2016, p. 14). Work permits 
have to be renewed annually or upon change of the 
employer. Amayesh cardholders have to stay in des-
ignated areas and have no permission to acquire 
driving licenses, open a shop or start a business, or 
enroll in institutions of higher education. Since 
2009, vulnerable refugees holding the amayesh card 
have been exempted from the municipality tax due 
for urban dwellers (UNHCR, 2010). In 2016, the 
UNHCR assisted 117,000 amayesh cardholders to 
ensure access to the Iranian national health insur-
ance scheme (UNHCR, 2017b). 
Pakistan is not a party to the 1951 Conven-
tion relating to the Status of Refugees/1967 
Protocol and has neither enacted national 
legislation for the protection of refugees nor 
established procedures to determine the 
refugee status of persons who are seeking 
international protection within its 
 territory. Such persons are therefore treated 
in accordance with the provisions of the 
Foreigners Act, 1946. However, documented 
Afghans are exempted. After, in 2007, a 
one-time registration process was termi-
nated, registered refugees received so-called 
Proof-of-Registration (PoR) cards issued 
by NADRA (National Database and Regis-
tration Authority of the GoP). Besides tem-
porary legal stay, the PoR-card allows free-
dom of movement. The first cut-off date for 
renewal was 31 December 2009. Subsequent 
extensions became ever shorter, i.e., for only 
a month after 31 December 2017 (until Jan-
uary 2018), then 60 days until 31 March 
2018. Since end of December 2015, the regu-
lar PoR cards have expired; they are re-
placed by mere official documents – a copy 
of the subsequent extension letters, which 
Afghan individuals often carry a minimized 
laminated copy of.
Annex II:
Pillars of refugee policy 
3 “The SSAR is a multi-year regional strategy based on an agreement between the UNHCR and the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. It 
was launched in 2012 and aims to ensure the protection of Afghan refugees and find durable solutions for them. Five outcomes guide the strategy in 
Iran: 1. Voluntary repatriation; 2. Essential services and shelter; 3. Livelihoods and food security; 4. Protection and resettlement; and 5. Coordination 
and support (UNHCR, 2017d). By 2016, 29 partners had joined the SSAR (FAO, 2016). 
4 At the trilateral SSAR meeting on 1 December 2017, “the governments of Afghanistan and Iran and UNHCR agreed to the extension of the SSAR fra-
mework for 2018-19. The Government of Pakistan committed to present the proposed SSAR framework for 2018-19 to its Federal Cabinet for conside-
ration” (cf. UNHCR, 2017f, p. 2). 
5 In 2016, the UNHCR operated in 20 communities in projects mainly targeting vulnerable refugees and children who were school dropouts (mostly 
because of work). In 2017, the project continued in 13 communities (UNHCR, 2017d).
6 Persian word for ‘logistics’ or ‘preparation’ (HRW, 2013).
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Education Since May 2015, undocumented Afghan children 
have gradually been registered according to a decree 
by Ayatollah Khamenei. Until May 2016, their par-
ents were obliged to pay US $70–90 in school fees. 
Since May 2016, documented refugee children have 
the right to equal treatment; paying the same fees 
for “schools and other curricular and extra-curricu-
lar activities” as Iranian children (UNHCR, 2016, 
p. 17). According to an Iranian government official 
from BAFIA, 60 per cent of the refugees in Iran re-
ceive education, among them 48.7 per cent females 
(Watt, 2017). Since September 2017, Afghan children 
have been officially integrated into public schools.7 
Afghan students in Iran receive a ‘red passport’ that 
is limited for four years and involves a denial of 
work permit. The students have to pay high fees and 
a high final payment (7 million Toman (US $2,333) 
to get the transcript and bachelor certificate.8 Ac-
cording to the Iranian government, 19,000 students 
are enrolled in Iranian institutions of higher learn-
ing (Watt, 2017). According to the UNHCR, most of 
the Afghan returnees intend to obtain passports in 
Afghanistan and apply for a visa to enroll in tertiary 
education in Iran (UNHCR, 2016, p. 18), which im-
plies that they plan to return to Iran.
The registration and PoR-cardholder sta-
tus has not entitled Afghans to education 
per se, i.e., not in Pakistani government 
schools. Within the camps (Afghan refugee 
villages), Afghan refugee schools were suc-
cessively opened over time, teaching an 
 Afghan curriculum and in Persian. Wealth-
ier Afghan families outside the camp con-
text send their children to private schools. 
The 2005 Census of Afghans in Pakistan 
does not mention education at all. Accord-
ing to the 2011 Afghan Population Survey, 
the overall literacy rate of Afghans aged 10 
and above is 33 per cent, with a gross enrol-
ment of 61 per cent. “44% of the children 
(5 to 14) and 20% of youth (15 to 24) are 
currently studying.” (SAFRON, 2011, p. 13). 
Literacy among women and girl refugees is 
at 7.6 per cent. 
By 2012, of the then estimated 1.74 million 
Afghan refugees, only five per cent had 
completed primary education, and the en-
rolment rate was reported to be 20 per cent 
in primary schools (cf. Muhammad, 2012). 
Other legal stay arrangements Documented Afghans without amayesh cards:
Besides documented refugees, there are more than
620,000 Afghans who hold Afghan passports with
Iranian visas (‘blue passports’). Some of them are
refugees who previously held amayesh cards and
then applied for the visa. Others never had amayesh
cards and have registered in the so-called “Alternati-
ve Stay Arrangement scheme” (ASA). A third
group of Afghans stayed in Iran as undocumented
migrants. About 800,000 of them registered or re-
newed expired amayesh cards when BAFIA imple-
mented the “Comprehensive Regularization Plan”
(CRP) in 2017 (UNHCR, 2018f). Iranian visas allow
Afghans to access services that are unavailable to
refugees such as driving licences, university educa-
tion, greater job opportunities, and freedom to trav-
el out of the country (UNHCR, 2016, p. 16).
Visa-regimes for different categories of 
 Afghans (workers, students, patients, in-
vestors) have been discussed since 1999, 
picking up again since 2006 and are cur-
rently re-enforced.
Since July 2017, undocumented Afghans 
have been able to register for issuance of 
Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC). By early Jan-
uary 2018, 525,273 ACC had been verified 
and were in the process of production, 
whereas another 140,222 were still in the 
process of verification (IOM, 2018).
7 About 48,000 children who were enrolled without being documented could be legalized through this decree.
8 Iranian students are obliged to work in Iran for ten years before they receive the final exam documents. Those who want to leave the country earlier 
have to pay this amount as well (information by former Iranian students in Mashhad, 2015).
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Annex III: 
History of refugee policies9
Iran Pakistan
1979 to 1988/92 1980–1989/92: ‘Open-door policy’ of GoI towards 
Afghans until 1992: Afghans entering Iran have the 
right to stay indefinitely and enjoy the same access 
to public services as Iranian citizens. The aftermath 
of the Iraq‒Iran war (1980‒1989) and international 
economic sanctions have devastated the Iranian 
economy and have exacerbated tensions within soci-
ety. Iranians turn against Afghans as they are per-
ceived to be competitors for scarce jobs, housing, and 
social services.
until 1988: Afghans entering Pakistan are openly wel-
comed and migration and refugee movement facilitated, 
e.g., more than 300 Afghan refugee villages are set up by 
the mid-1980s
1988/92–2001/02 The government of Iran puts pressure on Afghans to 
return to Afghanistan, aggravates procedures for 
renewing documents of refugees and refuses regis-
tering newly arriving Afghans as refugees. The gov-
ernment denies Afghan refugees access to free (sub-
sidized) public services (HRW, 2013). After a large 
return movement of about 1.3 million people to 
 Afghanistan between 1992 and 1995, a new wave of 
Afghan refugees arrives in Iran, displaced due to 
war and the seizure of power by the Taliban in 1996.
Openness without facilitation for the second (1988–96) 
and third wave (1996–2001) of Afghan refugees entering 
Pakistan. Repatriation is encouraged through cash in-
centives and the later recognition of the Taliban govern-
ment by GoP. After UNHCR and WFP end food aid for 
the camp residents, refugees move to the large cities for 
work. In 1999, an attempt is made to subject Afghans 
entering Pakistan to a visa regime, i.e., requiring  Afghan 
passports and Pakistani visa.
2003 The government of Iran introduces the amayesh 
card to register all Afghan nationals living in Iran 
who had been granted residency rights in Iran in the 
1980s and 1990s. UNHCR and BAFIA treat 
amayesh card holders as de-facto refugees implying 
that they are eligible for basic health care services, 
have to stay in designated areas and are not allowed 
to study.10 The card protects Afghans from being 
 denied the refugee status by the Iranian government 
without a worthwhile cause, although they have not 
legally been granted asylum. Most of the Afghans 
arriving since 2003 have been denied the amayesh 
card. 
Between 2001 and 2005, about half a million undoc-
umented Afghan labour migrants, mainly in con-
struction and agriculture, continued to move be-
tween Iran and Afghanistan (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 
2005).11
2003–05: A first tripartite agreement between GoA, GoP 
and UNHCR establishes a legal framework for future 
repatriation.
9 Migration from Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan has a long history, and its size has varied greatly according to political and economic push factors 
driving Afghans out of their country as well as pull factors related to economic opportunities and the varying migration policies of the governments 
of Iran and Pakistan. Most of the refugees to Iran are Shi’ite families, who have fled to Iran because of discrimination and targeted killing of 
 Afghans of the Hazara groups (Rohani, 2014, p. 19). Especially Farsi-, Dari- or Tajik-speaking Afghans were easily able to establish networks and find 
jobs in Iran, as they faced little language barriers. Pakistan attracted Pashtuns in the first place, but also considerable numbers of all other ethnic 
groups, including Hazara (to Quetta) and Tajiks. Uzbeks and Turkmen carpet manufacturers (weavers, dealers, etc.) had no difficulties making a 
living and blending into Pakistani society either. 
10 If Afghans intend to study, they have to return the amayesh card and receive a student identity card (locally ‘red passport’) (interview with Afghan 
students in Mashhad, April 2016).
11 Abbasi-Shavazi et al. summarize, “the migrants borrowed money from, and loaned money to, family and Afghan acquaintances mainly for illness 
and accidents, funeral costs and housing bond – constituting a safety net in Iran” (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005, p. 1).
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2004–2012 2004–2010: The government of Iran changes the 
amayesh card system nine times, demanding the 
annual renewal of the card (for payment) and im-
posing complicated bureaucratic procedures on the 
refugees. If they make any mistake, they will lose 
the refugee status and are at risk of being deported. 
The government appeals for changing the status of 
amayesh card holders in favour of residence and 
work permits (which cost US $70 and has to be re-
newed every six months) (HRW, 2013; Long, 2013, 
p. 210).
2010-2011: The GoI introduces the ‘Comprehensive 
Regularization Plan’ (CRP) and the ‘Alternative 
Stay Arrangement’ (ASA). These programs offer ref-
ugees and “undocumented Afghans an opportunity 
to register officially and apply for temporary visas 
and work permits with the possibility, but not the 
guarantee, that they would be extended” (HRW, 
2014). To obtain the visa, Afghan men without fam-
ilies or family heads have to travel to Afghanistan to 
get a passport and apply for visas. The Iranian 
 authorities continue to encourage Afghan amayesh 
cardholders to return the cards and apply for Irani-
an residential visas (HRW, 2014).
GoP initiates a Census of Afghans in Pakistan  
(SAFRON, 2005) which reveals that there are more than 
three million Afghans residing in the country. More than 
80 per cent do not intend to return, mainly due to lack of 
shelter, livelihood and insecurity (in this order)  
(SAFRON, 2005, p. 7f). As result of the registration 
 process following the census in 2006–07, 1.7 million 
 Afghans receive PoR-cards valid until December 2009. 
Subsequent extensions until 12/2015 and 12/2017 follow.
Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas Programme 
(RAHA) is launched in 2009 and evolves into an integral 
part of the SSAR first phase (until 2015) with the objec-
tive of enhancing the social cohesion of communities and 
of stabilizing such communities that host large numbers 
of refugees for an extended period.  
2011: SAFRON and UNHCR undertake an “Afghan 
 Population Profiling, Verification and Response Survey” 
that shows that 85 per cent of the Afghan households 
have at least one PoR cardholder (SAFRON, 2011, p. 13).
2013–2014 The GoI announces plans to cut the student fees for 
Afghans by half to provide access to free primary 
schooling for all children (including undocumented 
Afghans), and a six months visa extension for 
 Afghans staying in Iran (HRW, 2014).
GoP adopts the National Policy on the Repatriation and 
Management of Afghan Refugees, which provides a 
framework for the continued temporary legal stay of 
 Afghan refugees and further contemplates the elabora-
tion of a national refugee law.
2015–2016 2015: The government of Iran permits amayesh 
cardholders to join the public health insurance 
scheme (which has to be paid for) that provides Ira-
nians and now also refugees with basic health care. 
The UNHCR supports 142,000 vulnerable Afghan 
refugees by paying the insurance fees (UNHCR, 
2016, pp. 16-17; UNHCR, 2016b).
2015: GoP issues “Comprehensive Policy on Voluntary 
Repatriation and Management of Afghan Nationals 
beyond 2015” in line with the regional solutions strategy 
(SSAR). Commitment to extend PoR cards until Decem-
ber 2017.
2015: GoP adopts National Action Plan in the aftermath 
of Peshawar Army School attack in December 2014 that 
was blamed on Afghans. The action plan is an anti-ter-
ror package that also foresees to carry out a census of all 
undocumented Afghans in Pakistan as well as a review 
of Citizen National Identity Cards (CNICs). The pres-
ence of Afghans in Pakistan is politicized as never be-
fore, and Afghans are equalled to terrorists in popular 
perception. Discrimination and harassment increase to 
unprecedented levels. 
2016: From January to December, 381,300 Afghans 
 return due to political pressure and discrimination by 
Pakistani police and security organs (de facto forced 
repatriation).
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Iran Pakistan
2017 The cost of the amayesh card has nearly doubled 
for a family of five between 2013 and 2017 (from IRR 
6,693,900 (US $266) to IRR 12,321,000 (US $372)) 
(NRC, 2017).12 An estimated 250,000 Afghans hold 
temporary residency cards (‘blue passports’) and 
work permits issued by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs (Eqbal, 2017), whereas 35 per cent of 
the Afghans in Iran have invalid, expired or no doc-
uments (NRC, 2017). Adults who have resided in 
Iran for at least five years and prove a clean record 
and possession of sufficient property or employment 
that ensures a livelihood can apply for Iranian citi-
zenship (Iran Data Portal, 2013). Iranian citizen-
ship is denied to children of non-Iranian fathers.  
These laws provide unsurmountable hurdles for the 
majority of Afghans in Iran. Media reports indicate 
that the families of Afghans who joined the Fatemi-
youn Division in Syria, which is affiliated with the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards and fights on the side 
of the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad, 
will receive Iranian citizenship when their sons die 
in the war (Daily Sabah Mideast, 2017).
24 February: SAFRON notification for PoR cards exten-
sion until 31 December 2017 (after Cabinet decision on 
7 February 2017)
Within the framework of the 2015 National Action Plan 
of the government of Pakistan, the documentation of 
undocumented Afghans was carried out by NADRA at 
21 Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) Centers in 17 districts 
nationwide from July 2017 to 2 January 2018. SAFRON 
and MoRR collaborate in the effort; 665,495 undocu-
mented Afghans have applied (IOM, 2018) hoping to 
legalize their stay in Pakistan, though for an unspecified 
period. “ACC cards grant undocumented Afghans tempo-
rary stay in Pakistan, pending their return to Afghani-
stan, to regularize their legal status by acquiring a pass-
port and visa.” (IOM, 2018). 
At the Tripartite Commission Meeting between the 
GoA, GoP and UNHCR on 30 November 2017, Pakistan 
reports on Inter-Ministerial discussions on national 
refugee law and the implementation of a flexible visa 
regime for different categories of Afghan nationals in 
Pakistan as approved by the Federal Cabinet and com-
mits to another PoR-card extension, “encouraged” until 
31 December 2018 (“Conclusions…”, 2017). Visa catego-
ries include students, investors/work, skilled/unskilled 
labour, inter-marriages, health/medical (SAFRON, 2017). 
2018 By February 2018, at least 77,000 undocumented 
Afghan children have become eligible for enrolment 
in schools for free. Remaining barriers to access are 
payment by undocumented refugee children for an 
enrolment card and books. Language barriers exist 
for Pashtun-speaking children; others are impor-
tant breadwinners for their families (UNHCR, 
2018b).
January: Extension of PoR cards until 31 January 2018 
only.
9 February: Extension of PoR cards until 30 June 2018 
(SAFRON 2018)
As of 30 June: 
–  The validity of PoR cards and ACC cards extended 
 until 30 September 2018 (SAFRON, 2018a).   
–  Total number of Afghan refugees (PoR cardholders) in 
Pakistan: 1,394,308 (50 per cent children; 72 per cent 
women and children; 54 per cent male / 46 per cent 
 female), of which 32 per cent are registered in refugee 
villages (UNHCR, 2018e)
12 According to statistics by the Tehran Governor’s Office of Foreign Nationality, around 32,000 children in Iran did not have birth certificates because 
their fathers were not Iranian citizens in 2011 (Alikarami, 2016). For the problems related to the growing number of stateless children (mostly with 
Afghan fathers) in Iran, cf. Abbasi-Shavazi, 2012 and Rohani, 2014.
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   \  Family (wife, husband, child) in Ansar camp for 
deportees, November 2015
   \  Family with three children in Ansar camp for 
deportees, April 2016
   \  Group of elder Kuchi men in Maslakh camp, 
November 2015 and April 2016
   \  Group of Kuchi women and children in 
Maslakh camp, November 2015
   \  Group of Hazara camp inhabitants, April 2016
   \  Members of community council of Jabrail 
quarter of Herat, April 2016
   \  Police officer in Jabrail, Herat, April 2016
   \  Founder of a new quarter in Herat, April 2016
   \  Head of an Afghan NGO in Herat city, April 2016
General information collected from
   \  IOM staff, April 2016




   \  Afghan farm worker
   \  Afghan pistachio picker
   \  Iranian pistachio field owner
Mashhad
   \  Afghan split-up family (mother and children in 
Iran, father in Australia), March 2016
   \  Afghan wives of construction workers, October 
2015
   \  Afghan poor family (mother, two children, sick 
husband), October 2015
   \  Two Afghan students, one born in Iran, one ar-
rived from Pakistan as a school boy, March 2016
   \  Iranian hotel manager in Mashhad, March 
2016
   \  Afghan owner of a transport company,  
October 2015
   \  Focus group discussion with seven Afghan 
transport company Chief Executive Officers in 
Mashhad, October 2015




   \  Young man and his aunt in Tapa Bagrami 2 (Nasa-
ji Bagrami in governorate PD 8),  
November 2015
   \  Hazara man in Dasht-e Barchi, PD 13,  
Hazara quarter in Kabul, November 2015
   \  Son of a former army officer in Dasht-e Barchi, 
PD 13, Hazara quarter in Kabul,  
November 2015
   \ Retail trader in Dasht-e Barchi, PD 13, Hazara 
quarter in Kabul, November 2015
   \  Kiosk owner in Dasht-e Barchi, PD 13, Hazara 
quarter in Kabul, November 2015
   \  Government officer in Dasht-e Barchi, PD 13, 
Hazara quarter in Kabul, November 2015
   \  Journalist in Naw-e Abad, Kabul, November 2015
   \  Youth shura representative in Naw-e Abad, Ka-
bul, November 2015
   \  Lecturer at Kateb University, March 2016
   \  Pump producer, head of branch of Swedish 
company in Kabul, March 2016
   \  Owner of a transport company in Kabul, No-
vember 2015
   \  Class of IT students in Kateb University, Kabul, 
March 2016
General information collected from
   \ TLO staff working with IDPs in Kabul: Shariful-
lah Ehsas, 
   \  Staff of Deutsche Welthungerhilfe:  
Dr Fashid & Mr Berger, November 2015
   \  Staff of UN Habitat:
   \  Stakeholders of humanitarian, aid and develop-
ment agencies during a workshop in Kabul in 
May 2016, convened by Elke Grawert within the 
BMZ-funded research project
Herat
   \  Six boys, between 12 and 17 years old, in Ansar 
camp for deportees, November 2015
   \  Eight boys under age in Ansar camp for depor-
tees, April 2016
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   \  Three other Afghan residents of Al-Asif Square, 
March 2017
   \  Non-Afghan Taxi driver familiar with Al-Asif 
Square, March 2017
Islamabad
   \  Representative/ project director of Sharp, na-
tional office and Punjab, Islamabad, March 2017
   \  Chairman and lawyer, Sharp, Islamabad, March 
2017
   \  Biographical interview with Afghan-origin  
employee of Sharp in Sharp office, March 2017 
   \  Representative of Hanns Seidel Foundation,  
Islamabad, March 2017
   \  GIZ advisor to Ministry of States and Frontier 
Regions (SAFRON) of Government of Pakistan, 
March 2017
   \  Afghan woman/ civil society activist married 
to a Pakistani in Islamabad, March 2017
PAKISTAN
Lahore 
   \  Tajik Afghan shop owner, Liberty Market,  
February 2017
   \  Councillor of Khan Colony (in Khan Colony), 
February 2017
   \  Chairman of Khan Colony, February 2017 
   \  Afghan, Pashtun and Punjabi shopkeepers in 
Landa Bazaar, February 2017
   \  Punjabi carpet shop owner nearby Lahore  
Hotel, February 2017
   \  Afghan carpet businessman, February 2017
   \  Lahore Vegetable market, March 2017
   \  Turkman Afghan carpet traders, February 2017
   \  Three students/ two lecturers of Afghan origin 
at Punjab University, March 2017
   \  Biographical follow-up interview with one of 
the students, March 2017
   \  Uzbek Afghan carpet traders, March 2017
   \  UNOPS risk manager with background work-
ing with Afghan refugees in Punjab, March 2017
   \  Wealthy Afghan businessman/ trader settled in 
Pakistan, March 2017
Karachi
   \  Afghan representative in Al-Asif Square, March 
2017
   \  Pakistani journalist working on Afghans in  
Karachi, March 2017
   \  Uzbek Afghan in Al-Asif Square, March 2017
   \  His father, Al-Asif Square, March 2017
   \  Second generation Afghan in Al-Asif Square, 
March 2017
   \  Tajik Afghan in Al-Asif Square, March 2017
   \  Afghan from Kunduz in Al-Asif Square, March 
2017
   \  Two representatives of SHARP, UNHCR imple-
menter working on behalf of Afghan refugees 
in Sindh Province, March 2017
   \  Former police officer in Al-Asif Square, March 2017
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